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This is a thesis on internal migration in Guyana. It begins by presenting 
a theoretical review of migration. The characteristics of migrants, their 
motives for migrating, the decision-making process which migrants undergo 
and the implications of migration are outlined. Of the various models of 
migration examined the 'expectation of income' model of MP Todaro seems 
to be the most acceptable model with the suggestion that it should include 
decision-making of the family rather than of the individual only. 
The reader is introduced to Guyana. The early history and geography 
of the country are briefly described. Population growth in the post- 
indentureship period (1918) is analysed, noting its changing structure, 
spatial distribution, and the labour-force employment and unemployment. 
Also, recent administrative and political developments and the country's 
post-war direction of planning are outlined and their implications to popula- 
tion mobility discussed. 
Using the data from the 1970 Population Census and relevant data in 
agriculture, rural production, employment, education and urbanisation 
the following observations are made. 1) The social and demographic charac- 
teristics of Guyanese migrants are no different from those observed in other 
Developing Countries. 2) The great majority of migrants proceeded directly 
towards Georgetown, the country's main (primate) city. 3) The main 
cause of rural out-migration is rural underdevelopment which stems from 
the poverty of agriculture, the lack of alternative rural employment 
opportunities, poor rural services, and the more or less universal primary 
and substantial secondary education which serve to dis-associate the rural 
labour force from the land and to raise rural expectations. 4) Although 
rural-urban migration confers both benefits and disadvantages to the 
sending and receiving areas the evidence shows that it is by no means an 
equilibrating mechanism as it is thought to be. Rural-urban migration is 
observed to increase urban-rural inequality. Specifically, it represents a 
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severe drain on rural resources and increases the degree of stagnation and 
level of poverty there. In urban areas it adds to unemployment and 
congestion and exerts a pressure for expanding social and welfare services. 
In view of the adverse effects of migration on development in Guyana, 
the thesis presents a package of policies intended to bring about a reduction 
in the rate of migration and to minimise its harmful effects. The main 
policies suggested are those required to accelerate rural development and 
include a program of land and tenancy reforms which involve the 
redistribution of land and appropriate tenancy measures to ensure that 
those who work on the land receive its benefits. 
To ensure that this happens supplemental policies to land reform such as 
the provision of credit, adequate extension and marketing facilities are 
suggested. Also to deter migration, an increase in rural employment 
opportunities and an improvement in social services and utilities are 
recommended. Finally, some policy directions are suggested as to the re- 
orientation of education and in regard to population and urban wage policies. 
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It is said that most people who write about migration are not interested 
in migration at all but in its consequences. This is quite natural since it 
is because of the consequences that remedial action is necessary. (Sabot, 
1979: 4). If migration had only beneficial effects, as the traditional 
theory suggests, then it would have been a welcome process. But 
unfortunately the effects are not all so. In fact there is still considerable 
controversy about whether the effects are beneficial or disadvantageous, or 
which outweighs the other in cases where both are evident. 
In the traditional theory migration is the "facilitating factor" that 
promotes economic efficiency by rearranging workers to increase the 
national output (Morrison, 1977: 70). This implies that migration 
eventually brings about an improvement in the welfare of the entire society. 
But the way in which migration was supposed to have done this presupposes 
a number of conditions that do not really exist. One such presumption is 
that labour is a homogeneous factor when in fact it consists of "a variety of 
grades" (Berliner, 1977 : 449). Since it is generally accepted that it is the 
high grade labour in a region that is most likely to emigrate, then produc- 
tivity and wages in that region would decline as out-migration occurs. Also, 
since scarce resources such as capital are not motivated to relocate in out- 
migrating and declining regions and since income redistribution and 
expenditure on services are usually biased towards urban or in-migrating 
areas, migration in this sense is no longer a pareto-optimal redistribution 
or an equilibrating mechanism that it is thought to be. Moreover, since 
migration is a response to rural-urban differences in expected incomes, as 
suggested by Todaro (1969), migration progressively disadvantages sending 
areas. 
This, however, does not necessarily mean that migration may not, in 
some cases, be a highly beneficial process. Indeed, as Sovani (1969), 
Elizaga (1975), Li (1976) and others argue, since migration is the efficient 
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allocation of scarce resources it is instrumental in accelerating economic 
growth and development. That the out-migrating areas seem to be 
disadvantaged is the fault of the distribution system and is not due to migration 
per se. In theory the above role and function of migration seem logical, but 
whether in practice this is or is not so, as mentioned, is highly contentious. 
One factor is certain, though: in the interim (if migration is beneficial in 
the long run), or if it is a part of a progressively deteriorating process, the 
effects on agrarian economies can be extremely acute. 
In these economies, due to their widespread inequality, poverty and an 
education system which has a clear urban bias, migration from rural areas 
has two main effects. It encumbers the small modern sector by raising the 
level of unemployment and demanding greater resources for social and 
welfare services. At the same time it contributes to a decline in agricul- 
tural productivity and in total output on which the economy largely depends 
for survival and growth. One typical case seems to be Guyana, a poor 
developing country in South America. 
Over the last three to four decades development in the country has had a 
strong urban bias. Little more than token attempts were made to develop 
rural agriculture and improve rural conditions of life. Education, which 
was more or less universal, has served to dissociate many Guyanese from 
the 'land' and to heighten their expectations - the result of which was a 
fairly high and increasing rate of rural out-migration. 
Considering the resources available and other constraints to development, 
the a-priori assumption is made here that rural out-migration at its recent 
and present rate was and is more harmful than beneficial to development in 
the country. In view of the fact that there has not been an in depth 
appraisal of migration in Guyana, this thesis attempts to do this with the 
aim of enquiring into the circumstances and consequences of Guyanese 
migration. If, as expected, given the nature of the economy and the 
characteristics of the people, the direct and indirect consequences of 
migration are deleterious to growth and development, then a suitable package 
of policies will be presented to obviate the adverse effects of rapid rural- 
urban migration. 
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The thesis is presented in four sections (Chapters). Chapter One is 
intended to be a theoretical review of migration. It begins by presenting a 
brief overview and definition. of migration. It then outlines the broad causes 
of the phenomenon as it occurs mainly in the Developing World. Thirdly, it 
elaborates somewhat on the theory of migration-decision. It outlines and 
examines the various theories and models of human migration. The Chapter 
concludes by discussing the neo-classical and contemporary views of the 
consequences of migration to the migrants themselves and to the sending 
and receiving areas. 
Chapter Two is an introduction to Guyana. It begins by giving an idea of 
its geography and early history, emphasising in particular the early 
orientation of its labour force. Secondly, it presents some relevant popula- 
tion data. The causes and extent of population growth, its structure, spatial 
and occupational distribution and labour force employment and unemployment 
are analysed. Thirdly, a brief summary of recent administrative and 
political and planning development is then presented. In each case their 
implications for population mobility are briefly discussed. 
Chapter Three analyses the characteristics of migrants, the causes of 
internal migration, the pattern in which it occurs, and finally its 
consequences in Guyana. Firstly, -the extent of internal migration in Guyana 
is shown. Secondly, on the basis of the foregoing information on Guyana, 
some hypothetical deductions are made as to the age, sex, ethnicity, 
education and occupations of migrants. The analysis then proceeds to 
examine the data on internal migration and to verify or annul as the case may 
be these deductions. Thirdly, from a variety of direct and indirect sources 
the broad causes of migration are presented under the headings of 
institutional, economic, social, psychological and other factors causing 
migration. Fourthly, the period of entry of migrants is then presented to 
give an indication of the time of in- (and out-) migration. Fifthly, the pattern 
and rate of out- (and in-) migration by population districts is then analysed. 
This is done by positing a number of hypotheses and using the data to verify 
xiv 
or disprove each. Finally, the Chapter concludes by analysing in some 
detail the implications of the characteristics, rate and pattern of rural-urban 
migration in Guyana. 
In Chapter Four it is intended to present a package of policies designed 
to arrest the rate of rural-urban migration and to minimise its adverse 
effects on development. First, as a result of the harmful effects of 
migration catalogued in the previous chapter, the recent trend of decline in 
the economy is presented. Specifically, the reasons attributing to the 
decline, which originate directly and indirectly from the main reasons 
stimulating rural out-migration, are outlined, and on the basis of this a 
package of policies that is considered essential to reverse the harmful 
effects of rapid urban migration and to re-create a momentum for national 
economic growth and social development is presented. 
The Data, Scope and Methodology 
This study is limited to a descriptive analysis of internal migration in 
Guyana. 
Its scope is limited by the severe absence of relevant data, a feature that 
is more or less endemic in poor developing countries. Nevertheless, using 
its limited data base, it attempts to present a generalised picture of 
internal migration and its consequences in Guyana. 
On the theoretical aspects of migration, the thesis draws from the vast 
literature on the subject. Wherever it is relevant empirical studies in the 
Developing World are used to substantiate observations or for comparisons 
or references. The data on the extent, pattern and rate of internal 
migration was obtained from the 1960 and 1970 population censuses. 
Information on the causes and consequences of migration is obtained from 
the author's personal experience as a Guyanese and from his experience 
working as a research assistant for some time on an ILO/IDS (University of 
Guyana) Labour Mobility Study* and from a number of indirect sources. 
* This study has not been completed as yet. 
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Because of the lack of specific and quantitative data it is only possible to 
conceive an outline of the policies needed to arrest and minimise the adverse 
consequences of rapid rural-urban migration. 
Planning Implications 
Due to the unfavourable effects of rural-urban migration in Guyana, as a 
dependent underdeveloped economy, it is imperative that appropriate 
remedial action is undertaken to reduce the rate and effects of rapid 
migration. The absence of such action not only in Guyana, but in all poor 
developing countries where urban migration has had adverse effects, will 
lead to prolonged stagnation, and a reversal of growth into decline with 
severe economic and social implications. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTERNAL MIGRATION :A THEORETICAL REVIEW 
C'T4APTRR T 
INTERNAL MIGRATION :A THEORETICAL REVIEW 
1. Introduction 
This chapter intends to present a theoretical review of internal migration. 
It begins with a brief overview of the phenomenon attesting to its 
occurrence. A definition is given and some of the main factors causing it 
are outlined. The principal migrant characteristics are then identified. 
Although examples are drawn mainly from Developing Countries it is 
thought that the character traits are broad enough to apply in all countries. 
The next section outlines a few of the more well-known theories of migration 
and proceeds to discuss the relevance of the models derived from these to 
migration in the Developing Countries. The chapter concludes by outlining 
some of the implications of rapid rural-urban migration to the persons 
making the move and to both the receiving and donor areas. 
2. Migration Overview 
Because migration has to do with humans it has always been a subject of 
immense interest1. Often, it has been regarded as the process that enables 
man to overcome the "tyranny of space", ... "to correct rural-urban, inter- 
urban and regional imbalances" (Myers and Spengler, 1977 : 11). While it 
fulfils these roles, migration mobilises and re-directs productive resources, 
i. e. labour and capital, to locations where its marginal utility is highest. 
In the process, receiving areas tend to benefit from employment created 
and its concomitant benefits. Receiving areas also stand to gain from employ- 
ment creation and various 'backwash effects'. Given time a situation 
approaching equilibrium is likely to be reached in which both urban and 
rural resources are optimally utilised and incomes would move towards an 
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equalisation. But, however, migration, by itself, is not an independent 
process, a dysfunctioning of any of its component processes can lead to a 
situation whereby migration can accentuate rural and urban inequality 
(Myrdal, 1957) rather than being an equilibrator. 
In the study of migration the approach of the various disciplines differ in 
more or less the same manner as their contents differ2. Social psychologists, 
Anthropologists and Sociologists interested in mental health, culture, 
and societal changes respectively tend mainly to view migration from their 
respective viewpoints. Demographers regard it as locational shifts of 
population which signify changes in the rate of fertility with implications to 
rural and urban areas. Geographers see it as a change in the spatial 
location of population and tend to be interested in the process in which this 
occurs. Economists, on the other hand, tend to enquire into the principles 
governing such spatial relationships and tend to regard the movement in a 
costs-returns framework3, or in terms of the consequences of such a frame- 
work. 
3. A Definition of [nternal Migration 
As a consequence of its multi-disciplinary enquiry migration has been 
variously described. From a purely economic viewpoint, it is seen as "a 
mechanism of adjustment of the population to economic opportunities" 
(Elizaga, 1975 : 402). From a slightly. broader perception, it is regarded ... 
"as a voluntary movement through socio-cultural spaces occurring along a 
geographical vector and includes movement along an economic vector, from 
one set of economic opportunities to an other" (Myers and Spengler, 1977 : 14). 
However, the definition taken for the purposes of this study is that adopted by 
the United Nations in which it is regarded as ... "the geographic mobility of 
persons between areas involving a change of residence over a specific 
period of time "4 . 
Migration according to this typology is not new. Whether by free choice 
or voluntary transfer ... "such movements have characterised the history of 
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mankind" (Kubat, 1976 : 11). Viewing two regions of the world, i. e. Europe 
and Latin America, it will be seen that migration played and still plays a 
singularly important role in the development of each of these regions. In 
Europe, prior to the eighteenth century, migration was to a great extent 
the product of various disasters, i. e. wars etc. Later however, it 
occurred mainly as a response to changing social, economic and political 
conditions5. The agricultural, followed by the industrial revolution resulted 
in massive internal shifts of rural agrarian-based populations to urban areas 
and to centres of industrial activity. Concurrent with the internal move, 
political, economic, ethnic and reasons of empire building etc. led to an 
enormous volume of inter-regional and inter-national out-flows (mainly inter- 
continental). 
6 
More recently, since the end of the second world war, internal migration 
became a powerful and a 'universal' movement. Urban areas of nearly all 
countries in Western Europe received substantial out-flows from their rural 
areas7. Taking the region as a whole, its post-war tabour demands drew the 
surplus labour of the entire surrounding region into 'one vast labour market'. 
With the signing of various bilateral agreements whereby rapidly developing 
economies were assured of a steady supply of labour from those in which it 
was a surplus, and the freeing of restrictions on inter-Community mobility 
have led to an enormous volume of labour mobility within the region8. In 
1976 it has been estimated that there was a gross annual movement of 
between 2-3 million persons and that the 9 million foreign workers and their 
dependents would increase to 22 million by 1980 (Salt, 1976 : 82). 
In Latin America each country has a history of in-migration. As late as 
the early twentieth century countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and 
Venezuela continued to receive large in-migrations of Europeans9. Inter- 
regional movement as has occurred in Western Europe was not as 
important in these countries but nevertheless, there were substantial 
internal population shifts from the relatively slowly developing regions to 
those that were more developed and had higher rates of growth, i. e. a shift 
to the South in Brazil; to the North East in Argentina; to the oil producing 
regions of Venezuela etc. But however, the most important population 
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movement was rural to urban migration10. Within the last thirty years the 
average proportion of population in urban areas has risen from less than 407 
to more than 6070 in some countries which places Latin American urbanisation 
slightly below that of Europe and North America and significantly higher than 
ll 
that in Asia and Africa. 
4. The Causes of Internal Migration 
Despite the fact that the causes of migration or migrant motives may be 
extremely diversified and that in each move several reasons may operate, 
the move, when it occurs, is basically because the migrant has reason to 
believe that by migrating he can improve his condition and that of his family 
(Schultz, 1971 : 158). Such motivations, as Schultz mentions, originate from 
the migrant's awareness of his environment in relation to others within the 
ambit of his knowledge. Assuming that migrants are rational individuals, as 
the studies of Beals, Levy, and Moses (1967) and Sahota (1968) seem to 
indicate, then the move to a specific destination indicates that that area 
offers the possibility of higher gains than origin or alternative areas in terms 
of the specific migrant limitations. Also, since 'gains' are usually 
measured in terms of higher earnings, places of higher earnings or those 
having the greatest urban-rural income differentials are most likely to have 
higher rates of in-migration12. Hence the principal cause of rural (and 
urban) migration to those places is the opportunity or expectation of 
higher income. A number of other variables in which the economic motive 
is central are outlined below. 
In economies where most people earn their living off the land, the 
availability of land is a critical factor that determines whether they migrate 
or not. A number of studies have shown that a positive relationship exists 
between high man/land ratios and the propensity to migrate (Connell et at, 
1976 : 7-8). But however, the relationship depends on the quality of the land 
and the type of agriculture practised. Geertz, in Indonesia, and Fulis and 
Vingerhoet in Thailand, found that there were relatively fewer migrants from 
-4 - 
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the more densely populated villages . In other studies heavy emigration was 
observed from sparsely populated areas due mainly to soil erosion and 
related factors14. Because income from land is usually the main source of 
rural income then the 'poverty of agriculture' in certain areas stimulates 
migration. The inclusion of rural areas in a monetised economy 
necessitates the practice of cash cropping. If however because of land 
scarcity, repeated crop failures, low demand and consequently low profits, 
rural incomes fall below the poverty line then rural out-migration, either 
15 
seasonal or permanent, occurs 
The impact of technology in agriculture has been one of the principal 
causes of rural out-migration. The need for money, as shown above, has led 
to the decline of subsistence agriculture and the rise of cash cropping to 
which mechanisation has been a natural input. As a consequence, the demand 
for rural labour is drastically reduced and is limited to seasonal 'jobs'. 
Rural persons who own uneconomic parcels of land or who are landless and 
depend on casual farm labour are forced to migrate as increasing mechani- 
sation makes them redundant' 
In a good many of the poor Developing Countries rural-urban migration 
has historical antecedents. The impact of colonialism and the creation and 
persistence of dual economies in these countries have resulted in distinct 
regional inequalities and a social structure that is biased towards the modern 
(urban) economy. To this effect, Exeter presents Singer's argument that the 
'capitalist relations of production', employed originally by the Colonialists, 
and the natural population growth in rural areas created a relative scarcity 
of arable land. In the case of Latin America the extreme concentration of 
land ownership was a major cause of rural migration (Exeter, 1976 : 5-6). 
In other areas, such as Africa, the advent of Colonialism has resulted in 
a large rural landless proletariat most of whom have few ties in terms of 
property or employment and have few alternatives other than to migrate to 
urban areas. 
The size of rural families, their structure, family wealth and their 
social status among families in the rural community exert a strong 
-5 - 
influence' on out-migration. Most indications are that migrants tend to come 
from large families (Connell et at, 1976 : 45). Broad based families tend 
to promote migration in contrast to tightly knit 'rural oriented' families. 
Kinship and, to a lesser extent, communal or ethnic ties in destination 
(urban) areas, as shown by Gugler (1975 : 295) induces further migration. 
Because costs of migration to the rural poor are often prohibitive more 
migrants tend to originate from wealthier households17. Often, such house- 
holds, in order to maintain their social standing in the community, 
subconsciously prepare children for urban migration. If benefits from a 
former migration to the family at home are very noticeable so as to cause 
some disruption in the community's social relations other families tend to 
react by encouraging members of their household to migrate with the hope of 
receiving similar benefits 
18. 
The proximity of rural communities to urban areas tends to have a strong 
influence on the rate and volume of rural-urban migration19. Because 
proximity leads to more urban contact, a greater amount of relevant 
information is available. Both direct and indirect costs of moving tend to be 
less than from the more spatially distant communities. Also, rural 
communities within the general threshold of urban influence tend to benefit 
from the superior urban facilities of education, job training, etc. and are 
thus more conducive to urban ways of life and so better equipped for urban 
employment. Thus there is a tendency for a greater proportion of migrants 
to come from rural areas in close proximity to towns - which affirms the 
distance postulate of Ravenstein (1885)20. However this is by no means the 
universal pattern. High urban living costs may deter the migration of 
individuals who live within reasonable proximity, to commute instead of 
21 
migrating . 
In some of the poorer countries present migration tends to be a function 
of past migration. This tends to be so because a substantial proportion of 
migrants in backward areas of poor countries tend to be relatively 
unskilled and uneducated. Because rural employment and other prospects 
seem 'bleak, ' in view of the possibilities that are seen to exist in urban areas, 
the presence of kin or close contacts there provides a strong incentive to 
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migrate. Often, the initial migrations serve to generate 'chain' migration22. 
Even in the Developed Countries the unfamiliarity of urban environments, 
length of time involved in job search, scarcity and cost of urban housing, etc. 
make it easier for the second migrant from a household to migrate to join a 
former. Hence the presence of the first migrant in this case motivates 
migration of the second migrant, if conditions are that migration should take 
place. Thus, the decision to migrate can be influenced by the presence of 
relatives in urban areas. Often, migration takes place from greater 'effective' 
distances, invalidating to an extent the intervening and step migration 
23 
hypothesis of Stouffer and Lee 
A few of the earlier studies in migration hypothesised that migrants are 
attracted by the 'bright lights' of the city. However, such notions are 
unfortunately vague. Non-quantifiable benefits such as "the anonymity 
variety, fast pace, liberality, modernity and the complexity of urban 
surroundings" ... was found by Sabot (1976) to appear relevant in stimulating 
rural-urban migration. Villagers may even migrate for special forms of 
consumption (Connell et at, 1976). Rural individuals in receipt of 
reasonably high rural incomes resulting from higher education and skills etc. 
are eventually influenced by urban lifestyles to migrate. Generally, apart 
from the main motive of employment opportunities, complementary benefits 
envisaged from the wide array of urban services, facilities, business 
possibilities, etc. compared to that in rural areas are additional incentives 
for rural-urban migration to take place. 
Costs of moving exert a determining influence on migrants' decision to 
move and even determine destinations. Connell et al quote three studies 
attesting to the formidable element of direct costs in determining movement 
and destination24. Any reduction of the cost of transport or easier access 
to urban areas then are strong motives to migrate as this increases net 
returns from migration. A number of other (subsidiary) factors such as 
the destination factors of Bogue (1959 : 499-500) i. e. marriage, graduation, 
job offers and transfers etc. result in migration. In addition, instances of 
political instability and unrest as they occur throughout the globe, violence 
of the kind described by Schultz (1971) in Columbia, and active warfare, as 
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in parts of Latin America, Africa and South Asia are all powerful agents 
impelling migration from afflicted areas. Finally, the characteristics of 
migrants, their age, sex, marital status, level and type of education, risk- 
taking propensity, etc., each occurring in combination with others serve as 
motives for rural-urban migration. 
5. Characteristics of Migrants 
Since this paper is concerned with migration as it occurs in one of the 
poor Developing Countries it is considered relevant to present the common 
characteristics of migrants in this group of countries. As such, this 
section draws, to a great extent, on the work of researchers in Latin America, 
Africa and Asia. 
(i) Migrant selectivity 
"Migration is a highly selective process. Migrant characteristics 
usually differ from those of non-migrants ... at the place of origin and 
destination. " (Zachariah, 1977: 127). Migrants are generally thought to be 
young persons who are usually more educated, more innovative, and are 
more prone to risk taking than their origin populations. Also, ... "they 
tend to possess a very keen perception to their millieu in terms of 
cultural, linguistic and potential land use variations. " (Ng, 1976: 185). 
Although all migrants do not have identical traits the similarities are 
broad enough to be termed universal. 
(ii) Age 
Migrants generally tend to be young adults mainly in the age-group 15-40 
years. However, some variations do occur. Migrants in Latin America 
tend to be slightly younger (Browning, 1971 : 285) than in Asia or in the 
developed world where, as was shown in the case of North America, return 
migration is prominent (Lamont and Proudfoot, 1976: 229) and this tends to 
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raise the average age atwhich migration occurs. However , to the general 
pattern this variation is negligible. One underlying reason as to why 
migrants tend to predominate in this age-group might be, as Browning (1971) 
using Latin American evidence suggests, that potential migrants seem to be 
keenly aware of the relationship of age to success in the city. 
(iii) Sex 
While age specificity holds up remarkably well through space and time 
male/female ratio, contrary to Ravenstein's 7th law, does not. According 
to Ravenstein females are more migratory than males (Ravenstein, 1885 
167-235). In the more developed world females tend to be slightly more 
migratory than males (Hollmann, 1977: 358-364; Clout, 1976 : 41). In the 
developing world two patterns emerge. In the Latin American rural-urban 
migration females generally exceed males (Gilbert, 1974 : 113; Browning, 
1971 : 287) while the converse is true in the African (Harvey, . 
1976: 157) 
and Asian migrations (Gosal and Krishan, 1976 : 200; Li, 1976 : 87). 
(iv) Marital status 
The marital status of migrants is related to their sex-balance. The 
further the sex ratio is from 100 the greater the proportion of migrants who 
are single. The rate of migration of married persons or those in established 
conjugal relationships depends on their willingness to leave their families 
at home. In Asia and Africa this is more common than in Latin America 
(Browning, 1971 : 288). Single males tend to have a higher propensity to 
migrate as was found in Ghana (Caldwell, 1969 : 76). In some areas, e. g. in 
India, females feature significantly in rural-rural migration because of 
reasons of marriage, but rural-urban flow tends to be distinctly male 
excessive (Gosal and Krishan, 1976 : 206). Generally, rural-urban migrants 
are 'disproportionately' single when compared to the populations from which 
they originate. 
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(v) Educational attainment and propensity to migrate 
A number of studies, e. g. the Bombay Migration Study of Zachariah 
(1966), the Brazilian Study of Sahota (1968), the Monterrey Study of 
Browning and Feindt (1970), Sabot in Tanzania (1979) and others have found 
that migrants generally have a higher level of educational attainment than the 
populations from which they originate. Because of the overall 'attributes' of 
education it seems obvious that individuals with a higher level of education 
should move or want to do so to where 'better conditions of life' can be 
found25. In fact this movement among the rural educated is, according to 
Todaro, one of the more consistent findings of rural-urban migration 
(Todaro, 1976 : 27). 
In a number of studies there seems to be a clear association between the 
level of completed education and propensity to migrate26. This seems to be 
so because education, in many countries, is a highly marketable commodity. 
Schooling, according to Connell et at, was used specifically in some Indian 
villages to gain better employment (Connell et at, 1976 : 61). The effect 
of educational attainment on migration is best shown by the studies of 
Caldwell and Sabot in Africa. In Ghana, Caldwell found that males with 
secondary education were between two to three times more likely to migrate 
than those without (Caldwell, 1969), while Sabot, in Tanzania, found that 
the propensity of post-primary school leavers to migrate was twice those 
having only a primary education and more than twenty times higher than 
those with no education (Sabot, 1979 : 106-107). 
(vi) Occupational status 
Since migrants, on the average, tend to have higher education than non- 
migrants it follows, according to Browning, that ... "migrants to large 
cities, have ... a higher occupational 
level than the populations from which 
they originate, " (Browning, 1971 : 290). While this might hold true in most 
Developed Countries, it does not in all Developing Countries. In some 
countries there are two streams. Both can even have the same area of 
origin. Those in the stream having higher-than-average education originate 
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generally from higher paying, and usually higher status non-agricultural 
occupations. The other stream is made up of the uneducated, unskilled, 
poor or even destitute persons. Usually this group originate from 'low-status' 
agricultural or wage labour occupations (Perlman, 1976 : 62-66). 
A close scrutiny of the migrant streams shows that a high proportion of 
migrants are new entrants to the labour force, and as such had no previous 
occupation. Due to the high emphasis on education (much of which, as 
Bairoch (1973) shows, is unsuited for rural needs), school leavers find a 
27 
dearth of employment for which they have been trained . In preference to 
taking up rural occupations these choose to migrate. In the light of this, 
Sabot's findings, that the majority of those who leave the villages had little 
involvement in agriculture, seem to have some credibility. 
(vii) Innovatedness and propensity to assume risks 
"If socio-economic indicators alone explain migrant selectivity", as Kemper 
points out, then "all households with high levels of education, occupation and 
living standards would have sent migrants to ... the city" (Kemper, 1977: 
67). 
Since this is obviously not so then other factors determine who migrates and 
who remains at home. To define these 'other' factors is 'inherently' 
difficult. Simon Kuznets, according to Browning, considers one of these 
factors to be the "trait of willingness to assume risks" (Browning, 1971 : 292). 
But risk itself is a psychological variable that is inextricably intertwined with 
age, sex, marital status, education, etc. ; willingness to assume such may 
depend on an infinitely great number of other factors and specific conditions. 
Need and/or aspirations may serve to stimulate this risk-taking propensity, 
or it may be that migrants, being aware of their social millieu, evaluate 
their probable 'situations' in alternate locations and move to that location 
where their expected benefits are highest. 
In view of the foregoing a likely profile of migrants would then be: that 
they tend to be relatively young; females tend to predominate in the flows to 
cities in some regions (Latin America) while males dominate in others 
(Africa and Asia); most are likely to be single; generally they are more 
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educated than the origin population and as such have a higher propensity to 
migrate; and finally they tend to be more active, more ambitious and have 
a greater propensity to assume risks in their quest for what they regard as 
means of a 'better livelihood'. 
6. The Theory of Migration Decision 
On the whole, to explain why and how people migrate is 'notoriously' 
difficult. It is partly because of this, according to Everett Lee (1969: 284) 
that researchers have been reluctant to generalise and set forth theoretical 
propositions. As a subject, ever since Ravenstein made his observations 
and stated his much quoted laws in 1885 and 1889, the interest in migration 
has grown tremendously. In particular, since the mid-sixties, it has 
become the focus of attention to which the burgeoning number of studies 
attest. Researchers from all related disciplines attempted to formulate 
explanatory theories and present models simplifying the process of rural-to- 
urban or other migration. 
However, despite the number of theorists and model-makers only few 
notable contributions were made to the clarity of an overall understanding 
of the various migration processes. From a point of view of their own 
disciplines many concentrated on some lesser explored aspect of 
migration. Thus, instead of concentrating on migration per se, the 
majority of researchers were involved in 'infilling' in which many ad-hoc 
models of migration were substituted for theory. Because of this it is 
difficult to identify a theory that would apply generally and be valid in view 
of new findings. In the existing literature three broad, though not 
entirely separate, frameworks under which migration decision making can 
be analysed are available. 
Following the work of Ravenstein (1885,1889), Stouffer (1940,1960), 
Zipf (1946), Bogue (1959,1960), Wolpert (1965) and various others have made 
valuable contributions to migration understanding, the essence of which Lee 
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intelligently incorporated into a theory of migration. Lee defines migration 
as "a permanent or semi-permanent change of residence", and that "every 
act of migration involves an origin, a destination and an intervening set of 
obstacles" (Lee, 1969 : 285). 
The factors which enter the decision-to-migrate and process of migration, 
according to Lee, are those that are associated with the area of origin, 
intervening obstacles and personal factors. Every area is assumed to have 
positive and negative forces. Positive forces tend to retain the individual 
while negative forces act as a 'push' to the individual. Depending on their 
personal traits (e. g. age, sex, education, skill, race, propensity to assume 
risks, etc. ), migration occurs re-distributing people to places where 
their positive, 'attraction', forces are greatest, or where negative forces 
are least. In addition to personal factors there are 'general sets of factors' 
to which most people react in the same way, i. e. towards higher wages, 
better employment opportunities, better amenities, etc. There are also 
several differences between factors associated with the area of destination 
and area of origin. Generally, potential migrants have more information on 
their area of origin than on intended destinations28. Factors at destination 
and origin areas tend to be viewed differently by persons in different 'stages 
29 
of the life cycle', i. e. age groups . 
While 'positive' and 'negative' factors of Lee go a long way in explaining 
migration the migration decision is not a simple calculus of the positive and 
negative factors. The balance, or the dominance of one set of factors in 
favour of, or against the move must be enough to overcome the "natural 
inertia" that always exist (Lee, 1969 : 287). Lee further introduces the 
variable of "intervening obstacles" which is said to occur between the 
origin and destination points. These vary with different individuals. 
'Obstacles' that may be slight to some are insurmountable to others. In 
all cases distance acts as an 'impediment' to migration. With this 
understanding through the conceptualisation of the positive and negative 
factors as they occur to migrant perceptions, Lee formulated a number of 
general hypotheses about the volume of migration, the development of 
stream and counter stream and characteristics of the migrant. (For 
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a summary of Lee's hypotheses see footnote) 
30 
The second main branch of migration theory can be generally described 
as economic-oriented31. Taking this view several models purporting to 
explain rural-urban migration have been forwarded by Economists 
interested in the role of labour in economic development. Two such models 
are outlined below. 
The first model is associated with Economists of the Harvard School. 
In particular it 'permeates' the work of Simon Kuznets (197). This 
approach 'delineates' the relationship between internal migration and 
economic development in terms of the 'selectivity' of people. In short 
migration is effected by persons who have the ability to 'detach' themselves 
from their rural environment and to 'adapt' to the unfamiliar urban 
environment in response to better economic opportunities available there. 
This distribution then promotes economic growth which induces further 
32 
migration of selected individuals. 
The second approach, developed originally by Professor W. A. Lewis and 
subsequently 'formalised' and 'extended' by Professors G. Ranis and 
J. Fei, is basically a model of Economic Development through the utilization 
of rural surplus labour - thus, in effect, it is also a model of labour 
migration. In the model, the economy consists of two sectors, the 
traditional rural sector where labour is assumed to be in surplus and have 
zero or very low marginal product, and the (modern) urban sector 
characterised by high productivity to which labour is transferred. The 
rapidity of this transference is determined by the rate of capital formation 
and subsequent increase in employment in the urban industrial sector through 
the "re-investment" of profits creating, at the same time, further growth. 
The level of rural and urban wages are assumed to be constant with urban 
wages kept sufficiently high to induce migration. (According to Lewis 
average urban wages should be at least 307 higher in order to induce the 
rural worker to migrate. Lewis, 1954 : 150). In such a situation the supply 
of labour is likely to be perfectly elastic. The process of rural to urban 
transfer is assumed to continue until all rural 'surplus' labour is absorbed 
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into the urban industrial sector. At this point the supply curve becomes 
positively sloped (since there is little or no real income differential 
between the two sectors). Thus economic development takes place by inducing 
Labour to shift from areas where its unit productivity is Low to where it is high. 
The third major theory of migration was developed by Economists of the 
Chicago School and is based on the neo-classical theory of investment. 
Migration is regarded as an efficient allocation of resources. As such, it 
can be put in a costs and returns framework to shed light on a number of its 
processes and functions in a dynamic economy and at the same time clarify 
some of the misconceptions that surround it. The returns or rather expected 
returns, according to Sjaastad (1962) - the principal proponent of this view, 
consists of the differentials in income-streams accruing to the migrant from 
the (expected) 'better' employment and other opportunities available at the 
destination. Costs, comprise of direct and indirect costs. The former 
includes direct money costs of transportation, and initial settling, while the 
latter includes the opportunity costs of moving, job search, further training 
etc. and the 'psychic' costs of moving. If returns (money and non-money) 
seem greater than costs at a location then the resource, labour, is expected 
to move to that location. 
A fourth theory developed by Todaro, that is essentially the same as 
Sjaastad's but applied to a specific context, is considered here. 
Starting from the basic assumption that 'migration is primarily an 
economic phenomenon' and that the individual is a 'rational decision maker', 
migration, according to Todaro (1969), occurs from rural to urban areas in 
response to rural-urban differences in 'expected rather than actual earnings' 
even if high rates of unemployment prevail in urban areas. Todaro's basic 
premise is that migrants (as rational decision makers) consider the various 
labour market opportunities available to them in the urban and rural sectors 
and choose one which 'maximises' their 'expected gains' from migration. 
Expected gains are measured by the difference in real incomes between 
rural and urban work and the probability of a new migrant obtaining an urban 
job. Basically, the theory assumes that both actual and potential members 
- 15 - 
of the labour force compare their expected incomes (i. e. difference between 
returns and costs of migration) for a given time period in the urban area 
with the prevailing average rural incomes. Migration then occurs if the 
expected urban income exceeds that of the rural (Todaro, 1976 : 28-29; 1977: 
220-221). 
In their application to the real world situation, without exception, all of 
the models tend to be lacking in some way or another with some more than 
others. The 'push-pull' models were found to apply in a general sense 
only33. The hypotheses forwarded helped . 
little in clarifying many of the 
vital issues in migration, i. e. the decision making process, the function of 
migration and its consequences, etc. The economic labour transfer model 
too, because of its improbable assumptions and its static analysis, was 
deficient in explaining migration in the dynamic real world and in particular 
in the poor economies of the world. This is so because different economic 
forces apply there. The urban industrial sector is unable to expand and 
absorb migrant flows and this, in turn, is due to conditions that are 
different from those which occur in the present Developed Countries 
34 
The cost and returns framework of Sjaastad and expected income approach 
of Todaro however, seem to have a more overall relevance due to the fact 
that they are not static and the 'maximisat ion of utility' (an obvious human 
trait) is their basic assumption. The following section proposes to 
examine the applicability of the above models more critically in the hope of 
an explanation of migration, particularly as it applies to the poor countries 
of the developing world. 
7. The Applicability of Models in Developing Countries 
A. The Gravity Model: 
The 'sociological oriented' push-pull theory of Everett Lee seems 
appealing because of its simplicity and because of the 'intuitive validity' of 
some of its hypothesis. However, since the basic model utilised is a 
gravity model, the degree of generality diminishes its usefulness. Some of 
its criticisms are that it does not clearly specify which of the plus and minus 
factors at origin and destination are important to which groups or classes of 
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people. In the theory, Lee gave the perception and decision-making of the 
individual "a position of pre-eminence", but in the formation of his 
hypothesis individual perceptions were of "no relevance" (Kammeyer and 
McClendon, 1975: 218), and were lost in the median response35. Some 
serious criticisms arise from the observations of Todaro, who states that 
"the theory has no insights into the possible trade-offs between the plus and 
minus factors nor the range of possible migration responses to the 
alternatives in the magnitude and/or the sign of plus and minus factors" 
(Todaro, 1976: 19). Also, by not specifying the inter-relationships between 
dependent and independent variables within the context of a rigorous 
theoretical framework, he (Todaro) contends that Lee's theory is of little 
relevance in policy making, especially in the Developing Countries. 
B. Economic Oriented Models: 
In their application to the real-world situation of migration the economic 
models are less criticised than the generalised `push-pull' models for 
several reasons. With the use of economic tools of measurement a greater 
number of variables could be introduced into the various migration processes. 
The analysis of migration data benefits from intelligent regression and 
multiple regression analysis, simultaneous equation formulations, micro 
modelling, etc. which helps to elucidate specific relationships within the 
general migration framework. Also, most of the hypotheses were testable 
which was extremely useful in showing the gap between theory, as pictured 
by the model, and reality36. But nevertheless, some models are soundly 
'criticised' for some of their highly improbable assumptions and/or their 
failure to account for certain basic human and non-human traits that 
characterise rural-urban migration. 
(i) The descriptive model - 
Examining the descriptive model of migration based on the selectivity 
hypothesis of Kuznets (1957) a number of discrepancies are noticeable. 
First, the model is too generalised. Although the assumption of utility 
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maximisation is implied it does not specify the relationship between costs 
and return nor does it shed any light on the vital processes of decision 
making. Secondly, the model does not account for the migration of the 
relatively uneducated, unskilled and the rural poor who comprise a major 
portion of rural to urban migration in Developing Countries. 
(ii) The Lewis-Fei-Ranis model - 
The Lewis-Fei-Ranis model can be criticised in the context of its in- 
applicability to the countries of the Third World. First, the model implicitly 
assumes that the rate of labour transfer would be 'proportional' to the rate 
of urban capital accumulation (i. e. the amount of profits or the rate at which 
it is re-invested and which in turn induces further migration). Thus the 
faster the rate of capital accumulation the greater the growth of the modern 
sector and job creation and thus the greater the rate of rural-urban 
migration. But what the model did not take into consideration was the fact 
that the introduction and substitution of labour saving technology, as has 
occurred in most Developing Countries, had reduced the demand for labour. 
Without increases in the labour force technological inputs resulted in higher 
unit productivity and an increase in the total product signifying increased 
profits which was, obviously, the motive of introducing technology. Hence, 
the urban industrial sector operates along the lines of profit maximisation 
which was not accounted for in the model 
37 
The second criticism was that 'surplus' labour exists in rural areas and 
full employment in the urban. Nearly all of the 'contemporary' field 
surveys show the opposite to be true. In some countries there is even a 
shortage of rural tabour seasonally. Also, the notion of rural 'surplus' 
labour having a very low or zero marginal product may not be strictly true. 
Another major criticism is the "notion of the continued existence of constant 
real urban wages until the supply of rural surplus labour is exhausted" 
(Todaro, 1976: 25; 1977 : 217). In most Developing Countries urban wages 
have a tendency to rise. Also, the increases in average incomes tend to be 
higher in urban than in rural areas. . 
Thus taken together, the 
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introduction of labour saving technology, the non-existence of rural surplus 
labour and the tendency of urban wages to rise, relative to rural, in a 
situation of high and increasing urban unemployment makes the Lewis-Fei- 
Ranis model of migration of little relevance in policy making towards 
solving urban and rural unemployment in Developing Countries38. 
(iii) The Human Capital Approach Model: 
Having individual maximisation as the basic assumption, the Human 
Capital Approach model of Sjaastad is a more useful model of migration. 
In this the decision to migrate is put in a framework of costs and benefits. 
If benefits (or returns) are sufficiently high to offset costs then migration 
is likely to occur. Analysis of the decision in this framework explains a 
number of observed. phenomena. It explains why migration rates may be low 
despite the existence of high urban-rural income differentials (obviously, 
because costs are greater). It explains why younger persons tend to 
predominate in the migrant streams and older persons less disposed to 
move. This is so because older persons have a shorter pay-off period. 
The migration costs of younger persons (spread over a number of years) are 
likely to be smaller. Most young migrants eventually settle in the urban 
environment and benefit from the incomes of children etc. 
39 
Thus overall, 
their long term economic and social returns that accrue from their migration, 
in the first instance, are likely to be greater than anticipated at the time of 
migrating. 
This model stresses complementary investments in the individual's 
human capital (mainly be education) which provides a satisfactory explanation 
of the higher propensity of the educated to migrate. ' (It is 
interesting to extend this model to a household decision rather than an 
individual one in which the migrant is sponsored by the family in the expecta- 
tion of repatriated profits as is the common case in many Developing 
Countries. ) 
40 
ountries. 40 One of the more significant advantages of this model is that 
it allows for the crucial element of time to be included in the analysis; 
hence, unlike most testable economic models, this approach allows for a 
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dynamic instead of a static analysis. 
However, the model does not escape criticisms. Gains and costs are 
viewed . mainly 
in a real resource sense (i. e. quantitatively) as the determi- 
nant of the migration decision to the relative exclusion of (non-quantitative) 
variables such as psychic costs, psychic earnings, etc. But according to 
Sjaastad ... "the need for these measures can often be circumvented" 
41 
(Sjaastad, 1962 : 93). 
(iv) The Expectation of Income Model: 
The fourth theory, i. e. that of Todaro, is considered the most appro- 
priate of those discussed, in explaining the factors that determine migration 
in the case of the Developing Countries - and indeed in all countries 
(Greenwood, 1975 : 403). The basic model, operating under the same 
assumptions as that of Sjaastad, incorporates a critical'expected income' 
variable to predict migration. Thus the model departs from the contemporary 
view that migration can be predicted only on wage and income levels in rural 
and urban areas. The main element of the model is that the migrant's 
final decision to move will not be motivated by the prospect of increased 
earnings alone but by the crucial probability of his being employed within a 
reasonable time upon migrating. Thus, while actual rural-urban income 
differentials may be positive (and high enough to offset costs) the expected 
income differentials may be negative because of low employment probability 
and so make migration, rationally, not feasible. 
However, if the migrant expects a low probability of his finding 
employment in the initial period of his migration but is confident of 
obtaining such in time (as he probably will since he will be longer in the 
urban area and so 'broaden' his urban contacts), then his decision to migrate, 
if he does, is still rational, and would continue to be so as long as "the 
present value of the net stream of expected urban incomes over the migrant's 
planning horizon exceeds that of the expected rural income" (Todaro, 1976 
31; 1977 : 221). 
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This, to a fair degree of accuracy, explains why rural-urban migration 
continues in Developing Countries where urban unemployment is observed 
to be high and rising (which under normal circumstances should deter 
migration). In this situation the. newly arrived migrant can expect to be 
unemployed for a reasonably long time but, because urban income is 
usually much higher than rural, when he is finally employed his returns 
compensate for his period of waiting, job training, etc. 
42 
Thus, it is 
perfectly rational for migration to continue even in face of high unemployment. 
The occurrence of such situations is, rightly, according to Todaro, an 
indication of the serious imbalance in economic opportunities between urban 
and rural areas (Todaro, 1977 : 222). 
As mentioned, Todaro's model seems to be the most reasonable 
representation of migration as it occurs in Developing and other countries. 
However, it does suffer from some weaknesses in that it does not take into 
account some of the imperfections of the migration variables in the decision 
to move process. First, a great many migrants do not, or are not able to 
consider all the labour market opportunities available to them since they are 
`sponsored' by the family at home43. Thus the decision to migrate is 
determined by the family acting in both its own, and in the migrant's interest. 
Secondly, the sponsored migrant is likely to have greater 'back up resources' 
i. e. financial support from home if it is needed. This insurance surely has 
an effect on inducing persons to migrate who would not have done so on 
their own44. Thirdly, migrants have been known to have a high rate of 
occupational mobility. Todaro was not explicit about whether his probability 
variable could be adjusted to account for the gradual rise of migrants' 
expected incomes45. Also, it is not known whether dependents' incomes 
affect that of the migrant. Fourthly, Todaro's migration function excludes 
to a great extent important complementary factors such as superior urban 
living and/or facilities as well as a range of psychic costs and returns, 
and the role of friends and relatives in the destination area. 
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C. Some Policy Implications of the Todaro Model 
The Todaro model differs from most models in that it does not suffer 
from the common 'failings' of being of little relevance to policy making and 
planning in general. It has a number of important policy implications with 
regard to wages, incomes, rural development and industrialisation in 
Developing Countries. Firstly, since migration is shown to occur in 
response to expected income it is essential that urban and rural imbalances 
in economic opportunity be minimised. Secondly, there should be some 
restraint on the rate of increase in urban wages in relation to rural incomes, 
since, as the theory (substantiated by empirical findings in Africa) shows, 
the larger the gap between urban and rural real wages the higher the rate of 
urbanisation and unemployment are likely to be. Thirdly, the increase in 
urban job creation without 'simultaneous' attempts at improving rural 
incomes can lead to the 'paradoxical' situation where an increase in urban 
employment leads to a higher level of urban and rural unemployment (Todaro, 
1977 : 222). According to Todaro, for every new urban job created two or 
three migrants who were productively occupied in rural areas may come to 
the city. Thus a policy of reducing urban employment by providing more 
jobs may, therefore, lead to lower rural production and level of 
unemployment. 
Fourthly, because there is an oversupply of urban labour, employers 
tend to use education as a 'rationing device' in employment selection. The 
implication of this is an increase in the private demand for education which 
exerts strong pressure for Government investments in post-primary 
education. Since the observed relationship between migration and 
education attained is strong Government over-investment in post-primary 
facilities turns out to be, according to Todaro, "an investment in idle human 
resources", and ... "is not only bad economics: in the 
long run it is 
likely to be bad politics", as recent events in the developing world indicate 
(Todaro, 1977 : 223). Fifthly, Todaro shows that wage subsidies and other 
factors including minimum wage legislation results in a higher than the 
'correct' or 'minimum' wages which may 'effectively' generate employment 
opportunities, but can also lead to higher levels of unemployment by inducing 
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further migration. Finally, rural and agricultural development is essential 
if the urban employment problem is to be solved. There should be a 
restoration of a 'proper balance' between rural and urban incomes. 'Creative 
and well-designed programmes of integrated rural development' should be 
implemented according to the needs of the particular countries and regions, 
since it is this that is ... "the only viable long run solution to the problem 
of excessive rural-urban migration" (Todaro, 1977: 224). 
To summarise, migration is not a simple response to spatial earnings 
differentials but a search for higher paying occupations (Sjaastad, 1962 : 83; 
Carvajal and Geithman, 1974 : 110). The decision to migrate is presumed 
not to be based alone on the selectivity of migrants but on their expectations 
of higher income and the probability of obtaining employment at the place of 
destination within a reasonable time. Depending on its rate and pattern 
migration, as will be seen in the following section, has a number of 
consequences both on sending and receiving areas and to migrants themselves. 
8. The Implications of Internal Migration 
This section presents some of the general implications of migration. It 
outlines three of the more commonly held views and discusses their relevance 
in explaining the effects of migration in Developing Countries. It also presents 
some of the general effects to individuals and to receiving and sending areas. 
A. Some Theoretical Views: 
(i) The Neo-Classical View 
According to the neo-classical theories of general equilibrium and competi- 
tive market the discrepancy in factor payments caused by changes in the 
demand and supply schedule will result in the re-allocation of factors of produc- 
tion until an equilibrium situation is reached. In the specified field of regional 
economy the theories assert that the inter-regional mobility factor is a force 
tending to level prices for homogeneous factors in different regions. Thus in 
a situation where there is inter-regional (or urban-rural as the case might be) 
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differentials, say in real wages, labour will migrate from low wage region to 
high wage region until a levelling in wages occurs. This conclusion is based 
on several 'critical' assumptions, i. e. labour is regarded as homogeneous, 
a situation of constant returns to scale exists and labour markets are 
perfectly competitive. Also the sole cause of labour mobility is assumed 
to be wage differential, and finally, the analysis is static. 
However, in the dynamic real world situation, and in particular in the 
Developing Countries, it has been observed that wages between regions are 
not levelled or approach such a trend with the movement of labour. The main 
reason why this is not so is that the assumptions are inapplicable and the 
'primary' reason for this inapplicability is that labour is not homogeneous 
between regions as it is assumed to be (see Greenwood 1975: 415). Migra- 
tion is rather selective of the young, the educated, and the skilled. Thus, 
while it depletes the rural labour force qualitatively it has the opposite effect 
on receiving areas. Instead of constant returns to scale, industries located 
in in-migrant areas generally have a higher rate of productivity and benefit 
from external economies, and are so able to pay higher wages than rural. 
As such, perfect competition does not exist in tabour markets between regions. 
Also, wage differentiation is often not the sole cause of tabour migration. The 
previous sections on causes of migration and theory of migration decision 
show that a mix of factors usually influences the final decision to move. 
In addition to the invalidity of the basic assumptions a number of 
'imperfections' occur in the regional economies to weaken the theory of the 
equilibrating effects of migration. First of all, productivity in the agricultu- 
ral sector tends to be relatively low except in the commercial type farms 
which, as a rule, produce for export and employ only a small proportion of the 
agricultural workforce (Elizaga, 1975: 98). Secondly, the terms of internal 
trade between agricultural and non-agricultural products tend to favour in- 
migrant areas where manufacturing and processing activities tend to be 
located46. Thirdly, wages in in-migrant (urban) regions tend to be signifi- 
cantly higher than in sending regions (Bairoch, 1973 ; 30-31). Often this is 
due to direct government intervention by way of minimum wage legislations 
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(Sabot, 1979 : 115)47. Trade unions, which tend to be stronger in urban 
regions, prevent a 'downward inflexion' of wages even when in-migration 
increases the supply of labour. Also they exert a continuous pressure 
for the upward movement of wages. Fourthly, the form and content of rural 
education tend to create a disdain for manual work connected with agriculture 
and to induce school leavers to migrate irrespective of employment opportuni- 
ties present at home (see Myrdal, 1968; also Blaug, 1975)48. Fifthly, the 
range and quality of urban services and general standards of living are 
perceived to be superior to rural. Under these conditions in-migrant areas 
become increasingly attractive while sending or rural areas become more and 
more disadvantaged. The differentials in wages etc that exist grow wider 
instead of approaching an equalisation. Thus, in conclusion, the neo- 
classical notion of internal migration being an equilibrating mechanism does 
not seem to apply in the context of Developing Countries. 
(ii) The Convergence of Per-Capita Income View 
According to the 'free market' economic system, if there is a situation 
of marked imbalance in resources and in economic activity between regions 
a convergence of per-capita income or a redistribution will occur favouring 
the low income regions. 
Using a simple static model with certain simplifying assumptions 
Richardson (1969) has shown that the inter-regional flow of factors may lead 
to the convergence of per capita income. According to this model, by raising 
the capital-labour-ratio, i. e. increasing the flow of capital to capital-scarce 
or labour-surplus regions, the marginal product of capital will fall and that 
of labour will rise. (Thus the theory posits an inverse relationship between 
wages and the marginal product of capital. ) Capital will flow to low wage 
regions where its demand should be higher and likewise a reverse movement 
would occur in labour. In time, the least developed regions that would be 
developing at a greater pace should catch up with those that are more 
developed. Thus an equalisation of income in real terms between regions 
would have occurred. 
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Essentially this is a general equilibrium theory in which the adjustment 
of demand and supply schedules along with certain simplifying assumptions 
(mentioned earlier) brings about equilibrium conditions. 
This explanation too is inadequate in Developing Countries. Reality shows 
that a cumulative process occurs broadening the gap between per capita income 
between the more developed and less developed regions instead of a conver- 
gence occurring to close the gap. The main reason for this, according to 
Elizaga, is that under laissez faire economics the marginal efficiency of 
investments depends on technological change, variations in inter-regional 
demand, and other factors such as infrastructure, skilled supplies of labour 
etc which are generally deficient or absent in poor regions (1975: 405). In 
contrast, these conditions and factors are in the more developed or urban 
regions where they tend "... to perpetuate themselves and become more 
marked with agglomeration advantages ... 
" (Elizaga, 1975: 405). The 
benefits foregone by capital not relocating to use cheap rural labour are 
compensated by a more conducive urban investment climate that gradually 
develops. The urban market is larger, new technology and supplies of skilled 
labour are available, also external economies are present to optimise invest- 
ments. Hence, there is no capital flow to poorer regions except migrants' 
remittances to balance the inflow of labour. Thus instead of a convergence 
of per capita income occurring, as the theory suggests, a cumulative process 
occurs which increases inter-regional differentials in wages and income. 
However some researchers, for example Easterlin, according to Li, hold 
the view that a convergence of per capita income does occur through migration 
(1976 : 83). If it is observed to cause some disparity in the society, as is 
typical in the early. stages of development, it would diminish as society 
advances - regional convergence comes at a later stage (Williamson, 1965). 
This would seem logical since mature economies are supposed to grow at 
relatively moderate rates due to the fact that, in time, out-migration exhausts 
the supply of labour which then becomes inelastic. If this is due primarily to 
low demographic growth then it signifies that the regions have achieved 
balanced regional development. However, it should be pointed out that the 
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above view of regional convergence is likely to be more relevant in the 
developed regions of the world49. In most of South East Asia, Africa and 
Latin America high rural fertility seems to provide an inexhaustible stream 
of migrants. ' In addition rural decline increases as the rate of migration 
increases. 
(iii) Cumulative Causation View 
Observing the trends of migration and its consequences some, for 
example Myrdal (1968), have pointed out that under ordinary conditions 
market forces tend to increase rather than diminish inter-regional inequalities 
and, more important, it does this in a circular and cumulative way. In the 
unrestricted economy market forces tend to concentrate the more productive 
activities in certain localities and tend to increase this concentration at the 
expense of others. This is so for two reasons. One is that favoured localities 
generally have natural or historical significance and enjoy a number of 
benefits. The other, and more important, is that capital tends to have higher 
returns when invested in localities of expanding internal and external economies 
which, as a rule, occur in the 'favoured' localities. In this situation "migration 
and capital and trade movements are the means whereby an upward cumulative 
process takes place in rich regions and in a downward form in poor regions" 
(Elizaga, 1975 : 406). This takes place in the following manner. Expanding 
centers benefit from inputs of technology, capital and labour which serve to 
encourage investment. This in turn further increases income and demand 
which give rise to a second stage of investment. Thus the process occurs 
cumulatively. 
The above view of migration seems to be appropriate in most of the 
Developing Countries and may even have relevance in the more Developed 
World. Seen as a direct effect the cumulative process accentuates regional 
differentials. Rural industries, unable to face urban competition, decline 
while migration aids the growth of urban by creaming-off rural labour, 
capital and other resources and by increasing demand. Thus in a regional 
sense, urbanisation and metropolisation is accompanied by rural stagnation 
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and decline. But from a national point of view the centralisation of productive 
resources that migration brings about may be highly beneficial, especially 
in poor Developing Countries such as Guyana and in many other Latin American, 
African and Asian countries. In these countries the few productive resources 
that are available are dispersed. In this situation the total national output is 
likely to be lower than if some degree of migration and centralisation of 
productive resources were to occur. Theoretically, if there is an efficient 
system of redistribution of the benefits of centralisation then a lowering of 
regional differentials can occur, in which case migration is beneficial to both 
receiving and sending areas. However, the system of redistribution in 
Developing Countries is, in most cases, ineffective, which results in the 
mal-distribution of benefits accruing from migration. Thus in conclusion, 
although migration may be beneficial to the national economy by way of 
increasing national product it does so at the cost of increasing the differen- 
tials between regions. Depending on the nature of the economy, the long term 
effects of this might offset many of the benefits due to migration. 
The following is a brief mention of some of the private returns to migra- 
tion and some of the general effects on sending and receiving areas. 
B. Private Returns of Migration 
Whether migrants are compared to non-migrants at home or to natives 
at destination they generally tend to improve themselves economically 
50 
(Morrisson, 1977) . Despite high and rising unemployment in urban places 
(and some marginalisation or bias that they face) most migrants find some 
employment within a reasonable time (Perlman, 1976; Yap, 1975)31. Since 
income levels depend largely on level of education attained as reported by 
Sabot (1979), Gugler (1976), and Caravajal and Geithman (1974) migrants 
with high levels of education have the highest income among migrant groups. 
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But due to the diversity of employment opportunities and scope that exist in 
urban areas even those with lower levels of education and skills manage to 
increase their income in time. One way in which migrants increase their 
income is by increasing their human capital stock by means of acquisition of 
higher education and skills. Harris and Todaro (1970) note a queueing 
process by those unemployed and in the informal market to enter the higher 
paying and more prestigious formal sector, which attests to the constant 
striving by migrants to improve themselves economically and socially. Many 
migrants are able to spread their income gains to their sending households by 
way of remittances (Sabot, 1979; Connell et at, 1976). In many cases 
migrants benefit from their dependents' incomes (Kemper, 1977). Finally, 
migrants enjoy many non-job benefits of the increased real incomes they attain 
by migrating (Rothenberg, 1977). Also they benefit from better urban utilities. 
Urban housing, health care, education and recreation facilities are often far 
52 
superior to rural 
C. General Effects of Migration on Sending and Receiving Areas 
The effects of migration depend on the rate and character of the migrants 
and that of the sending and receiving areas. Due to the range of effects 
(occurring as a benefit or cost) only those that apply generally are presented 
here. 
First, is that migration has a number of demographic effects on both 
the sending and the receiving areas. Because it is selective of the younger 
age groups of between 15 and 40 years rural-sending areas are being left with 
an increasing proportion of the young and aged in their populations. This 
increases the dependency burden on those in the economic labour force and 
on rural welfare services wherever such happen to be present, while it has 
the opposite effect on in-migrant (urban) areas. Migration influences the 
rate of population growth. In sending areas it tends to depress the rate of 
growth. It does this in three ways: it delays the age of marriage; where 
it results in the unbalancing of male-female ratios a lowering of the birth 
rate occurs (Davis, 1977 : 160; Connell et at, 1976 : 140); and it transfers 
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population from rural areas of high fertility to urban where it is lower 
(Standing, 1976). On the other hand, in in-migrant areas a high rate of in- 
migration tends to inflate the rate of population increase. 
Secondly, because migration is selective it deprives rural areas of the 
cream of their population resource. The loss of the educated represents a 
direct loss of investments made on education. It is also an indirect loss since 
sending areas cannot tax the high incomes of this group in order to recoup 
some of its investment costs. However, the loss of the educated may be an 
indirect benefit to those remaining. According to Greenwood, this loss has a 
"positive pecuniary spillover effect" to those remaining due to the fact that 
the labour supply is lower than it would otherwise be. All remaining persons 
with less education should find an "upward pressure" exerted on their wages 
while those with more education do not have a "downward pressure" exerted 
on theirs (1975 : 415). But it should be noted that the presumption of this 
gain predicates the fact that those out-migrating were fully employed, and 
that their out-migration would reduce the pressure on employment. In most 
of the Developing Countries there is a substantial degree of unemployment 
among the educated at their place of origin. Also, their out-migration creates 
little perceivable impact on the wages of those remaining due to the high 
fertility existing there. While the out-migration of the skilled and educated 
is a loss to rural areas it is an obvious gain to urban, as will be seen later. 
Thirdly, migration may affect employment levels in sending and receiving 
areas. Due to the selective out-migration of the young, the skilled and the 
educated rural areas become less attractive to new industries that require a 
large supply of skilled workers. Only marginal firms paying low wages are 
likely to be located there (Morrisson, 1977 : 70). On the other hand, the 
flow of these persons to urban areas is most likely to stimulate industrial 
expansion and to create additional employment opportunities: "... Migration 
and employment growth have been known to perpetuate each other" (Morrisson, 
1977 : 69). But it may not be so in all cases. Where the rate of in-migration 
is excessive and beyond the absorptive capacity of urban industry and other 
employment avenues it may cause a disequilibrium in the urban labour market 
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resulting in a rise in unemployment or "over unemployment". The conse- 
quences of this are that wages may decline, relatively, in the unregulated 
sector53 and the period of job search and costs involved are likely to be 
higher for both migrants and non-migrants. 
Fourthly, out-migration may have serious implications on the level of 
productivity and on total rural production. It may either cause a rise or a 
lowering of productivity but, in both cases, total production is likely to 
decline relative to population growth. This is likely to happen in either of 
two ways. Where migration reduces the pressure on land a lessening of 
fragmentation and even some consolidation of uneconomic parcels may occur. 
This in turn is conducive to mechanisation which, while it may increase the 
productivity of the fewer workers on the land, decreases production per acre 
(Sukdeo, 1977: see also Raj, 1973 and Dumont, 1963). The other way in 
which migration may affect productivity, and hence total production, is that 
if the rate of out-migration of farmers and farm workers is high the resultant 
labour shortage causes a shift from the usual intensive cropping pattern to 
extensive cropping. Other changes that the loss of labour may cause include 
a change of the crop type or even a fall in the acreage cultivated as reported 
by Connell et at (1976: 143). Thus, in this case too, migration causes a 
lowering of productivity per acre and total production. Since most of the 
Developing Countries depend on the land for supplies of food and raw materials 
for industry then, by lowering production, migration may have serious conse- 
quences on the level of nutrition and industrial growth in these countries. To 
economies that depend largely on the export of agricultural raw materials 
54 
its consequences may be even more critical 
Fifthly, despite their marginalisation rural areas do receive some bene- 
fits from the out-migration of some of their population. The most evident is 
the receipt of cash remittances. The extent of this income and the regularity 
of its flow to the recipient communities depends on three factors: the nature 
of the migration decision, the purpose of migration, and whether the migrant 
returns or not. In many cases the impact of remittances on communities of 
origin is not very noticeable as most of it tends to be consumed in "everyday 
- 31 - 
household needs or in conspicuous expenditure" ( Connell et at, 1976: 98; 
Caldwell, 1969: 163). In some others it may be used in major expenditure 
such as the purchase of land or building of a house or to educate children, or 
even as wages to village labourers to compensate for the loss of the migrants' 
labour. 
Apart from direct economic benefits, migration affects the rate of social 
change and the social organisation of a society. By migrating the cultural 
values, norms and goals of migrants change, affecting themselves as well as 
their places of origin and destination (Kosinski and Prothero, 1976 : 11-12). 
Places of destination have the benefit of extracting 'desirable influences' from 
the diversity of cultures that migrants bring. A rapid inflow of migrants to 
the urban labour market may allow some occupational mobility of the origin 
population. To the sending communities migration may have an even more 
significant effect. Former migrants are usually the main source of informa- 
tion feedback (Mabagunje, 1968). Such information that they might send may 
trigger off a chain of reactions in the sending communities. Often, return 
migrants act as agents of modernisation and diffusion among the sedented, 
and so accelerate the pace of social change°. Also, they fulfil roles as 
innovators and as agents of economic change. Connell et at reviews a 
number of studies in which return migrants were instrumental in causing a 
major economic change such as a shift from subsistence to cash cropping 
(1976 : 132-133). Another effect of migration on sending areas is that any 
remittances sent by migrants are likely to contribute to the 'increased 
monetisation' and to draw those communities into the urban monetary nexus 
(Standing, 1976 ; 4). However, not all migrant influences are desirable. 
Frequently the diversity of cultures that migrants bring may be a cause of 
conflict (see Midgett, 1975; also Sutton and Makiesky, 1975). By accelera- 
ting the pace of change migration may have a destabilising effect on the social 
organisation and control in rural communities. 
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CHAPTER Ii 
AID INTRODUCTION TO GUYANA 
CHAPTER II 
INTRODUCTION TO GUYANA 
1. Introduction 
This chapter is intended to provide an introduction to Guyana and the 
present social, political and economic setting in which rural out-migration 
occurs. It begins by presenting relevant geographical and historical 
information on the country - and to show how some of the early Colonial and 
Plantation policies have led to ruralising the population in the first instance, 
and to later cause a rural-to-urban drift. It presents a brief analysis of 
population growth in the country and the characteristics of the population 
which, to a great extent, determines migration. The chapter concludes by 
outlining the major post-war political, administrative and planning 
developments and their implications 'to migration in Guyana. 
2. Geography and Natural Resources 
Guyana is the only English speaking country in the South American 
continent. It lies just north of the equator - between 1 and 90 latitude and 
between 57 and 610 west longitude. In area extent it is 83,000 square miles. 
Geologically, the country is part of the old precambrian Guiana shield, 
the denudation of which influenced its topography. In terms of areal 
differentiation the country divides roughly into four natural regions. (See 
Maps I and II in Appendix). The climate is tropical equatorial with the sea 
coast being tempered by the cooling North-East trade winds that blow across 
the coastlands from the Atlantic. Relative humidity tends to correlate with 
the wet and dry seasons, but generally it is high throughout the country. 
There is a small diurnal and seasonal variation in temperature. Mean 
temperature on the coast is in the vicinity of 80-850F. Much of the rainfall 
occurs in two seasons -a long wet season lasting from May to mid-August 
in which an approximate of 45% of rain falls, and a short wet season 
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lasting from December to mid-February in which one quarter of annual rain- 
fall occurs. Average rainfall on the coast where 90% of the population is 
located is about 60-80" annually compared to 120-140" in the interior highlands. 
(See Map III in the Appendix). Despite, at times, heavy cloud cover, there 
is an average of 6-8 hours of (bright) sunshine daily. 
Once linked with gold and the riches of the fabled El Dorado, Guyana has, 
apart from abundant sunshine, rainfall, and lush vegetation, a number of 
mineral and non-mineral resources of which only a small portion has been 
exploited to date1. 
The coastal soils comprise fluvio-marine and alluvial deposits and are 
generally good to moderate for agriculture. However, because of their 
clayey and silty nature the soils have poor natural drainage and require high 
investments in drainage systems before agriculture could be profitably 
undertaken. The interior soils tend'to be poor-to-moderate for agriculture2 
In some areas, i. e. in the North West Region, soils tend to be peaty and 
swampy requiring large inputs of fertilizer to make agriculture feasible. 
In other Interior Areas pockets of deep, well drained, sandy soils can be 
found which with fertilizer and conservation practices can easily be adapted 
for agricultural use, but basic infrastructure, i. e. roads etc. , to the 
interior are lacking. In terms of the extent of this resource only a small 
percentage is productively utilised. 
Forests cover nearly 87% of the country (47 million acres) but the 
contribution of forestry to the economy is minimal. On average it 
contributes about 1% of the country's GDP and between 1 to 2% of total 
export by value3. The main reasons for its relatively insignificant role are 
that the stands of forests are usually of mixed hardwoods of which only a 
few species are commercially marketable. World demand is for softwoods. 
Thus the forests of Guyana are subjected to selective felling of only the high 
demand species, which keeps the costs of extraction high and is at the same 
time a wasteful use of a valuable resource. 
Guyana has no known source of natural fuel or commercially exploitable 
high-demand mineral ores except for bauxite and some other lower-demand 
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mineral ores, i. e. kaolin etc. Bauxite ores of a fairly high grade occur 
within reasonable proximity to the coast but deposits are usually overlain by 
thick forests and deposits of sand and clay, the removal of which is expensive 
and prevents rapid exploitation of the resource. Gold, diamonds and other 
precious and semi-precious metals and minerals are mined in small 
quantities. Of the lesser important, in terms of unit value, ores - laterites, 
stone, clays and sand are extracted mainly for local use. 
Indigenously, Guyana is known as the 'Land of many waters'. In many 
cases 'the many waters' - rivers, have been regarded both as a hindrance 
and an aid to development. Three huge river systems divide the country 
into three physically separate zones or counties, which results in a certain 
degree of isolation and higher transport and other costs between them. On 
the other hand the rivers have facilitated easy access to the interior 
regions in the absence of roads, and most of all, the rapid stream flow and 
the geomorphology of the land result in numerous rapids and waterfalls 
which have been recognised as potential sources of hydro-power generation. 
3. Early Settlement and Labour Force Orientation 
Little is known of the pre-history of Guyana apart from the fact that 
around 900 AD it was settled by groups of Cariban and Arawakan tribes who 
lived by hunting, fishing and by a culture of shifting agriculture. To the 
Europeans the country did not arouse interest until the end of the sixteenth 
century although the coast was known some one hundred years before. 
The Dutch, under a Charter to the West India Company of the Netherlands, 
were the first 'effective' European occupiers. They settled in riverain 
areas of Essequibo and Berbice rivers, cultivated plantation crops and set 
up fortifications for defence purposes. By the beginning of the eighteenth 
century settlements began to spread down-river and on the sea-coast. This 
was so for three main reasons. First, the interior soils were of limited 
fertility. Second, was that there was a period of stability in European 
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relations which meant settlements were not threatened with bombardment 
and thus no need for locating in inaccessible (to the enemy) interior areas. 
Thirdly, more land was needed for the cultivation of sugar which had 
replaced coffee and cotton as high demand crops in Europe. Not only 
riverain settlements moved to the coast. Settlers in the smaller 
Caribbean Islands beginning to experience a shortage of land were lured to 
Guyana's coastlands by its alleged fertility, its cheap transport system4, 
and the non-occurrence of hurricanes. The British were most responsive and 
soon they outnumbered the original (Dutch) settlers. 
The period 1781-1803 was a turbulent one in Guyana's history. The 
country changed hands of ownership no less than six times before it 
finally remained in British ownership from 1803 until 1966 when it gained 
independent status from Britain. 
The British reconquest of Guyana in 1796 set off, according to Adamson, 
"the most feverish decade of speculation and expansion in the country's 
history ... A flood of newcomers 
looking for instant wealth poured into the 
country". (Adamson, 1972: 24). Most were planters from the West Indian 
Islands who brought their slaves with them. For a short period Guyana was 
the greatest cotton producer in the world and the greatest coffee grower in 
the British Empire (Adamson, 1972 ; 25), but competition and various 
trade policies ended the boom 
o. 
The high profits obtained by the Colonists producing sugar, cotton and 
coffee were due to free slave labour which was the base of the 18th century 
Colonial agriculture. Plantation work was generally labour intensive, thus 
when the emancipation of slavery in 1933 occurred it spelt doom for many 
Planters. In many cases the number of slaves on a plantation was a 
reflection of its wealth. After 1938 many ex-slaves elected to leave the 
scene of their recent servitude and to establish plantations and farms of 
their own, or to move to urban areas where they could expect employment 
on the ports. This meant that many Sugar Planters went bankrupt. They 
could not readily accept a change in their circumstances. Freedom of the 
slaves meant an end to high profits and a sharp decline in their social 
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position in the colony. Because of this it would have been prudent, on their 
part, if they had, with tact and diplomacy, wooed ex-slaves to remain on 
the plantations as wage-labourers. But this was not so. The apprenticeship 
period was said to be the hardest in Guyana, taking the Caribbean as a whole, 
as Planters tried to extract as much labour from the negroes as they possibly 
could (Burns, 1937 : 363). 
The harsh treatment in their last years of slavery and a number of 
activities and restrictions imposed on the newly freed slaves accelerated 
their exodus from the plantations. They could not retain their estate 
lodgings if they were not prepared to engage in wage labour - at wages set 
by Planters. Some Planters deliberately destroyed negro provision 'grounds' 
and fruit trees so as to make them dependent on estate wages to purchase 
food. (See Adamson, 1972 : 35). Since negroes could not erect their 
private dwellings or use estate lands to grow food they had to migrate. By 
1948, only ten years after emancipation, only 20,000 negroes or one quarter 
of the original slave population remained on the plantations. 
In leaving the estates the negroes had to contend with forces that tended 
to undermine and to some degree negate their full freedom. Although 
unutilised crown land was abundant in the colony the Planters'-controlled 
Legislature and the Colonial Office intervened to control the sale of land and 
prevent the rise of an independent peasantry as a strategy of controlling the 
labour market to their benefit. Crown lands were sold only in blocs at 
exorbitant prices. However, by pooling their resources groups of negroes 
were able to buy abandoned plantations and set up communal villages. (See 
Adamson, 1972: 35-36). Others managed to buy small plots and set up 
peasant proprietary villages along the coast. Those who remained on the 
estates or settled in the environs worked on the sugar estates. These had no 
bargaining power. Wages were always set by the Planter-employers and 
as such were very low. In addition Planters manipulated price increases 
for essential food and consumer items which had to be imported since they 
actively hindered the development of indigenous substitutes. Thus workers 
were made dependent on wages for sustenance6, and the plantation, by 
employing subtle means, secured a supply of cheap labour. 
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The above situation could not continue indefinitely. Increasingly, the 
negroes drifted away from the plantations. To fill the labour shortage 
created by their withdrawal the Sugar Planters resorted to immigrant labour. 
The first flows were from the West Indies, Africa and Madeira but these 
were small compared to the later flow from India (see Table 2 in text). 
Indian 'Coolie' labour proved suitable for the plantation needs. However, 
their arrival in large numbers aroused feelings of hostility among the 
negroes. They changed a situation of labour shortage into one of labour 
surplus. Wages declined and more negroes out-migrated7. East Indians, 
because they were contracted, had to remain on the plantation site. 
The Indian Coolie too found life on the plantations intolerable. Conditions 
were very different from that portrayed by recruiting agents in Calcutta and 
Madras. Most being illiterate felt cheated by the clauses and the interpreta- 
tion of their contracts. Many came from urban backgrounds and were 
unused to arduous field labour. Their employers added to their dissatisfac- 
tion by using every guile to extend their period of contract (Adamson, 1972 
50-56)8 . At the completion of their stipulated terms of work some of the 
immigrants returned to India - but many opted to purchase small parcels of 
land and settle. In rnanycases all such land was only available within 
the environs of the sugar plantations. Also, saleable land was made 
extremely expensive which meant that only a few were able to purchase 
economic sized plots, hence many had to indulge in seasonal employment 
to supplement meagre farm incomes. 
Thus by immigration the Colonists solved their immediate labour needs 
and by overt and covert Government policies were able to direct the 
settlement of the rural population in the vicinity of sugar plantations. To 
ttiose who moved away from the estate environs and settled in rural villages 
along the coast, other policies were directed against them with the implicit 
intention of making them dependent on estate wage labour. Land for 
settlement and expansion of their food and cash crops were not easily 
available. In cases where land could be bought it was always at high prices 
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and was always marginal land subjected to the ravages of the sea or 
9 inundation from floods. Estate workers who owned land or property were 
subjected to subtle pressures to give up their private ventures and to 
'dedicate' themselves to estate employment. 
By pursuing policies such as the above the Colonial Administration and 
the Planters were largely successful. Apart from the slow drift of negroes, 
creoles and a few Indians to the two main towns, the majority of the 
population was still rural and most of this population was located on the 
sugar estate or its environs. The few who lived away from the Estate's 
'sphere of influence' practised peasant farming at a slightly-higher-than 
subsistence level. Those who lived within the Estate were more or less 
completely dominated by the 'Estate mentality', i. e. their lives were wrapped 
around the sugar estate. It offered employment for themselves and their 
children. Even if wages were just enough to 'keep body and soul together' 
the surety of employment was an opiate to which they succumbed and held on. 
During this time, particularly since the end of indentureship, the labour 
force had been undergoing a rapid change both in structure and orientation 
to employment. An increasing proportion of women withdrew from the 
labour force. The proportion of adults in the working ages declined. More 
attention was on schooling which delayed entry for some. On the whole, the 
labour force was beginning to have a different orientation towards employ- 
ment. Those seeking employment were selective in the type of 
employment entered. Higher class, i. e. mainly non-manual labour, was 
preferred to manual labour. Field labour on the sugar estates or in rice 
fields was regarded with distaste10. In complement to this, schooling 
became important as it was seen as the only way for children to escape a 
life of drudgery and toil11. The drive for education was self-generative in 
a sense that increased awareness which was both a function of and a result 
of education. Because the education system in Guyana is not oriented 
towards rural needs school leavers had to migrate to urban areas where 
the probability of obtaining employment to commensurate with their level 
12 
of education attained was highest 
- 39 - 
Also rural areas, where the majority of the population still resided, had 
been experiencing high rates of population growth. The continuation of 
restrictive policies (especially towards land availability and patronage of 
sugar estates) 
13 
resulted in high rates of unemployment. Ironically, the 
sugar estates had a low demand for labour now that it was in surplus. This 
was due to their continual policy of mechanisation in an effort to increase 
productivity and profitability. In the rice industry the same process had 
occurred, and mechanisation made redundant a large portion of rural 
labour, especially female labour. However, despite redundancies, the 
industry suffered from acute seasonal labour shortages. The disinclination 
for agricultural-manual work was strong. In some cases unemployment was 
preferred to working in rice fields. Thus, even in the face of rising 
unemployment, many of the rural unemployed preferred this situation 
rather than to perform as low-status manual labourers. In some ways it 
can be said that workers were gradually becoming aware of their lowly status 
their poor conditions of work and wages in relation to other attractive 
alternatives, which they strived to attain. 
4. Population Growth : 
The analysis of causes and trends 
Population growth in Guyana can be analysed in four demographic periods. 
(i) Slave and Indentureship Period. 
This period encompasses the first two demographic phases of population 
growth in the country. They were both characterised by low birth and high 
mortality rates. This was due primarily to the high incidence of epidemics 
which was the natural outcome of poor hygiene, low nutrition and deplorable 
housing conditions in rural areas14. During the 1850-1860 decade alone 
three epidemics ravaged the population. First there was a yellow fever 
epidemic which lasted from 1853-1855 and was followed in 1856 by an outbreak 
of smallpox which was terminated the following year by an epidemic of cholera. 
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During the following 1860-1870 decade the incidence of epidemics was nearly 
the same as in the previous decade. However, between 1870 and 1880 
conditions improved somewhat, but the rate of mortality was still high due 
to a weakened population and the indirect effects of the epidemics. This 
respice lasted until the end of the century. Soon after a new wave of 
epidemics began which lasted until the end of the period of immigration in 
1918. 
As a result of the epidemics, population increases were only due to the 
high net-immigration that occurred in this period. In some decades 
excessive mortality even resulted in a declining population, as the following 
analysis shows. During the 1861-1871 decade the colony received a net 
immigration of 54,924 persons (see Table 2) but the census of 1871 (see 
Table 1) showed an increase of only 45,465 persons signifying that deaths 
exceeded births by as much as 9,459 persons and that the increase of 45,465 
persons was only due to immigration. The following 1881 census showed an 
increase of 55,695 persons, but again such an increase was only possible 
due to a net immigration of 64,227 persons implying that deaths again 
exceeded births by 5,532. Only in the decennium 1881-1891 was population 
increase over and above net immigration. This situation however did not 
continue for long. In the subsequent three decades (1891-1921) high 
mortality, due primarily to epidemics, resulted in a rate of population 
growth even lower than in the previous 1851-81 period. 
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TABLE 1 
Population at Census Dates 1851-1970 
Year of 
Census 







1851 67,267 60,428 127,695 30.12 3.0 
1861 79,623 68,403 148,026 15.92 1.6 
1871 108,791 84,700 193,491 30.71 3.0 
1881 140,134 112,052 251,186 30.33 3.0 
1891 151,759 126,569 278,328 10.37 1.0 
1901 151,000 130,000 281,000 . 96 .1 
1911 153,717 142,524 296,041 5.35 .5 
1921 151,261 146,430 297,691 . 56 .1 
1931 155,381 155,552 310,933 4.45 .5 
1946 183,079 186,599 369,678 18.90 1.9 
1960 279,128 281,202 560,330 51.57 3.7 
1970 347,852 351,996 699,848 24.9 2.5 
Source: Population Census Reports 
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TABLE 2 
Immigrants to Guyana mainly under Indenture 1834-1918 
Year Source Immigrants 
1838-1918 India 238,909 
1835-1881 Madeira 32,216 
1834-1867 Africa 14,060 
1852-1884 China 13,533 
1834-1845 Europe 381 
1835-1867 Other 1,868 
Tota 1 300,967 
Source: G. W. Roberts and J. Bryne, Summary Statistics in 
Indenture and Associated Migration affecting the West 
Indies 1834-1918 Table 1. 
(ii) Period of Transition. 
The period 1921-1945 is known as the "demographic transitional period" 
(Sukdeo, 1973), between low growth in the slave and indenture periods to 
rapid growth in the post-war 1946-1970 period. Immigration ceased in 1918 
allowing for the first time for population increases to be attributed to 
natural increases rather than to immigration. During the 1921-1945 period. 
the occurrence of four factors changed the trend of population growth from 
slow to rapid. First, there were considerable improvements in public 
health (sanitation and medical care), nutrition and housing standards. 
Secondly, a concerted programme to combat epidemics beganl' . Thirdly, 
the equalisation of the sex ratio16 occurred and fourthly, the relatively more 
prolific East Indians in the population began to make large additions towards 
the number of births. 
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(iii) Period of Rapid Population Growth 1946-1959. 
As can be observed from Table 1, the most rapid increases in the 
Guyanese population took place during the period 1946-1959. The birth rate 
rose from 38.8 per thousand at the beginning of the period, and remained in 
the 40's (per thousand) throughout the 1950 decade. Adult and infant 
mortality rate declined drastically. Den1h rates in 1959 declined by 35.5% of 
what it was in 1946. (See Table 3). As a result of high birth and falling 
death rates the rate of natural increase showed a steady increase. Throughout 
the period, the total population increased by approximately 190,000, or more 
than the natural increase of one hundred years previous to 1946. 
TABLE 3 
Birth Rate, Death Rate and Rate of Natural Increase and Infant Mortality 









1946 35.8 15.5 29.3 - 
1948 43.3 14.2 29.1 - 
1950 40.4 14.6 25.8 - 
1952 44.3 13.5 30.8 81.8 
1954 42.9 12.4 30.5 76.1 
1956 43.2 11.2 32.0 68.4 
1958 44.5 10.2 34.3 64.2 
1960 42.9 9.5 33.4 61.3 
1962 42.9 8.2 34.5 
1964 39.8 8.5 31.3 
1966 40.2 8.4 31.8 
1968 36.7 7.5 29.2 
1970 34.3 6.6 27.7 
Source: Population Census Reports 
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(iv) Period of Stability 1960-1970- 
From 1960 onwards the population exhibited positive signs of stability 
and even a decline in the rate of increase. The average rate of birth in this 
period was lower by 20% than it was in the 1950's. Death rates continued 
to fall to the remarkably low rate of 6.6 deaths per thousand (population) in 
1970 which is comparable to those of the more developed countries, such as 
Sweden. Rates of natural increase continued to climb until the early sixties 
when falling death rates caused a decline. Infant mortality rates, particularly 
East Indian mortality rates, declined remarkably (see Table 1 in Appendix). 
During this 24 year period a doubling of the 1946 population occurred (see 
Table 1). 
The most important factors contributing to rapid population increases 
in the post-war period were the vast number of births that survived in the 
former 1921-45 period, and the high rate of survival within the 1946-70 period 
itself. However, the single most important contribution came from the 
East Indians, who rose to become the most populous ethnic group since the 
1940's. By 1946 approximately 9070 of East Indian women had children, 
compared to 78% of all other groups. Also the average number of 
children born alive per East Indian female was 5 compared to an average 4 
among all other groups. In addition East Indians tend to have more 
daughters and to enter into union earlier (see Table 2 in Appendix). 
Another important factor was that the expectancy of life increased signifi- 
cantly. The average expectancy of life of females increased from 35.8 years 
in 1920-22 to 56.2 years by 1952, while that for men rose from 33.5 to 53.1 
in the corresponding period. 
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5. Some Characteristics of the Population 1946-1970 
(i) Structure and Dependency 
An examination of Table 4 presented below shows that the population had 
undergone a remarkable structural change since 1946. Between 1946 and 
1960 the proportion of the population below 15 years increased from 37.7%0 
to 46.2%, or by 22% in the 14 year period. This was no doubt due to the 
increased births and falling infant mortality rate during the period. As a 
result of the large proportional increases in the young ages, the proportion 
in the active age groups - 15-44 declined relative to that in 1946 even when 
it numerically increased by over 50,000 persons. Similarly, the older age 
groups showed a relative decline. (For a detailed structure of the population 
see Table 3 in Appendix). During the 1960-70 inter-censal period the 
structure of the population remained more or less the same excepting that 
the 0-14 age group increased by a slight proportion. Overall, in the 24 year 
period the dependent population (0-14 years) increased from a little more 
than a third in 1946 to nearly one half in 1970. 
TABLE 4 
Structure of the Population 1946-1970 
Census Year Percent Distribution by Age Group 
0-14 15-44 45+ 
1946 37.7 44.6 17.6 
1960 46.2 38.4 15.4 
1970 47.1 38.5 14.4 
Source: Population Census Reports 
The above situation of 47.1% of the population being below 15 years in 
1970 attests to the relative youthfulness of the population. This age structure 
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biased towards the young has had considerable implications on dependency 
on the economically active population. It has recently been pointed out that 
this feature is a major constraint to economic development instead of an 
17 
aid. It necessitates a greater public expenditure on education, and on 
various social and child welfare programmes. Childbirth and child 
rearing tend to keep a large proportion of the labour force out of active 
service, and at the same time the 'upkeep' of a large number of children 
makes large 'inroads' into family incomes18. The following Table shows 
the change in youth and adult dependency on the economically active 
population over the period 1946-1970. For every 100 persons economically 
active there were 113 in the dependent ages in 1970. 
TABLE 5 
Showing Age Dependency 1946-1970 
Census Percent of Population Youth 





0-15 15-59 60+ 
1946 37 56 6 68 11 79 
1960 46 48 6 96 12 108 
1970 47 47 6 100 13 113 
Source: Population Census 1970 Summary Tables Statistical 
Bureau, Govt. of Guyana, p. iv (adjusted). 
(ii) The Spatial Distribution of Population in Guyana 
It is a general concensus that there is a mal-distribution of Guyana's 
population. With a population of less than one million and an areal extent 
of 83,000 square miles (214,000 square Km or the size of England and 
Wales) it is ironical for the country to have high densities and to experience 
population pressure. Yet it does both due mainly to the fact that about 2%o 
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of the total land area on the coast supports 86% of the population, while the 
expansive interior of the country is sparsely populated. In 1970, the density 
in the interior of Guyana was .8 persons per square mile while that on the 
coast was 25.2 persons making an overall average of only 8.5 persons 
per square mile. 
The overwhelming preference for coastal settlement was due to a 
number of historical and geographical factors. The relatively flat coastlands 
with fairly fertile clay soils were the natural choice of early settlement. As 
a result, the early plantations and their attendant population were established 
there. Because of its relative flatness (low gradient) and the limited 
permeability of the clay soils canals had to be dug to aid gravity drainage. 
This restricted the depth to which cultivation was feasible, hence 
expansion was `sideways'. This resulted in a strip of between half to five 
miles wide along the sea coast being intensively cultivated and a ribbon 
type of settlement to be established. The majority of the population lived in 
groups of villages or small towns along the major roadway that follows the 
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coastline. 
The interior population, with the exception of Linden-town, is made up of 
small concentrations in mining and forestry areas and scattered villages 
along the main river banks and in the savanna regions. where the majority of 
Amerindians live. Excluding Linden the interior population is less 
than 10% of the total country's population. (Map 4 in Appendix shows the 
distribution of the population). 
Geographically, the country is divided into three counties - Essequibo, 
Demerara and Berbice. (See Map 1 in Appendix). Having Georgetown - the 
main and capital city, and Linden - the second largest town after 
Georgetown, Demerara has always had a population twice that of the other 
two counties, as the Table below shows. Even without the major towns the 
population of Demerara exceeds that of either Berbice or Essequibo. But 
however, since 1946, proportionally, the population of Demerara has been 
contracting due to increases in Essequibo and Berbice and this has been so 
even in the face of substantial increases in the two major towns. 
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TABLE 6 
Percentage Distribution of Population by Counties 1931-1970 
County 1931 1946 1960 1970 
Demerara 59.6 59.7 59.2 58.2 
Berbice 24.4 26.1 25.4 26.2 
Essequibo 16.0 14.2 15.4 15.6 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Urban and Regional Planning Project Guy/74/005 
Draft Working Papers 76/3-2, Nat. Physical Dev. 
Strategy 2. Population p. 7. 
(iii) The Guyanese Labour Force 
The size and structure of the labour force. 
The labour force is taken to mean all those above 15 and below 65 years 
of age, but excludes those attending educational institutions and the retired 
or disabled. 
In proportion to the total population the labour force has been declining. 
The main reason for this trend was because of the increasing youthfulness 
of the population. Between 1946 and 1970, as a proportion of the total 
population, the labour force declined from 58% to 4970. In numerical terms, 
however, it increased from 147,500 persons in 1946 to 210,000 in 1970, 
or by 42.4% when the total population more than doubled during the period. 
(See Table 8). 
In its composition there was a marked predominance of males. Female 
participation' in the labour force, as mentioned previously, has been 
declining since the end of indentureship in 1918. During the 1946-1970 
period female participation was consistently below 30ö. This low 
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participation was, according to Standing (1979), a product of 'dualism' in 
the economy. Sukdeo (1978) has shown that before mechanisation in the rice 
and sugar industries the proportion of females in employment was greater 
and that their withdrawal was a direct result of these processes. 
Occupational distribution in the labour force. 
Over the 1946-70 period there was a reasonably high degree of 
occupational change. In 1946 nearly half of all those employed were in 
agriculture. By 1970, however, this proportion declined to less than a 
third. A useful observation here is that agriculture did not only experience a 
proportional decline but an actual 13,589 persons moved out of agriculture - 
20 
which is an indication of the rate of rural out-migration, 
Over the 1960-70 period all industrial groups apart from services 
experienced a proportional decline in employment. Agriculture experienced 
the highest withdrawal while services gained massively, as the following table 
shows. It would have been a fair assumption that in a poor agriculturally 
dependent country such as Guyana the proportion employed in agriculture 
would be substantial and would remain at that level. But according to the table 
the more productive sectors, i. e. agriculture, manufacturing, etc. were, 
proportionally, losing employment to the relatively less productive service 
sector. (This seems to be the result of direct Government policies in an 
attempt to improve the welfare, i. e. services to the population. This was 
started by the P. P. P. Government in the late 1950's and early 1960's and was 
accelerated by the present P. N. C. Government in keeping with its 
Socialist philosophy. 
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TABLE 7 
Distribution of Working Population by Industrial Group 1946-1970 
Industry 1946 1960 1970 
% Increase 
1970-1960 
Agriculture 46.2 37.1 29.0 -21.8 
Manufacturing 15.9 16.3 15.0 - 7.9 
Commerce 8.2 11.4 10.8 - 5.2 
Services 16.9 18.6 28.8 54.8 
Other, including 
Mining, Transport 12.0 16.5 14.3 -13.3 
and Construction 
Not Stated .8 .1 2.1 - 
Total 100 100 100 - 
Source: Population Census Reports 
(iv) Employment and Unemployment of the Labour Force 
Without exception, almost all of the observers of the Guyanese economy, 
in the post-war period, have commented on the slow growth of employment 
in relation to population growth and the consequences of this for economic 
growth and social development. During the 24 year period between 
1946 and 1970, while the total population increased by 90% or by nearly 
340,000 persons, the number in employment (or jobs) increased by only 
21.9% or 32,000 over that of 1946. This meant that there was only one 
person employed for every eleven persons added to the population, which 
implied that a large proportion of the labour force was always unemployed? 
1 
An examination of Table 8 below shows this to be largely true. In the period 
of rapid population growth, i. e. in the 1946-60 period, the number unemployed 
rose tremendously. From a little over one thousand in 1946 it rose to nearly 
fourteen thousand in 1960, or from . 8% of the 
labour force to 7.9% in the 
period. The upward spiral in the unemployment rate continued in the first 
22 
half of the 1960's but slowed down since . Nevertheless, taking the 
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1960-70 period the actual number unemployed was more than doubled. The 
rate of unemployment increased from 7.97 of the labour force in 1960 to 
over 15T in 1970. 
TABLE 8 
Labour Force, Employment and Unemployment 1946-1970 
In Thousands 
1946 1960 1970 
A Employed 146.2 161.2 178. 
Males 105.6 124.5 133. 
Females 40.6 36.7 45. 
B Unemployed 1.3 13.8 32. 
C Labour Force 147.5 175. 210. 
Males 106.5 134.1 150. 
Females 41. 40.9 60. 
D Rate of Unemployment % .8 7.9 15.2 
Sources: A-C Govt. of Guyana, Second Dev. Plan 1972-76 
Min. of Econ. Dev., p. 155 
D Own calculation. (This Table was compiled from six 
sources in which the definition of the labour force and 
unemployment is not strictly the same. As such the 
percentages in D do not even out). 
Since unemployment tends not to spread evenly throughout the labour 
force but to concentrate in the lower ages it meant that unemployment in the 
juvenile age groups, i. e. 15-19 and 20-24was highest. An indication of this 
rate can be obtained from the following illustration. During the period 
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1960-1970 the total persons employed increased by 17,000. The additions 
to the labour force from the age groups of 15-19 and 20-24 (after adjusting 
for rate of participation in these groups) was 59,160. Assuming all the new 
jobs were given to this group then only three in every ten, or, more 
precisely, only 29 in every 100 were employed. This then meant that 
the rate of unemployment among the ages of 15 to 24 was a phenomenal 71%. 
(See Table in Appendix for the population by age groups). 
Regionally, the rates of unemployment have been found to differ 
substantially. In 1965 the Man Power Survey found that rural areas, had a 
higher than the national averate rate of unemployment with certain regions, 
e. g. West Berbice, having rates which were twice that of urban areas. Thus 
overall, the rate of unemploymentwas high, with the highest rates among 
the new entrants to the labour force and in rural areas. 
To trace the exact causes of this situation is beyond the scope of this 
introduction. However, the main causes of high unemployment are here 
mentioned. First, since the 1950's the sugar industry -a major employer, 
had embarked on a policy of mechanisation in the field and factory. This led 
to a marked 'decasualisation' of the estate's labour force which growth it 
nurtured in the first instance. This policy was pursued with much vigour. 
During the 1950-61 period alone the industry reduced its labour requirements 
by nearly one quarter (Reubens and Reubens, 1962). Field operations 
which employed the majority of the sugar estate's tabour experienced the 
greatest decline even when, as Sukdeo (1978) shows, the industry benefited 
from high productivity and an increase in total output23. 
Secondly, the rice cultivation which was a traditional labour intensive 
activity and which employed the majority of rural labour began to mechanise. 
The advent of the tractor and combine harvester completely altered the 
regimen of production. Sowing and reaping, which were the main farming 
activities, now needed small. amountsof labour. Thus mechanisation here 
too has resulted in an increase in the rate of unemployment 
24. 
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6. Administrative and Political Developments 
In 1928 Guyana became a full Crown Colony but it was not until the late 
forties that . 
the electorate had any real participation in the internal govern- 
ing of the Colony. Under a new constitution granted in 1943 the first 
elections were held in 1947. Although the ballot was restricted to property 
and literacy qualifications, events were not closeted in the elite circles 
rather there was an awakening of political and social consciousness in 
the country25. The usually indifferent East Indians began to shed their 
rural outlook and became more and more conscious of the lowly roles they 
were fulfilling. Africans had been rapidly improving their education and were 
filling Civil and Public Service posts while they remained in the stagnant rural 
areas ekeing a livelihood out of agriculture. For them (the East Indians) the 
outcome of the elections was relatively unimportant save for the fact that it 
ushered in Cheddie Jagan (a Guyanese of East Indian descent) into Guyanese 
politics. 
Returning from studies in the United States he was incensed by what he 
saw as oppression and exploitation of the Guyanese people26. Having won a 
seat in the 1947 elections he embarked on a campaign against Colonial rule 
and against the agents of exploitation, i. e. the Sugar Barons. First, with 
the help of Forbes Burnham, a barrister of African descent, he launched 
the ... 'first truly national political party" - the P. P. P. (Mitchell et al, 
1969 
43). Dedicated to the goals of ownership and Guianisation of foreign enter- 
prises and independence, the party gained popular appeal - and won a number 
of concessions in voting rights etc. In the following election of 1953 in which 
all adults were allowed to vote the party gained an overwhelming victory. 
It received 51% of the ballot and obtained 18 out of the 24 seats in the 
Legislature. Thus for the first time the internal government of the colony 
was the choice of the majority of its people. 
Before its accession to office the party (P. P. P. ) had a strong socialist 
orientation. Its leader, Jagan, had declared himself to be a Marxist, and 
'to all intents and purposes' his radical policies seemed to create a 
Socialist State in Guyana. This was highly resented by the business community 
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and by the more literate groups, on the whole. Thus in its attempt to 
implement its (radical) manifesto promises it met with severe opposition. 
In the sugar industry it attempted to have the union of its choice recognised 
27 
as the principal bargaining agent. This generated the greatest opposition 
- which finally led to the downfall of the Government after only 133 days in 
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office, and the suspension of the Constitution. 
In the period between the suspension of the Government and the next 
general elections an Interim Government was appointed. While out of office 
a split in the leadership of the P. P. P. occurred with Burnham departing to 
form his own political party (P. N. C. )29. Despite the fact that policy 
differences may have been the principal cause of the split the division was 
chiefly along ethnic lines30. In the campaign for the next elections, held in 
1957, both factions appealed indirectly to their respective ethnic groups. 
Because voting tended to be along ethnic lines the P. P. P. emerged as the 
most popular party in the rural areas where East Indians predominate. 
The P. N. C. similarly polled most votes in the urban working class districts 
where the majority of negroes reside. Overall, due to the larger East 
Indian population, the P. P. P. was returned to office. 
In their new period of office the P. P. P. bemoaned the fact that they had 
no real power to implement changes31. The Governor, who was the 
Constitutional head in the Colony, had the ultimate veto power in nullifying 
legislations he did not approve of. Hence, this period of Government was 
characterised by numerous 'clashes' between the elected assembly and the 
Governor as an agent of the Colonial Office. However, the most notable 
contribution of the 'Japan Government' during this period was its generous 
aid to agriculture. A review of the programme of expenditure (shown in 
the following section) shows that expenditure in agricultural and related 
sectors accounted for almost half of the total development expenditure for 
the planned 1957-61 period. The East Indians who were the main land- 
owning group in the rural areas were the main beneficiaries. 
In the following 1961 general elections, which were held under a new bi- 
cameral system, the Government was returned to office and, in similar 
32 
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manner as in 1953, it tried to re-introduce its labour relations bill which 
was directed against the sugar producers33. As in 1953, a long general 
strike resulted which was punctuated this time by numerous incidents of 
arson and violence34. This time too the opposition forces and the entire 
organised labour movement rallied and called a crippling general strike in 
which widespread civil disturbances and riots swept the country35. Finally, 
the Government withdrew its bill but the consequences resulting from the 
disturbances were to a great degree irreparable. Acting as the mediator in 
trying to resolve the growing conflict among the political groups, the 
Colonial Office proposed a new constitution of proportional representation. 
In new elections under this system in 1964 the P. P. P. was unable to secure 
the 27 seats needed to'form a Government in the new 52 seat assembly. This 
the two main opposition parties (the P. N. C. and the newly formed U. F. ) were 
36 
able to do and so formed the new Government with Burnham as the Premier. 
As the head of the new Government Burnham faced what seemed an 
impossible task. It was the widespread opinion that the new Government 
would fall in a matter of months. But, contrary to predictions, the 
Government took the necessary steps to consolidate itself in office. Burnham 
announced a new system of "Consultative Democracy" to ensure at least 
some consultation with the electorate before the Government proceeded with 
a policy - quite the opposite of what occurred during the reign of the P. P. P. 
Overnight, Burnham was said to have grown in stature and had become a 
Statesman. The post of Premier, usually regarded as a `denigrated' gift 
from the Colonialists, was changed into one of -respectability and one which 
became the centre of a policy making Government. 
With Peter D'Aguiar (an Industrialist) as Minister of Finance, the new 
government enjoyed a period of considerable success in its economic policy. 
An influx. of foreign investment followed the demise of the Jaganite threat of 
Communist takeover. The Government had the support of the commercial 
interests, the Public Service machinery and the security forces in which a 
majority of the personnel were Africans and so, by and large, supporters 
of the P. N. C. In pacifying internal ethnic strife the Government also made 
some useful gains. It did not by any means gain the confidence and support 
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of the disgruntled Indians, but at least it allayed their worst fears37It held 
its reactionary arm in control, and thus no major inter-ethnic conflicts 
occurred. Armed with peace and some degree of stability Burnham approached 
the Colonial Authorities for complete independence which promised a stable 
administration. The Colonial Office conceded and thus, after 20 years of 
struggle, the colony of Guyana was declared an independent state on 
26 May 1966. In 1968 the P. N. C. Government was returned to office, this 
time without recourse to a coalition. 
(i) Implications for Migration 
The administrative and political developments in the post-war period in 
Guyana had direct implications on the level of population mobility that is 
observed. In fact the rate of mobility can be regarded as a function of 
political activity in the 1947-70 period. As mentioned, since the late 1940's 
and throughout the 1950's there was a slow out migration of negroes from 
rural areas. Since this group was the most literate (of the two) groups, it 
is expected that many found jobs in the various Government Services. 
East Indians, on the -other hand, were generally less educated and tended to 
be less mobile in that they were farmers or sugar estate labourers. Before 
the 1960's this group accounted for only a small proportion of urban 
population; hence, few rural persons had close relatives in Georgetown and 
New Amsterdam and, in any case, most East Indians either had a sugar- 
estate or rice-farming background and were thus unsuitable for most urban 
jobs. Moreover, in rural areas high investments were made in agriculture 
to their benefit, which served to reinforce their traditional immobility. 
In addition to establishing land development and settlement schemes, the 
P. P. P. Government went further - it secured new markets in Cuba etc. for 
rice produced by the East Indians. Machinery and fuel to farmers were 
subsidised. Generous grants and loans were made for machinery purchases 
etc. Prices were high in relation to production costs. Rice farmers, 
especially the medium sized and large operators, experienced relative 
degrees of prosperity. The change of government in 1964, however, was a 
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disaster for rice farmers as it not only removed the subsidies and other 
benefits to them but failed to link prices of agricultural produce with the 
costs of production. The pattern of high investments in agriculture (in 
proportion to other sectors) was changed. Expenditure on social and welfare 
services increased instead. The result of this was that the small farmers 
became progressively poorer with many pushed out of agriculture 
altogether. Out of their usual source of livelihood, farmers and farm- 
labourers had no option but to migrate towards Georgetown seeking non- 
agricultural or other employment. 
The change of Government also resulted in intense politicing. To 
consolidate their power the P. N. C. Government had embarked on a number 
of job creation projects in which jobs tended to go to party supporters, the 
majority of whom were negroes. The development impetus was switched 
from rural areas to urban where the majority of negroes were located. 
These developments served to accelerate the out-migration of negroes from 
rural areas. But not only did negroes move: East Indians moved also. 
Since the beginning of the 1960-70 decade schooling had featured high on 
their list of priorities. Increasingly they moved with the intention of 
entering into Government and related employment as their negro counter- 
parts had been doing. 
The periodic rekindling of social feelings at times of elections has served 
to alienate the two groups. The major disturbances and riots of the 1963-64 
period have resulted in the displacement of a considerable number of persons 
who fled from villages where they were in a minority to villages where their 
ethnic group was in majority or equal to the other race. (The result is the 
peculiar ethnic pattern of settlement in which one village, almost entirely 
populated by one group, exists adjacent to another peopled by the other. 
In terms of employment, the implication of racial animosity (both latent and 
open) was that it restricted mobility. Few East Indians moved to Linden in 
spite of very attractive wages. Similarly, negroes were disinclined to move 
to sugar estate areas where East Indians predominate. But, since large 
numbers of both groups were in Georgetown it had been the common 
destination of negroes and East Indians. 
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7. Post-War Planning in Guyana 
In dependent countries such as Guyana it was observed that market 
forces, if left at will, will not lead to economic development -a necessary 
precondition if the goals of an improvement in the social and economic life 
of its inhabitants were to be achieved. To attain the necessary level and 
rate of economic growth it was realised that careful planning in the 
economy was necessary. Such planning, it was realised, could take either 
of two approaches. Either the State could first decide its goals and, by 
fiscal and other incentives, re-direct market forces and encourage private 
investment in such a way that the pre-determined goals and objectives are 
the indirect outcomes of such investments; or, it can adopt the Socialist 
approach whereby the principal means of production are owned by the State 
and private and individual enterprises are directed to conform to the national 
framework or plan of development. 
The path that the post-war Governments of Guyana took prior to 1964 
has been described as a "quasi-inducement" approach in that it was between 
the two approaches outlined above (David, 1969 : 395). After 1964, the new 
Government that purported a Socialist image made a number of positive 
steps in that direction. Hence, it heralded a change in the form and context 
of planning. The basic aim of attaining economic growth was modified by 
high welfare considerations. In both approaches to development, the mobility 
of the population was directly influenced. In some ways it can be said that 
the latter approach (i. e. the P. N. C. brand of Socialism) accelerated mobility. 
(i) Economic Planning 1945-1972 
Planning in Guyana began since 1945 when an allocation of $12 million 
was received under the Colonial Development Welfare Act of that year, but 
the first rudimentary attempt at real plan making and execution of same 
began in 1947, when a 10 year development plan was drawn up. Expenditure 
in this plan was allocated under the following headings: drainage and 
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irrigation projects ($6.5 million); social welfare, justice and public buildings 
($11.2 million); agriculture, forestry, transport, surveys and research 
($10.3 million). It was planned to spend $20 million in the first 5 years with 
an additional $6 million later. However, in the first 3 years 1947-50, only 
$2 million or 10% of expenditure planned was spent. The most plausible 
explanation of this was that planning was a new activity and, as such, there 
was a lack of planning experience, and/or the basic infrastructure in the 
country was inadequate for the execution of planned projects. 
In 1953, at the request of the Government, an Economic Survey Mission 
from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) 
visited the country. The main objectives of the mission were to make a 
survey of the economy as a whole, and to make recommendations on the 
level and directions of future investment - taking into consideration internal 
and external financial resources which were, or would be, made available 
to the country. The main findings of the Mission were that, on the whole, 
the economic climate was healthy, but there were a number of problems 
that tended to retard the pace of growth and development. In the recently 
completed (then) 1946-52 programme the Mission pointed out that there was 
a lack of an integrated development programme and as such there was a 
tendency to indulge in ad-hoc planning, among other things38. 
As part of their 'terms of reference' the Mission prepared and 
submitted a Five Year Development Programme for the 1954-58 period. 
This programme aimed at increasing the national income by 20% and income 
per head by 6% in the planned period. This increase was seen as necessary 
to maintain or improve the standard of living in view of the rapid population 
growth the nation was experiencing. In order to achieve the above aim 
four objectives were outlined. The first was to strengthen, as rapidly as 
the technical resources of the colony would permit, those sectors which 
appeared most urgently in need of improvement in order to provide a better 
balance in the economy. Second was to provide for continued progress in 
those sectors where the economy was already strong. Third was to provide 
a programme of technical research and experimentation in agriculture and 
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related fields such as soil, geologic, hydrographic, topographic and others 
which was a prerequisite for the development of the colony's resources, 
both during the next five years and thereafter. Fourth was to stimulate 
local savings and investment in order to reduce the dependence of the 
economy on external grants and capital inflows. The salient features of the 
plan are presented in the Table below. 
TABLE 9 
The Five Year Government Development Programme 1954-1958 as 
Recommended by the I. B. R. D. Mission 
Investment Programme (G$7,000) 
1. Agriculture 24,487 
(i) Drainage & Irrigation Projects $10,780 
(ii) Land Settlement 1,150 
(iii) Rice Development Corporation 5,000 
(iv) Other Agricultural Projects 1,106 
(v) Research & Surveys 2,251 
(vi) Agricultural Credits 4,200 
24,487 
2. Transport & Communications 22,304 
3. Forestry 2,280 
4. Social Welfare 7,450 
5. Public Works (including Sea Defences) 5,450 
6. Industrial Credits 1,500 
7. Hydro Electric Power (Tunmatumari Project) 1,440 
8. Surveys - Geologic etc. 400 
9. Credit Corporation 600 
Total 65,911 
Source: I. B. R. D. , The Economic 
Development of British Guiana, 
pp. 30-36. 
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The pattern of development that followed was determined by the expendi- 
ture pattern planned. More land was to be brought into cultivation through two 
large drainage and irrigation schemes. High priority was to be given to 
the improvement of transport and communications. Overall, the plan was 
committed tc the existing pattern of coastal development with only 
exploratory surveys of the interior resources. 
This emphasis on the coast, to the relative exclusion of the vast interior, 
was one of the major failings of the plan, according to Guyanese Economist 
Wilfred David (1969). The bias given to the development of rice as an 
export commodity was, according to him, misguided, in terms of the slow 
rate of return of such investment. However, the Mission's strategy can 
be justified by their stated remit that "it was wisest to invest in projects 
which promised the most returns to the colony in the light of the financial 
resources, technical staff ... manpower and the time needed for 
engineering planning" (I. B. R. D. , 1953 : 25). 
Further, the Mission categorically stated that a stable political climate 
was necessary to attract outside capital and accelerate internal investment. 
Sadly, however, this was not to be. During this period Guyana experienced 
its worst period of political instability. The effect of this was that most of 
the planned investments were not realised due to an acute shortage of 
capital, which was due to the non-occurrence of expected foreign investment. 
In 1959, the newly elected Government did not proceed with the I. B. R. D. 
programme. It requested the drawing up of a new one which planned for the 
expenditure of 44 million dollars. Of this, 33 million was for economic 
activities and the remainder was allocated to social services. No firm 
assessment of this plan is available. In an attempt at such a task David 
(1969) shows that G. D. P., at factor cost, rose by 32 million dollars between 
1956 and 1959, which was by no means spectacular, but nevertheless, in 
view of past performances, it can be regarded as a fair rate of overall 
growth. 
In 1959 a new programme was considered necessary, and was drawn up 
by Mr Kenneth Berrill, an Oxford Economist. The new programme was aimed 
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at both the economic and social development of the country, but again, 
emphasis was on projects that were expected to increase productivity and 
strengthen the economic sector, i. e. such projects as drainage and 
irrigation, and land development. As such, this plan was in the same vein 
as that advocated by the World Bank Team, excepting that there was a 
stronger emphasis on agriculture in terms of the proportion of development 
expenditure devoted to it. The following Table presents a summary of 
Berrill's (1960-64) five year Development Plan. 
TART 17 1 !1 
Development Programme 1960-1964 (G$ . 000) 
Allocation of Expenditure 
Agriculture (including Sea Defences, Drainage, 49,040 
& Irrigation and Land Development 
Transport & Communications 25,457 
Forestry 550 
Surveys (geological etc. ) 4,700 
Public Buildings 1,300 
Credits agricultural & industrial 11,000 




Social Welfare 750 
Rural Water Supply 2,882 
Credit, Housing 2,000 
Miscellaneous 1,568 
Total Social Sector 17,873 
Total All Sectors 110,280 
Source: Wilfred David, The Economic Development of Guyana 1953-1964; 
Table 3, p. 353. 
- 63 - 
This plan too, by devoting the lion's share of expenditure to agriculture 
and related, attracted much criticism from Planners who did not see the 
expansion of agriculture as the answer to the country's economic problems. 
Newman (1960) and others argued that heavy industry based on the country's 
natural resources of bauxite, manganese, timber, etc. should be the basis 
of its long term development. Agricultural and light industry should be just 
an aid to transition to industrial development, and thus high expenditure in 
those sectors was unwarranted. However, Berrill defended his programme 
by showing that heavy industry was a new venture while infrastructure and 
resources were readily available for agricultural expansion, and furthermore, 
the country was unable to raise finance for such an ambitious programme, i. e. 
one that included industrial as well as agricultural development. This plan 
too was not allowed its full course. Political instability (1963-64) again 
undermined the economic climate. However, some of the major aspects of 
the plan, in land settlement schemes and drainage and irrigation projects, 
were completed, and expenditure targets in a number of others were met39. 
At the end of the period of internal hostilities of 1963-64 the new Coalition 
Government that came to office presented a new strategy of development. 
Their first five year Development Plan, prepared by the eminent West Indian 
Economist W. A. Lewis, aimed primarily at reducing the level of unemploy- 
ment which had risen dramatically in both urban and rural areas over the 
recent years. The strategy was to increase public expenditure on projects 
such as school building, sea defence, roads, etc., and thus, while it 
provided for some respite from high unemployment infrastructure for long 
term development would be laid. The new programme also devoted 
considerably more expenditure to social and welfare developments. Although 
it did not terminate agricultural projects work continued in a low profile. 
It even started a more genuine attempt at agricultural diversification. The 
main importance of this programme, however was that it was devoted 
massively to industrial development. Total expenditure planned for the five 
year period was estimated at 294 million (Guyana) dollars, which was 
expected to generate an annual growth of 6% over the planned period. 
The new approach, whereby agricultural development was balanced with 
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industrial and where social and welfare services featured heavily, was 
hailed by the Government as the first real attempt in planning. As to 
exactly how successful it was, it is not possible to state here. Much of the 
programme seemed to have been rolled over into the following 1972-76 
planned period. 
(ii) Implications for Migration 
The impact of the post-war 'Plans' or Development Programmes on 
population mobility in the country depended on the allocation of development 
expenditure in those plans. The earlier Programmes, including those 
adopted by the P. P. P. Government, were committed to agricultural 
development (mainly in rice farming), which tended to ruralise the largest 
portion of the rural population. The later Programme of the P. N. C. 
Government, on the other hand, concentrated on social and industrial 
development and relatively de-emphasised agriculture, which resulted in a 
substantial rural outflow. Of the two main groups, negroes were always more 
prone to migrate. Since there were fewer negro farmers the East 
Indians tended to benefit most from the generous expenditure on land settlement 
schemes, drainage and irrigation projects and the overall patronage in rice 
production. While this resulted in the East Indians being more sedentary, it 
caused the now recipient negroes to out-migrate from rural areas. One 
factor that exerted a pul[ on a portion of the negro population was that they 
were relatively more educated than East Indians and moved to take up 
employment in the various Government Services in the city. 
The failure of all the Programmes to seriously take into consideration the 
rate of population growth and the increase in unemployment has proved to be 
a notable contribution to mobility. The land development drive benefited a 
small percentage of the small farmers and the landless. Most of the schemes 
were far too costly in terms of the number of persons who received direct 
benefits40. Overall, the land-sharing was still tightly controlled, which led 
to increased fragmentation of existing land and higher rates of unemployment 
and open unemployment. The Programmes (or Planners) were indifferent 
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to the effects of mechanisation on rural unemployment, as few alternative 
rural employment opportunities were provided to absorb redundant labour. 
The result was that, in the face of contracting rural opportunities, persons 
who would not normally have migrated did so in search of better opportunities. 
Hence, through its failings, planning in the post-war period (prior to '64) has 
even increased the level of rural out-migration 
1 
The change of Government in 1964 resulted in a change of development 
strategy which, more than the former, increased population mobility (mainly 
rural-urban movements). By reducing the amount of public expenditure on 
42 
agriculture in relation to other sectors, the rice industry suffered a decline. 
Marginal farmers discontinued farming for wage employment, and this 
eventually turned out to be their first move towards urban areas where economic 
opportunities were perceived to be greater. By giving a high priority to the 
lowering of unemployment the 1966-72 five year Development Plan accelerated 
the rural-urban migration of negroes who migrated in the hope of employment 
in the many Government projects43 Hence, in the country, rapidly increasing 
population growth, increasing unemployment because of mechanisation and 
low profitability in agriculture, coupled with the orientation of the labour 
force to urban white and blue collar employment and the system of Government 
and its development strategy, have laid the foundations for rapid rural out-migra- 
tion. The following chapter, in greater detail, seeks to define who the migrants 
were, the main reasons for their migration, and the patterns in which the 
flows have occurred, and finally to venture into some of the ramifications 
and consequences of such flows. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE CHARACTERISTICS. CAUSES, PATTERNS AND IMPLICATIONS 
OF INTERNAL MIGRATION IN GUYANA 
CHAPTER III 
THE CHARACTERISTICS, CAUSES, PATTERNS AND IMPLICATIONS 
OF INTERNAL MIGRATION IN GUYANA 
1. Introduction 
From the previous chapter it will be noted that Guyana is one of the 
countries emerging from a long period of Colonial domination. It was used 
by its owners primarily to extract wealth in the form of cheap raw materials 
by manipulating and orienting the labour force to that end. The result of this 
and the short-term palliatives it employed was that it led to a steady 
impoverishment of rural areas, especially in the face of rapid population 
growth and rising unemployment which the country has been experiencing 
since the end of the Second World War. 
Faced with the above situation, a significant proportion of the rural 
proletariat began to look elsewhere for a source of livelihood - away from 
peasant agriculture which was fraught with 'impediments', and from sugar- 
estate wage employment which was becoming scarcer and which allowed a 
livelihood at subsistence level for most1. Many left their areas of origin in 
the 'path' that was already established, as in the case of Africans, for the 
urban areas where employment and general conditions of living were better, 
or, at least, seemed to be so. 
This movement was not without significance to the sending areas. 
increased population growth coupled with an increasing awareness of the 
greater income and other potentials 'outside', compared to the depressing 
conditions in their village, have led to a quickening of the outward drift. 
Rural areas, on the whole, have progressed from being raw-material 
producer in the Colonialist period to a human resource exporter in this 
modern era. How and why this came to be so this chapter proposes to 
clarify. First of all, it indicates the magnitude of rural and urban migration 
prior to 1970. It then notes some of the salient characteristics of those who 
migrate, and briefly posits some of the broad reasons as to why they have 
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left rural for urban areas. To give a better approximation of the pattern of 
inter-rural and rural-urban mobility the movement between the 1960-1970 
intercensal years will be examined in greater detail. The chapter concludes 
by outlining some of the implications that the migration pattern is likely to 
have on both sending and receiving areas. 
2. Extent of Inter-Rural and Rural-Urban Migration in Guyana 
(i) The Origin of Guyanese Migration 
Migration in Guyana is not new, in fact from a social and economic point 
of view, the history of the country can be best portrayed by the analysis of 
the developments relating to the population and its mobility. The extent and 
pattern of the Guyanese labour mobility was first set by the Africans. 
Ex-slaves, who were not keen to continue to serve their former masters as 
wage-labourers, were not allowed to remain in estate housing nor to cultivate 
2 
food crops on estate land. As previously mentioned, it was exceedingly 
difficult for them to own or occupy State lands. Thus many had no alternative 
but to migrate to the townships of New Amsterdam and Georgetown where 
casual jobs could be had in the informal sector and formal employment in 
social and public services. Their presence in the towns served as an 
incentive for other Africans, i. e. kinfolk and close friends etc. , to follow in 
their path. As a result, in 1970 approximately half of the country's African 
population resided in urban or suburban areas. 
During and after the end of indentureship in Guyana a growing proportion 
of East Indians tended to follow in the same pattern taken by the Africans, 
and for nearly the same reasons excepting that while Africans came to 
urban areas mainly for employment, many Indians came as petty traders and 
businessmen. Their initial rate of inflow, however, was much slower than 
the Africans and has continued to be so. Because they too, like the Africans, 
had strong ethnic, cultural and familial ties, they tended to draw or 
accelerate the flow of other East Indians to urban areas, and to provide 
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. the necessary 
information and help to the newcomers in establishing 
3 
themselves, 
(ii) Migrants in the Population 
Prior to the census of 1960 only crude estimates were available as to the 
extent of the mobility of labour, i. e. the number of migrants in the population 
at any one time or place . The census of 1960 recorded the 
fact that one in 
every four persons in the country was enumerated at a place other than that 
of his birth, which was astonishing, given the then low level of transport 
development, information dissemination and adult literacy. Even if it 
was expected that the urban population would have a sizeable migrant 
component it was certainly not in the vicinity of one in every three persons 
as the census showed. Even more remarkable was that migrants were found 
to constitute more than one half of the total population of the townships of 
New Amsterdam and Linden. Rurban areas adjacent to-Georgetown (see 
Table presented below) also seem to have a fair share of migrants, 
especially East Bank and West Demerara, where migrant percentages were 
38 and 27% respectively. Another observation of the census was that one fifth 
of the population of rural areas were migrants to those areas, which seems 
somewhat high considering the sedented nature of rural life. 
However, the proportion of migrants in rural areas should be regarded 
with some reservations due to the census definition of migrants. 
enumerated at a place other than that of their birth were regarded as migrants 
to that place. Thus, births in any of the three main hospitals that were 
not located in their usual area. of residence were regarded as migrants there7. 
It was also customary for East Indian females to have their first, or first 
few births, at their parents' residence. However, despite such discrepancies, 
the census of 1960 provided valuable insight as to the pattern and the real 
extent of internal mobility in the country as a whole. 
The following, 'decennial', census of 1970 had further startling Observa- 
tions. Throughout the country the population not residing at their place of 
birth increased from one quarter to nearly one third of the entire population 
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in the interval of only ten years, which points to a significant increase in the 
rate of mobility of the population (see Table q in Appendix). All population 
areas, with the exception of West Berbice, showed an increase in the number 
of migrants in their populations. Observing Georgetown as a whole, although 
the number of migrants increased by an insignificant 13% the increase of the 
migrant population in the suburban area was nearly 1500/70 which, more than 
amply, compensated for the city-centre's tow attractions The outlying semi- 
suburban areas of East Bank and East Coast of Demerara experienced inflows 
which increased their migrant component to 53 and 42% respectively. The 
Upper Demerara district, mainly the town of Linden, remained attractive to 
migrants. Its proportion of migrants in the population increased by 36% 
over the 1960-70 period. The generally more depressed areas, i. e. 
New Amsterdam, Essequibo and the Interior regions, had fewer migrants. 
However, despite the reasonably high migrant increases in most of the 
districts, the proportion of migrants to the origin (resident) population 
declined with the exception of Georgetown, its suburbs and the East Coast 
of Demerara. The reason for this was that there was a high rate of natural 
increase which was fuelled by in-migration. Overall, migrants in 1970 
constituted 36.3% of the population in urban areas and 22% in rural areas. 
3. Characteristics of Guyanese Migration 
There is reason to suggest that migration, as it occurs in Guyana, is, 
in some ways, slightly different from that occurring in Latin America and 
other countries. The basis of this difference is due to the fact that the 
pattern of migration, as previously mentioned, was preconditioned by 
historical and cultural factors. Each of the two main population groups 
originated from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds have imbibed 
'Western values' at different rates and so have adapted differently to changing 
social and economic conditions in the country. The East Indians settled 
principally in the rural areas and tended to be self-sufficient, while Africans 
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-a great proportion of whom came to depend on wage-employment - migrated 
to urban areas where such employment could be found. 
In view of the above and on previous information given in Chapter 2 it is 
possible to make some deductions as to who the migrants were and the 
pattern in which they have migrated. It is likely that: 
1. The age at which migration occurred was more or less the same as in 
other Latin American and other Developing Countries. 
2. As in Latin America, females would have a higher tendency to migrate 
than males. 
3. Taking the two major ethnic groups in the country the rate and direction 
of migration in any one group was directly related to the proportion of 
that group in the destination population. (As such, since Negroes 
predominated in urban populations it is expected that Negroes would be 
the majority in rural-to-urban migrant flows. ) 
4(i). Since education is the main criterion in employment recruitment and 
the determining factor in remuneration then it is obvious that a greater 
proportion of rural persons with higher education will proceed to 
Georgetown and the suburbs where the high income jobs were available. 
4(ii). Given the urban-rural disparity in the level of educational facilities 
it was expected that, on average, rural-to-urban migrants would be less 
educated than the origin (urban) population. 
5. Although rural-to-urban migrants might have had a lower educational 
attainment than urban populations they were not marginalised in a sense 
that they occupied mainly low income occupations. 
(i) Age of Migrants 
In the absence of specific (formal) data on the age at which rural-urban 
migration occurs in Guyana it is assumed that it occurs within the traditional 
'age of migration', i. e. between the ages of 15 and 40, as a number of 
researchers in Latin America and elsewhere have found. This age 
9 
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assumption in migration seems particularly valid since migration, as will be 
shown later, is undertaken directly and indirectly in search of employment. 
Since it is the young who are most likely to be involved in job search then it 
is these persons who were most likely to have migrated. On average, inter- 
urban migrants were expected to be slightly older than rural-urban since 
they would have spent some years in employment at that previous place of 
origin. 
(ii) Migrants by Sex 
A casual observation of Guyanese migration gives the impression that the 
male/female ratio is equal in the migrant streams. A closer examination, 
however, shows that proportionally females exceeded males, on average, and 
taking both in-migrant and out-migrant streams they exhibited a higher rate, 
i. e. were more migratory than males but did not 'predominate' in-the flows. 
As expected, urban areas seemed to attract more females. Out of every 
1000 persons entering urban areas prior to 1970,533 were females and out 
of every 1000 migrants remaining (subtracting in- from out-migrants) females 
comprised 550 of such persons? In rural areas the sex ratio of in-migrants 
was more or less equal, but in their out-migration, females again exceeded 
males in volume due to their higher rate of out-migration of 220/1000 
compared to males 182/1000. In view of the above rates, the sex composi- 
tion of migrants in Guyana is similar to the observed pattern in Latin America 
(cf. Gilbert, 1974: 113, and Browning, 1970 : 287) and is in accordance with 
Ravenstein's '7th Law of migration', which states that females are more 
migratory than males10 
(iii) Migrants by Ethnicity 
The two main ethnic groups, Africans and East Indians, comprised 
approximately 85% of all migrations in the country. Africans, while 
comprising only 21% of the rural population, accounted for 58% of rural to 
urban migrations. East Indians, on the other hand, were 66% of the rural 
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population but only accounted for 24% of rural to urban migrations. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, this African dominance in urban migration was due 
to historical factors. Ever since their emancipation, Africans continued to 
move to urban areas. As the dominant group there they eventually were 
established in key employment positions, i. e. administrative and managerial, 
which tended to make it easy for others of their own ethnic group to enter 
into urban employment through both formal and informal recruitment 
practices. Also, the strength of their cultural ties tended to confer paternal- 
istic rights or allow the development of such attitudes by residents or previous 
migrants over the newly arrived migrant. These two factors made it 
relatively easier for Africans to migrate compared to other ethnic groups. 
Hence, the steady and greater flow of such persons to the urban areas of the 
11 
country. 
In the absence of relevant statistical information the following illustration 
is presented to give some credence to the above statement - that Africans 
have a higher rate of out-migration from rural areas than the more 
populous East Indian group. The rural area of West Berbice is chosen since 
it had in 1970 the highest proportion of 327 of Africans compared to other 
areas. (See Table in Appendix. If it is found that West Berbice had 
the highest rate of out-migration, then it can reasonably be assumed that 
that was so because it had a high proportion of Africans. ) In 1970 the census 
recorded the total of 10,824 persons out-migrating from this area, with 
5,769 or 53170 of the migrants proceeding to urban areas. In terms of the 
ethnicity of the migrants, a total of 4,030 or 707/0 were of African descent. 
Thus proportionally, while the African group was only 32% or approximately 
one third of the population it comprised 700 or more than two-thirds of the 
rural-to-urban migrants. East Indians, who comprised more than 607 of 
the total population, accounted for only 21% of urban-ward migration. Thus 
clearly, the African component of the population of West Berbice, and indeed of 
all rural areas, had a high rate of rural-urban migration12 
While Africans tended to dominate in the rural-to-urban flows 
East Indians tended to do the same in the rural-to-rural streams. Taking 
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West Berbice again as an example, East Indians in 1970 comprised 63% of 
the total population and accounted for 607 of the out-migrants. who had rural 
destinations. Thus, the original deduction that members of one ethnic group 
will tend to flow from an area to another where members of that group were 
the dominant group is valid. As a group, Africans tend to have a higher rate 
of movement to urban areas where they were the most populous group, while 
the converse is true'for the East Indians. 
(iv) Migrants by Education Attained 
The educational status of migrants is analysed according to their place 
of residence in 1970 (see Table 9 in Appendix). The majority of rural and 
urban out-migrants seemed to have only basic primary education. However, 
those proceeding to urban places seemed to be more educated (in terms of 
formal education attained) than those proceeding to rural destinations. 
Slightly over two-thirds of the migrants to urban places had primary schooling 
as their highest level attained while three-quarters of those moving to rural 
areas had the same level. Urban areas, as expected, received a higher 
proportion of migrants with secondary education (227/0) than rural areas 
(8.6%). More striking was that 58% of all migrants who had secondary 
education moved to Georgetown and the suburbs, and 69% of all migrants who 
had University education had the same destination. Thus the hypothesis 4(1), 
which states that a greater proportion of the migrants with higher education 
will proceed to urban areas, is valid. 
To see how migrants to urban areas compare, educationally, with the 
resident population, migrants to the City and Suourbs of Georgetown are 
analysed (see Table 10 in Appendix). 
Comparing urban migrants with the resident population in terms of 
level of education attained, it can be seen from the above mentioned table that 
more migrants only had primary education. The destination population (i. e. 
Georgetown and Suburbs) had a higher proportion of persons having 
secondary and University education. Thus rural-urban migrants were less 
educated than their urban counterparts, which lends support to hypothesis 
13 
4(ii) stated earlier. 
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(v) Migrants by Occupational Status 
The occupational status of migrants is analysed in terms of their 
occupation at place of destination by major areas (see Table iz in Appendix). 
Migrants to urban areas seemed to be well represented in the relatively 
high and medium-paying occupations. If clerical and related occupations 
can be considered as reasonably high paying in relation to others, then 
between 23% and 37% of migrants in urban areas can be said to be in high- 
income occupations . (This proportion of migrants in relatively high-income 
occupations seems to be inordinately high compared to migrants in other 
Developing Countries, and seems to be so mainly because of the favourable 
economic position that educated individuals were able to attain, prior to 1970. 
Because of this a large number of persons aspired to secondary education and 
later came to Georgetown where suitable employment was most likely to be 
found. There they experienced a high degree of occupational mobility. ) 
14 
Further, if public sector service workers can be considered as, more or 
less, medium income employment, then a total of 7290 of migrants to 
Greater Georgetown were in high and medium paying jobs. Approximately 
another 20% of migrants were in production and related occupations in which 
incomes depended on the specific circumstances, and less than 7% were in 
15 
really low-income jobs such as labourers etc. 
Considering the agrarian nature of rural areas a somewhat high 
proportion of the rural-to-rural migrants moved to high paid jobs, which may 
be explained by reasons of job transfers of those employed in the rural 
services. However, as expected, the majority of 55.5% of migrants with 
rural destinations moved to employment in farm and related activities. Thus 
migrants to urban areas, despite their lower average educational attainment 
than destination populations, were not marginalised in a sense that they 
predominated in low income or poorly paid jobs; on the contrary, compared 
to those moving to other rural areas, those to urban areas moved to relatively 
well paid jobs . 
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(vi) Migrants by Mobility (Number of Moves Made) and Distance Travelled 
The number of moves made by migrants to place of residence in 1970 is 
analysed to show the degree of migrants' geographic mobility. 
Approximately 80% of all migrants were found to have made only one 
move from the place of their birth to the place of residence in which they were 
enumerated (see Table 12 in Appendix). However, those moving to Georgetown 
had a slightly higher mobility in that 19% made two moves compared to 14% 
making the same number of moves but going to rural areas. A relatively 
small proportion made more than two moves. Most of those finally moved 
to urban places or to interior regions of the country. 
To give an indication of place of origin of migrants, in terms of distance 
travelled, those arriving at Georgetown and the Suburbs are analysed. 
The data presented in Table i2 mentioned above generally seems to support 
the early postulate of Ravenstein which states that the majority of migrants 
proceed a short distance only. The migration data observed from the census 
reports show that 47T of migrants to Georgetown have originated from less 
than 40 miles 18°70 came from the medium distance of between 40-70 miles 
while 357 travelled over 70 miles. In terms of a ratio of movers to non- 
movers the pattern of movement was more or less expected, and in relation 
to the size of origin populations and distance located from Georgetown. An 
average of 99 out of every 1000 persons in the region less than 40 miles from 
Georgetown moved to it. The comparative rate for medium and long distance 
movers was 109 and 69 per thousand respectively. Thus Ravenstein's short- 
16 
moves hypothesis was not borneout for medium range migrants. 
Two possible reasons can be cited for this. One is that Georgetown! s 
influence was inordinately strong in the outlying regions of East Demerara, 
Essequibo Coast and West Berbice. Since it was difficult to commute 
long distances to and from the city it was most likely that this to a great 
extent influenced the migration decision, i. e. to move to the city. Another 
reason might be that there . had 
been some under enumeration of migrants 
in the city who originated from nearby districts. Since many children in the 
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East and West Coasts and East Bank districts would have been born in the 
Georgetown district they would not be considered as migrants to the city when, 
in fact, they were. Thus, persons from medium-distance, i. e. 40-70 miles 
from Georgetown, were shown to have a higher rate of in-migration to the 
city than those from nearby. 
Hence, in summary, migrants to urban areas (mainly to Georgetown) 
were young individuals in the ages of 15 to 40 years. As in most Latin 
American countries, females tended to have a slightly higher tendency than 
males to migrate. Africans were more mobile than East Indians with most 
of them moving to urban locations. Education seemed to be a strong 
variable in the decision to move. Due, in part, to the urban-rural disparity 
in educational facilities, migrants to Georgetown were less educated than 
the city population, taking both groups as an average. But despite this fact 
they were not marginalised, in a sense that they occupied mainly low-income 
jobs. And finally, migrants were not as mobile (geographically) as is the 
opinion of some observers . 
4. Causes of Internal Migration in Guyana 
In the absence of necessary information it is not possible to present the 
specific causes of migration, as such; rather, with the help of relevant 
published and unpublished material and primary sources of information the 
17 
broad causes are outlined. The causes are analysed mainly with respect to 
the rural-urban flows since those were the dominant flows and thus the most 
important. Reference is made to other flows whenever such is relevant. 
As previously stated, migration has been observed to occur in response 
to a set of factors in a special combination. Usually, the factors are of 
different weights. Each, or each set, exerts influence on the decision to 
move and choice of destination in accordance with their specific weighting. 
The view is taken here that in Guyana economic motives were principal in the 
decision to move process. 
18 
This, however, does not imply that economic 
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motives existed in isolation, or that such motives alone accounted for rural- 
urban and other migration in the country. It was complemented by relevant 
groups of social and psychological factors which in themselves were not 
powerful enough to determine the final decision, but nevertheless exerted 
considerable influence in shaping the decision and the consequent action. The 
following exposition attempts to show the causative factors and the social and 
economic background under which they operated to create migrant motiva- 
tions among sections of the rural population which eventually resulted in 
their out-migration. 
Broadly, the principal causes of rural out-migration in Guyana were rural 
population growth and rural underdevelopment. While very little could have 
been done to affect the former (it should be recalled from Chapter 2 that 
since the end of the Second World War the population of the country entered 
its most fertile demographic phase) much could have been done to improve 
the rural conditions of life and making rural areas attractive to living and 
thereby to retain its population. Because this was not done the two 
conditions combined to result in high rates of out-migration from rural areas. 
The result in 1970 was that migrants from rural areas comprised nearly 
a third of the entire urban population. In a more explicit analysis of why this 
was so the relevant institutional, economic, social and psychological and 
other factors of rural underdevelopment are presented below. Each of the 
factors is analysed separately. 
(i) Institutional factors 
Foremost among the factors here was why, in the first instance, rural 
underdevelopment or low development relative to urban, was permitted when 
it was that the sugar production, which was the economy's chief source of 
wealth, by necessity, was located in rural areas. The answer to this lies 
in the fact that the primary objective of the Sugar Planters was to obtain the 
highest returns at the lowest possible cost. The Colony's Administration, 
seated in the city, tended to protect the interests of Sugar Planters and the 
land owning and elite classes and so did very little to alleviate the deplorable 
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living conditions in rural areas. In fact their rural interest was a little more 
than casual, which was reflected in their post-war attempts to reduce the 
19 
effects of rural poverty and decay. 
As was seen in a previous section on Post War Planning Developments, 
there were no attempts at 'integrated planning' before 1966. The planning 
that was done was that investments were made on coastal projects that had 
the potentials of highest immediate returns? 
°As 
such, the investments were 
not in accordance with an overall framework and the result was that it helped 
to increase the inequality between the progressing and the stagnated areas. 
There was no attempt at diversification of agriculture, the country's main 
rural activity; rather, an increase in the rice and sugar acreages during 
this period accentuated the concentration of agricultural activity to these two 
crops, while the country had to import most of its food. The irony of the 
situation was that this situation was allowed to develop when both land and 
21 
labour in the country were surplus commodities. Also, there were few 
attempts to diversify the employment base of the rural population in terms 
of providing an impetus for creating a climate for the development of some 
agriculture or related industrial development. Thus the rural labour force 
had the limited options of entering into agricultural employment as small 
farmers, or to try to obtain estate employment as wage labourers, or 
to remain underemployed or unemployed in areas of growing impoverishment. 
(ii) Economic factors 
Rural underdevelopment to which rural out-migration is attributed was 
due to a number of reasons other than Administration biases and lack of 
planning foresight. Foremost among these 'other' reasons were economic 
reasons which finally determined whether the individual would migrate or not 
and the place of destination if migration did take place. Most of the economic 
reasons discussed here are concerned with the nature and causes of rural 
underdevelopment in the country prior to 1970. 
Firstly, rural underdevelopment was, to a great extent, due to the 
inability of peasant agriculture to provide for the wants of practising farmers 
- 79 - 
and their dependents. This inability, in itself, was due to a number of 
factors the foremost of which was the availability of land - the basis of all 
agriculture. Ever since the days of emancipation and the earliest rise of 
peasantry in the country land was in short supply. Given the size of the 
farming population and the amount of land available and suitable for agricul- 
ture it was ludicrous that peasants and small farmers should be faced with a 
continual shortage of Land in the country. Yet that was (and until now is) the 
situation. 
In 1970 there were an estimated 25,000 farmers in the country occupying 
22 
784,000 acres. The average size of holdings, if the land was to be shared 
equally, would be approximately 31 acres per farmer, but the actual holdings 
of farmers vary immensely. Small sized farms predominated. 5070 of all 
farms were under 15 acres, and occupied less than one quarter of the total 
acreage cultivated. The 'bottom end' of the land distribution spectrum was 
even more remarkable. A mere 4.2% of land holdings were in large farms 
but these accounted for 607 of the total land available. Until this point in 
time very little real attempts were made to redress this unequal distribution. 
The State, pursuing a policy aimed at preventing the alienation of State lands 
and fragmentation of cultivated plots, has made it extremely difficult for 
small farmers to obtain unoccupied and unused State lands while it is 
relatively easy for large operators to do so. Asa result relatively large 
farmers or influential (and wealthy) individuals manage to obtain large parcels 
of land at 'pepper-corn' rents. These then sublet parcels to small 'land- 
hungry' farmers at high rents. Thus while attempting to prevent land 
fragmentation, the State had actually accelerated it and so contributed to the 
growing gap between large landowners and poor rural peasants in the process23 
In addition to the shortage of land, a number of outstanding handicaps 
have served to make agriculture, especially rice-farming, which was done 
by the great majority of farmers, to be very unprofitable24 Since the early 
sixties mechanisation was introduced in the industry with a number of 
implications. Nearly all farmers had the heavy work of land preparation and 
harvesting done by tractors and combine harvesters. Thus by mechanising, 
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much of the back-breaking toil was removed but it also had some disadvantages. 
Machine costs were high, which resulted in ownership being limited to the 
larger farmers and, as such, resulted in the smaller farmers depending on 
them for machine hire. Mechanisation also resulted in declining yields 
as Table 2+ in the Appendix shows. Production in the 1960-70 decade was 
only maintained by increasing the acreage under cultivation. Also, while 
mechanisation made life easy for the farmer, it eroded the quality of his 
husbandry. Good husbandry, in terms of intensive cropping at high yields, 
was traded for extensive cropping at low productivity per acre which 
resulted in low profits and hence had serious implications on. the viability 
of rice farming as an economic activity. Further, it eventually resulted in 
many small farmers giving up farming for alternative sources of livelihood. 
Since there were few alternatives in rural areas it is reasonable to imply that 
many took the more promising option of migrating to urban areas where the 
probability of employment seemed greatest. 
The most significant effect mechanisation had on rice farming was that it 
made redundant four fifths of the labour formerly required on rice farms. 
It is estimated that the tractor and the combine harvester have reduced 
labour inputs on a 15 acre farm by at least 110 man days per crop, or by 
approximately 80 of the time needed to do the same jobs by traditional 
methods. Thus, mechanisation contributed to underemployment of the farmer 
and made redundant the casual labour in rural areas who depended on the 
seasonal (harvest and planting) employment In view of the relative 
permanence of mechanisation in agriculture it is rational to assume that all 
those among the displaced persons who could move did so to areas of 
employment and better opportunity, i. e. to urban areas. Hence rural out- 
migration was a direct result of farm mechanisation. 
Apart from the ill-effects of mechanisation, a number of other factors 
undermined the ability of farmers, particularly small farmers, to remain in 
agriculture, and hence in rural areas. For a significant proportion of these 
farmers the 'quasi-feudal relations' of production in agriculture in some 
areas have been the reason for rapid out-migration. 
26 
Many large landowners 




i. e. in Essequibo county, have living on their land peasants who during the 
1950's supplied labour and paid token rents for the 'usufruct' of small. plots 
but who, during the 1960's, were forced to pay exorbitant rents for land which 
they had farmed for a number of years. The alternative to this was that they 
could terminate their tenancies. Thus while, formerly, only the 'prepared' 
adult left the village for employment in Georgetown or in bauxite mining areas 
entire households were forced to out-migrate. 
On the whole rice farming, which was in 1968 estimated to be the basis 
of livelihood for 48,000 families, or involved approximately 60% of the total 
rural population, was beleaguered with innumerable problems, risks and 
difficulties which the poor incapacitated farmers were unable to overcome. 
Profits, after the 1963-64 period when rice prices paid by the monopsonist 
(Government) buyer were not related to costs, declined sharply. While large 
and medium sized farmers responded to this market situation by increasing 
their farms or by double cropping the smaller farmers could do little. Large 
farmers also intensified their mechanical operations and so employed fewer 
of the rural unemployed. 
Even in the well planned and Government controlled Land Development 
Schemes productivity and yields declined enormously due to Government 
failure to resolve outstanding bottlenecks to production. The assumed rice 
profits of G$ 103 per acre cultivated or an income of G$ 1552 per year in 
1961 declined to G$ 20 if wages for his labour was to be deducted from total 
costs 
7 
Thus, in the best of circumstances, rice farming for which the 
entire rural population and infrastructure etc. was geared, was unprofitable. 
As an economic activity it was inadequate to supply the basic wants of the 
farming population. In view of this, it would be quite rational to propose 
that farmers here should have turned to mixed cropping and other forms of 
agriculture. But this was hardly feasible since, apart from domestic need, 
there were no marketing arrangements for the relatively more perishable 
commodities. The lack of transportation was the single most important 
28 
factor disallowing such developments. 
Many farmers tried to supplement their failing farm incomes by 
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engaging in part or full time wage-employment outwith the farms. While 
negro farmers had an easier access to public works jobs, East Indians 
sought employment as labourers on the sugar estates. But there was a limit 
to the amount of (manual) labour the estates could absorb. Since the early 
fifties they too had embarked on a policy of more or less full mechanisation. 
As such, there was no longer a need for a large workforce. In fact the 
labour employed declined even when the acreage under sugar and the amount 
of sugar produced increased. 
Employment in the bauxite industry, which was the traditional source of 
employment for a large number of African migrant workers, did not increase 
significantly in the 1955-70 period. The reason was that the industry was 
very mechanised. Actual numbers employed remained around 5,500 over 
the years with the result that many in the mining areas had to subsist on 
secondary and other employment30 Thus the unsatisfactory returns from 
agriculture and declining employment opportunities in both sugar and bauxite 
industries resulted in a mass of rural persons seeking employment away 
from rural areas. While many were able to migrate overseas a great many 
proceeded towards the urban areas, mainly Georgetown and its suburban 
districts where employment prospects were brighter. 
(iii) Social Factors 
While employment opportunities or the probability of obtaining employ- 
ment at destination seems to have been the most significant reason for 
migrating a number of subsidiary considerations have exerted a very strong 
influence on the decision to move to urban areas. The most important of 
these was the poor rural living conditions with a dim view in the migrant's 
perspective of improvement in the near future. The level of services, which 
determine the level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction of rural living, was 
deplorable compared to that in urban areas. Some areas did not even have 
the most basic of services 
31 
. 
Prior to 1972 all the Plans and Development 
Programmes paid scant attention to housing, even with the knowledge of the 
As a result, post-war population growth the country was experiencing. 
32 
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housing was continually in chronic short-supply33 Overcrowing was rife34 
The 1960 and 1970 censuses showed that the majority of rural houses, in 
which the principal material of construction was wood, were old and in need 
35 
of repairs. 
Other services were equally poor and deficient. Health services were 
especially poor. Although there were 14 regional hospitals in rural areas 
until the mid sixties these catered primarily for the needs of the Sugar 
Estates for whose welf are many were originally set up. A number of health 
centres were established in the early sixties but these were woefully under- 
manned and suffered from a perpetual shortage of trained staff and medical 
supplies. Facilities for secondary education were acutely lacking36Sanitation 
and rural hygiene were either non-existent in many areas or very poor where 
present. Basic utilities, i. e. water supply and electricity, were available 
only in selected areas. Transport was the most debilitating of rural handi- 
caps. Most areas lacked adequate commercial and other facilities. Extensive 
travel had to be undertaken for whatever shopping, marketing, banking 
activities, etc. that were needed. 
(iv) Psychological Reasons 
It is widely believed that among sections of the rural population, i. e. in 
the African community and the relatively wealthier East Indian group, there 
was a response to the pull of the 'bright lights of the City'. (In this context 
'bright lights' is taken to mean that in the city there are avenues, e. g. 
social gatherings, dances etc. , in which to spend one's earnings and to 
have 
a 'good time' in doing so. Also 'bright lights' is taken to mean that urban 
living gives prestige to the individual or family to those remaining at the 
place of origin with which the migrant maintains strong links. ) In this sense 
there was a psychological-behavioural pull to Georgetown, but it is highly 
unlikely that this factor alone caused urban migration among those most 
likely to respond to it. The fact that many more Africans left the rural areas 
for urban was (as previously explained) due to their lesser involvement in 
rural agriculture, their long established urban links, and the expectation of 
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help upon arrival in the city. While such help minimises the difficulties of 
moving and adjustment etc. , it was not long lasting. If, hypothetically, there 
were no or few chances of being employed then the return migration would 
have been higher. But since it was negligible it can be assumed that it was 
not really 'bright lights' that pulled rural persons to urban areas but the 
more tangible chances of finding employment. However, the city 'bright 




(v) Other Factors 
There has been little decentralisation of employment activities from 
Georgetown. Over the years the Government machinery expanded substan- 
tially, providing 'white-collar' and other non-labouring jobs, which resulted 
in a tremendous 'pull' on rural persons of some education or 'other' 
qualifications to move to Georgetown. Complementing the rise of urban 
white collar employment was the disproportionate allocation of housing 
expenditure in favour of urban areas. In terms of wages and prices real 
urban incomes were significantly higher than rural. Most urban workers were 
members of active trade unions while no such organisations existed in rural 
areas except in the sugar industry. 
Thus, in review, land scarcity, fragmentation, mechanisation, declining 
profits in rice farming, and a contracting workforce in the sugar and bauxite 
industries relative to output, have contributed to rural out-migration. Other 
factors include the low level of development in rural areas, and the poor 
quality or non-existence of many basic services. 
S. Period of Entry of Migrants 
Since migrants dealt with here are internal migrants, period of entry in 
one population district also means period of departure from another. The 
intermediary moves are not taken into account. Place of birth is assumed 
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to be the migrant's place of origin. 
Despite the long history of black and brown mobility in Guyana there is 
substantial evidence to show that the recent rate of mobility and volume of 
movement have exceeded that of any former period. Also, in view of 
increasing rural awareness, rising expectations and the lack of rural 
opportunities, the direction of movement has been heavily biased towards 
urban areas, the principal of which is Georgetown. In the absence of 
specific data it is here attempted to verify the above by various direct and 
indirect means. 
The data on the period of entry of migrants to the usual place of residence 
in 1970 indicated that the majority of moves were of very recent occurrence 
(see Table 7 in Appendix). All areas received an average of 61.5% of their 
total in-migrants during the 1960- 70 inter-censal period. Compared to this 
volume, the movement occurring during the preceding 1946-60 14 year inter- 
censal period seems small, and the total movement prior to 1946 insignificant. 
However, the volume of migration during any period was related to the size 
of the origin populations of that period and as such, by itself, did not indicate 
the rate of movement. A good indication of the rate of mobility within a 
period can be obtained by comparing the ratio of movers to non-movers within 
that period, and by examining that ratio with population increases within that 
period. 
According to the census of 1946 there were only 24,229 migrants (movers) 
in the entire population, or only one in every 15 persons were not living at 
the place of his/her birth. During the 1946-60 census period the ratio of 
movers to non-movers increased to one in every seven persons being a 
migrant, and in the 1960-70 (10 year) period the mover to non-mover ratio 
further increased to become one in every three persons in the country not 
residing at the place of his/her birth. This geometric increase in the 
proportion of movers to non-movers is indicative of the increasing rate of 
38 
post-war mobility in the country. 
To show that the increase in mobility was not mainly a result of population 
increases, additions to the population are discussed in relation to the migrant 
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increases within the 1946-70 period. During the 1947-60 period the population 
increased by 51%, and the corresponding increase in mobility was 12370 over 
what it was in 1947. In the following 1960-70 census period the total 
population. increased by only 25% but the number of migrations (on the basis 
of one move per person) increased by 132%, which is a clear indication that 
39 
the rate of mobility was higher than population increases 
In terms of destination of migrants the census data does not show an 
increasing trend in the proportion of movers to urban areas, as the prevailing 
social and economic conditions in the country would seem to suggest. Prior 
to 1947, movement to Georgetown accounted for 39% of all movement within 
the country. In 1960 this proportion was reduced to 23.7% and remained 
around this level in 1970 (230). This seemingly substantial reduction in the 
proportion of migrations to Georgetown can be explained by two factors. One 
is inter-area movement, i. e. between rural areas, which had increased 
significantly over the period, and areas adjacent to Georgetown, i. e. East 
Bank Demerara, had become high in-migration areas. Nevertheless, despite 
its proportional decline as destination of migrants, Georgetown increased 
its attractiveness to migrants; as, clearly, most of those who moved to its 
three suburban districts moved indirectly to Georgetown, but because of 
housing etc. located themselves in the peripheral areas of the East and 
West Coasts and the East Bank of Demerara. Thus geographically, as 
taken by the census, these migrants moving to the above three areas were 
regarded as migrants to those areas and not to Georgetown which was the 
real destination of the migrants. 
The assertion made earlier that the population of Guyana was becoming 
increasingly mobile seemed to be fully justified from evidence presented in 
Table 8 in the Appendix. Reviewing this Table it will be seen that, on 
average, all areas received more than half of their total migrant population 
within the short period of ten years, i. e. between 1960 and 1970. Georgetown 
received 63.5% of its migrant population within this period, while the towns 
of Linden and New Amsterdam received 63.3% and 54.9% respectively. It 
cannot be said that the above migrant increases were due directly to 
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population increases. During the entire decade the population increased only 
by (approximately) 25% while migrant increases in urban and rural 
populations were, on average, over 60%. Thus clearly, the rate of population 
mobility was significantly higher than population increases. This pattern seems 
to have been the trend throughout the decade. Table 8 shows that in fact the 
rate of urban migration has risen dramatically towards the last years of the 
1960-70 decade. During the last 15 months urban areas, on average, 
received more than a third of their total migrants, which is cause for serious 
alarm0 
However, the above rate of increase seems statistically unfounded and 
seems to be due to data imperfections. This could have arisen from the 
respondents' erroneous interpretation of the census question. But nevertheless, 
the rate of urban migration seems to have been increasing throughout the 
decade. 
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6. The Patterns of Migration 
This section, using census and other relevant data, analyses the patterns 
of internal migration in Guyana. A knowledge of the spatial and temporal 
variations of the settlement pattern, the characteristics and orientation of 
the labour force, and a knowledge of the structure and functioning of the 
Guyanese economy, allows one to make a number of hypothetical deductions 
as to the patterns of population mobility in the country. The following are 
some of these deductions. 
Hypothesis one: Since Georgetown was by far the largest city and since it was 
most likely to have greater employment opportunities than elsewhere, most of 
the rural-urban flows would have been directed towards it. 
Hypothesis two: For the same reason, as above, it was also the main 
destination of inter-urban migrants. 
Hypothesis three: Since rural areas had few employment opportunities and 
generally poor services, return migration (from Georgetown) was negligible. 
Hypothesis four: Because the predominant agricultural areas had limited 
employment opportunities, and because a great many persons were not 
prepared to enter into agricultural employment, the rate of net migration 
from these areas was likely to have been the highest in the country. 
Hypothesis five: Since it is well known that Africans are generally more 
mobile than East Indians, rural areas having a high proportion of Africans 
would have high rates of net out-migration irrespective of whether the rural 
base was agricultural or not. 
Hypothesis one 
Since migration in Guyana was said to occur mainly in response to better 
economic and other opportunities it is obvious that such movement would be 
directed to or towards those centres where employment and. other opportuni- 
ties were greatest. Hence it was towards urban areas, mainly Georgetown, 
where such conditions were seen to prevail. A number of factors tended to 
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lead to creating such a situation. Georgetown was centrally located along the 
coast. One half of the country's entire population was located in it and within 
the distance of thirty miles from it: As previously mentioned, it was the 
chief port and centre of commercial and industrial activity in the country. 
As such it had nearly 80% of the total non-agricultural jobs that were 
available. Thus to potential migrants it was perfectly rational that they 
should move to Georgetown instead of other destinations. The Table below 
shows the extent of the preference for Georgetown as a migrant destination. 
TABLE 11 Comparing Rural-Urban Migration to Georgetown with the Next 
Most Popular Destination 1970 
Area of Origin 
Destination of Migrants % 
Georgetown Next Popular 
Place of Next 
Destination 
East Bank Demerara 40.1 19.8 West Demerara 
East Coast Demerara 45.3 10.9 West Demerara 
West Demerara 42.8 15.9 East Bank Demerara 
Essequibo Coast 44.0 18.6 West Demerara 
West Berbice 25.6 22.0 Rest Berbice 
Rest Berbice 35.0 22.3 New Amsterdam 
Interior Districts 52.2 14.6 Essequibo Coast 
(Average) (40.7) (17.7) 
Source: Population Census 1970, Vol. 5. 
An average of 407/0 of the total out-migrants from rural areas moved 
directly to Georgetown, which was nearly two and a half times more than 
those proceeding to the next population destination. On average, the 
proportion of migrants from the three rurban districts was only slightly more 
than that from the more distantly located rural areas. The most plausible rea- 
sons why migration from the three rurban areas was not more evident were that 
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the acute housing shortage in the city and relative ease of commuting might 
have deferred migration. But however, migration to the city of Georgetown 
per se was not the true indication of rural out-migration to it since it was 
strictly defined by geographical boundaries. A closer observation of 
Table 11 shows that four of the seven areas presented have either of the 
adjacent areas to Georgetown as the second most popular destination. (Even 
the three areas (see Table) that did not readily fit into the pattern where a 
rurban area was the second most important destination had approximately 
one fifth of their out-migration directed to the three rurban areas near the 
city. ) For reasons similar to that mentioned above, the migrations to the 
East Coast, East Bank and West Demerara were, in fact, migrations to 
Georgetown, and are here considered to be so. With this view the Table 12 
below gives a truer approximation of the attraction of Georgetown as a 
migrant destination. 
TABLE 12 Showing Migrants to Georgetown and its Environs by Place of 
Origin of Migrants 1970 
Place of Origin Proportion Moving to Georgetown and Environs 
East Bank Demerara 75.5 
East Coast Demerara 66.4 
West Demerara 69.5 
West Berbice 47.1 
Rest Berbice 55.1 
Essequibo Coast 76.8 
Interior Districts 71.2 
Average 66.0 
Source: Calculated from the Population Census 1970, Vol. 5. 
Thus, on average, approximately two-thirds of the total rural out-migration 
proceeded to Georgetown alone. Hence, the hypothesis that because Georgetown 
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had the greatest employment opportunities it would be the main destination 
of migrants seems valid. 
Hypothesis two 
Approximately 45% and 48% of the out-migration from Linden town and 
New Amsterdam respectively moved directly to the city of Georgetown. In 
each case this proportion was more than twice that moving to the next main 
destination. If, however, the true migration to Georgetown is observed then 
a total of 82% of the migrants from Linden and 60% from New Amsterdam 
had Georgetown as their destination. Thus migrants from urban areas too 
were strongly attracted to Georgetown. 
Hypothesis three 
In rural Guyana employment opportunities were limited to rice or 
vegetable farming for those fortunate enough to own land, or to employment 
as casual farm labourers, or sugar estate workers. In the event of 
migrating to areas of greater economic (employment) opportunities migrants, 
knowing their limited rural prospects, make a determined effort to do well. 
In this they might receive help from previous migrants or members of 
'family' etc. Thus migrants rarely returned to their place of origin for 
reasons of failing to adjust and improve their economic position above that 
prior to their departure. Even when migrants have done reasonably well, 
given their skills and capabilities, they tend to remain in Georgetown for the 
reason that their rural origin areas remain relatively undeveloped. Over 
the years they tend to acquire a taste for urban living, the benefit of 
superior urban utilities such as piped water, electricity etc. , and such 
services as housing, public health, transport etc. which are absent or very 
poorly developed in rural areas. Thus, from all areas excepting East Bank, 
shown in the Table below, rural out-migration to urban areas, and to 
Georgetown in particular, exceeded return migration by between 60% and 8070. 
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Net Loss/Gain to Area 
No. % 
East Bank Demerara 2527 2045 1498 59 
East Coast Demerara 11845 5510 - 6335 - 54 
West Demerara 7658 2698 - 4960 - 65 
West Berbice 2761 469 - 2298 - 83 
Rest Berbice 5883 1359 - 4524 - 77 
Essequibo Coast 1561 963 - 6598 - 87 
Interior Districts 2797 600 - 2197 - 79 
Source: Population Census 1970, Vol. S. 
Observing the Table closely it will be seen that the areas located more 
than 40 miles from Georgetown, i. e. West and Rest of Berbice, Essequibo 
Coast and Interior Districts, experienced high net losses. For every one 
migrant returning four did not. This was more or less expected since, 
compared to Georgetown or even the relatively more developed rurban areas, 
these areas had the least developad services and fewest employment 
opportunities outside agriculture. The more developed rural areas near to 
Georgetown, having slightly better services and avenues of employment, 
had a lower net outflow. For every ten persons out-migrating as many as 
four returned, which signifies a somewhat substantial return flow. 
However, there is strong reason to suggest that, on the contrary, the 
return flow was small - much less than that indicated by the Census. Since 
migrants were defined as persons not residing at their area of birth it was 
likely that babies etc. , originating in the rurban areas 
but born in hospitals 
which were geographically located in Georgetown, were counted as migrants 
to their usual place of residence. Thus, the volume of migrants returning 
from Georgetown was much lower than that stlown in Table 13. Hence, on 
the whole, because of limited employment opportunities and poor services, 
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return migration from Georgetown and similarly from the other two urban 
areas was small, which lends support to the previously stated Hypothesis 
three. 
Hypothesis four 
The slow pace of rural development has been a lamentable problem in 
Guyana. Until the end of the Second World War very few attempts were made 
to accelerate the development of rural areas. It was the domicile of the 
majority of the country's population who lived by cultivating rice and 
vegetables or worked on sugar estates. Because rural fertility, in terms 
of live births par number of persons, was higher than in urban or rurban 
areas, and because the rate of mortality was the same throughout the 
country, rural areas had a higher rate of population increase than the 
average rate of the country. 
2 
As a result of this high rate of increase, 
occurring more or less throughout the 1950's and 1960's, pressure on the 
available land and other resources was greatly increased. The need for 
land that was already in short supply became acute. Its very uneven distri- 
bution served to seriously aggravate the shortage, which gave rise to 
practices such as fragmentation and landlordism. Whatever farm employment 
that was available, labour saving innovations such as mechanisation and 
others were instrumental in reducing. Low profits in rice farming had 
served to deter enthusiasm for expansion and enfeebled the industry, making 
diversification and job creation activities impracticable. Thus, in the face 
of rising population there was a reduction of employment available and a lack 
of employment creation activities. 
In such a situation it was imperative for population entering the labour 
force and those made redundant to migrate to areas of better opportunity. 
Hence since dominant agricultural areas had fewer jobs and greater population 
increases it was logical that the net rate of out-migration (a function of in- 
and out-migration) would be higher than in the mixed activity rurban areas 
where more employment opportunities were available. 
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Also, the flow of information on urban wages, the attractive conditions 
of work and the relative superiority of urban services and facilities compared 
to rural had the effect of creating 'white collar' attitudes among the rural 
43 
work force. As part of-it was that there grew a general disdain for agricul- 
44 
tural work by all those who had average or higher than average education. 
Hence, the unwillingness to accept farming employment even when this was 
45 
available. Because alternative employment opportunities were not usually 
available this group then out-migrated in an effort to improve their dim rural 
prospects. Thus, as the Table below shows, the net out-migration was 
highest from the predominant agricultural areas. 
TABLE 14 Net Out-Migration from Rural Areas Ranked by Proportion of 
Population Involved in Agriculture 1970 
Rural Areas Net Out-Migration (per 1000 population) 
Essequibo Coast and Islands - 154 
West Berbice -145 
Rest Berbice - 44 
West Demerara - 56 
East Coast Demerara - 87 
East Bank Demerara + 155 
Source: Calculated from Population Census 1970, Vol. 5. 
From the Table above it will be seen that in Essequibo Coast and 
West Berbice where agriculture ranked foremost as the principal activity, 
the rate of net out-migration was highest. In these areas approximately 70-80% 
of the labour force (i. e. those in employment) were engaged either directly 
or indirectly in agriculture. Alternative employment was limited to a few 
service and 'public works' jobs in the areas46 The substantially low net rate 
of only 44/1000 persons out-migrating from Rest of Berbice can be explained 
by the fact that it was the furthest coastal district from Georgetown, and 
that it had greater employment opportunities than either Essequibo or 
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West Berbice. Three large sugar estates and a bauxite processing plant 
located within the area provided alternative non-farm employment for a 
substantial proportion of the population. Large numbers from its Corentyne 
district migrate periodically (seasonally) to the rice, sugar and banana 
plantations in neighbouring Surinam 
7 
Also, in its agriculture, land seems 
to be slightly more evenly distributed. A higher proportion of farms were 
economic sized holdings for rice cultivation which was the main crop. Thus 
a smaller proportion of farmers were prepared to migrate for wage employ- 
ment to supplement low farm incomes. And generally, a greater proportion 
of those who were not keen on agricultural employment found alternative jobs 
and so remained in the area. Hence the lower rate of net out-migration. 
In the rurban districts (see Table 14) the lower rate of West Demerara 
and higher rate of East Coast of Demerara can be explained by the following. 
First, the proportion of negroes, who will be shown later to be generally 
more. migratory, was lower in West Demerara's population. (See Table 5 in 
Appendix. ) Secondly, a substantial number of the East Indians in West 
Demerara were employed in the area's four sugar estates. East Coast with 
a 30% greater population only had two such estates48 Thirdly, during the 
1950's and 1960's proportionally more of the population along the East Coast 
had easier access to the city49 Hence along the East Coast more of the popu- 
lation were Africans, fewer employment opportunities were available and 
access to the city of Georgetown was easier. 
The high rate of net in-migration to East Bank of Demerara seems to be 
due to three factors. One was that it was a region of high in-migration (see 
Table 14 in Appendix). Another was that commuting to the city for 
employment etc was quite extensive, and finally it was the most industrialised 
of the rural or rurban areas. Thus, proportionally, it had the greatest 
amount of non-farm employment to retain its population or to delay their out- 
migration. 
Thus, in review, rural areas where agriculture was the main occupation 
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and alternative employment opportunities least, as in West Berbice and 
Essequibo Coast, the rate of net out-migration was highest. In Rest of Berbice, 
although having agriculture as the main occupation, the majority of the 
population had reasonable employment opportunities outside of farming. In 
the rurban districts, West Demerara had a greater proportion involved in 
agriculture, but the nearness of Georgetown and alternative employment 
opportunities within the area have resulted in it having lower rates of net out- 
migration than on the East Coast of Demerara, where the areas where 
agriculture was practised were similar to those on the Coast of Essequibo 
and in West Berbice. East Bank Demerara had fewest involved in agriculture 
and the greatest proportion (taking rural and rurban areas) of non-farming 
occupations, and hence it was an in-migration area instead of an out. Thus 
Hypothesis four, stated earlier, seems to be valid to some extent. Two of 
the three principal agricultural areas had high rates of net out-migration. 
But however, in Rest of Berbice and in West Demerara, where alternative 
opportunities to farming were available, the hypothesis tended to be weak. 
Hypothesis five 
The rate of out-migration from rural areas has been observed to be 
determined by the characteristics of the potential migrants. It is also the 
widespread belief that Africans have a higher propensity to migrate to urban 
and other areas. To test the validity of this statement the proportion of 
Africans in rural areas and their (rural areas) rates of gross out-migration 
are examined. Presented in the Table below are the rates of gross out- 
migration from rural areas ranked by the proportion of population of 
Africans in their population. 
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TABLE 15 Rates of Gross Out-Migration from Rural Areas Ranked by 
Proportion of Africans in the Population 1970 
Area % Africans in Gross Rate of 
Population Out-Migration per 1000 population 
West Berbice 32 275 
East Coast Demerara 30 219 
East Bank Demerara 28 220 
West Demerara 22 216 
Essequibo Coast 21 251 
Interior Districts 15 136 
Rest Berbice 13 122 
Source: Calculated from Population Census 1970, Vol. 5. 
As the Table clearly shows, except in the case of Essequibo Coast the rate 
of out-migration seems related to the proportion of Africans in the population 
and unrelated to the degree of agricultural activity in the out-migrating areas. 
West Berbice, with the highest proportion of Africans and having a 
predominant agricultural base (in which between 707/0 and 80% earn their 
livelihood from agriculture), had the highest rate of out-migration. At the 
other end of the regional distribution of Africans, Interior Districts and 
Rest of Berbice, having the same agricultural base as West Berbice but a much 
lower proportion (14%) of Africans in their populations, had a rate of out- 
migration that was lower than that of West Berbice by nearly 51% and 56% 
respectively. The rurban areas where economic activity was mixed had 
a slightly lower proportion of Africans in their populations and as such had 
lower rates of out-migration than West Berbice. 
Thus Hypothesis five seems to be valid. Irrespective of the economic 
base of rural and rurban areas those areas with a high proportion of Africans 
in their population experienced high rates of out-migration. The reason for 
this has to do with the fact that, on the whole, Africans tend to be disinclined 
towards farming as a means of livelihood. Few owned economic parcels of 
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land to enter into rice farming. 
51 
Rather they tended to prefer to seek 
employment in the Social Services, public works or related fields. Where 
such jobs were limited, as in the case of West Berbice, out-migration was 
high. In conclusion, areas in which Africans constitute a high proportion 
of the population experienced a high rate of out-migration. 
7. Implications of the Rate and Pattern of Rural-Urban Migration in Guyana 
Rural-urban migration may have a number of very desirable effects on 
both the receiving and sending areas. But, depending on the rate and pattern 
and other specific conditions under which it operates, it may also be the 
prime reason for disequilibrium and decline in both regions. Generally 
the range of effects depends on the rate and volume of out and in-migration. 
In Guyana the rate and volume of rural out-migration as it occurred in the 
post-war period was thought to have serious implications for rural develop- 
ment, urban conditions and hence for the economy as a whole. At the same 
time, it had been observed to have some notable advantages for the 
individuals making the move. The following analysis is intended to outline 
some of these implications in terms of advantages and disadvantages it 
conferred on rural and urban regions. 
Taking the adverse effects of rural-urban migration on urban areas first, 
it was noticed that in Guyana, as in a number of Developing Countries, 
migrants to urban areas were induced by the prospect of employment 
opportunities along with the expectation of higher wages, relative to that in 
their rural places of origin. The flows were thus not a response to a 
demand for labour in urban areas, and were not strictly subjected to the 
mechanisms of an equilibrium situation where the inflow would subside once 
the demand was met. Rather, continuing Government programmes of 
increasing urban employment, and the significantly higher urban wages, led 
52 
to a continual inflow of rural persons. 
The continuation of this rural-urban flow throughout the 1950's and 1960's 
had effects inimical to urban employment on the whole. At the beginning of 
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the 1960-1970 decade unemployment in Georgetown was estimated to be in 
the vicinity of 30970. By the mid-1960's it had declined somewhat, but by the 
end of the decade the increasing rapidity of rural-urban migration resulted 
in levels that were never experienced before. In the following 1970-1980 
decade this trend continued, with the result that, during the last years of 
the 1970's, a realistic approximation would put urban unemployment at 
between 307 and 40°70 of the labour force, with juvenile unemployment 
53 
considerably higher. 
The most prominent causation factor of the above magnitude and rate of 
increase of urban unemployment was the large flow of migrants from rural 
areas. The effect of this was that it disrupted the normal labour-market 
mechanisms of adjusting supply to demand and the processes through which 
this was done. Together with additions from natural increases, a perpetual 
surplus of semi-skilled and unskilled labour flooded the urban labour market. 
While this conferred some advantages to the urban employing sector, it had 
a number of disadvantages to the native population and to the general urban 
economy. Taking the latter first, it meant that more of the nation's labour 
resource was drawn to urban areas where many were, for varying periods, 
unemployed. During their period of unemployment it was most likely that 
they had zero or near zero marginal product. Thus, to the national economy, 
a concentration of a great portion of the labour force in urban areas, where 
unemployment was high and the period of 'waiting' long, was an inefficient 
use of one of the country's most valuable resources. 
The inflow of relatively qualified persons aspiring to administrative or 
clerical and related employment resulted in the increasing competition for 
such employment. The consequence of this was that State expenditure on 
education facilities had to be increased as individuals were forced to remain 
54 longer in schools to improve their qualifications. An influx of semi-skilled 
and lower-status manual workers caused unemployment of native workers 
in those categories to rise. Increased entry into the informal sector 
resulted in wages for such categories as domestics, etc. , to remain 
relatively static. Generally, in both formal and unregulated sectors, occu- 
pations that hitherto experienced a shortage of labour experienced a surplus 
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which they were unable to absorb, which eventually resulted in the lowering 
of wages and a rise in the level of unemployment. 
In addition to the above, the rapid inflow of rural persons resulted in an 
increase in the costs of job search, both in terms of time and income lost. 
Often, the arrival of newly qualified migrants resulted in the less qualified 
persons resorting to other than the usual means of job recruitment to avoid 
being marginalised. This led to highly biased and improper practices in 
employment recruitment that so often was a handicap to development. Often 
employment decisions were influenced by factors such as race, family 
connections, political affiliations, bribery, etc. , instead of allowing vacant 55 
or new posts to be filled by the most competent of those available. 
Another implication of rapid rural-urban migration was that it imposed 
significant external diseconomies in the form of congestion, environmental 
deterioration, and overloading the city's social services and social welfare 
programmes. The most notable effect was the housing shortage it created. 
Housing facilities in Georgetown, Linden and New Amsterdam have been 
inadequate since the early fifties56 Since then the inflow of migrants has 
served to aggravate the shortage. Originally, the three urban areas were 
zoned into high and low density housing areas to correspond with income and 
other class differences in the cities' populations. The migrant flows were 
mainly directed to the cheaper but more crowded wards. The result was 
acute overcrowding, slums and shanti-town development in those wards. 
A review of the housing statistics in Georgetown, in 1970, indicated the 
distressing state of urban housing in which nearly a third of the country's 
population resided. Nearly 50% of all households had five parsons or more. 
A fifth had as many as eight or more persons residing in one unit of three 
rooms. As could be expected, sanitary facilities were generally poor. 
Nearly 40°70 of all households shared toilet facilities, and less than 50°70 had 
their toilets linked to the sewer network. This factor, together with 
inadequate maintenance of the city's open drain system, created a serious 
57 
health hazard to city inhabitants. 
The picture of the general urban statistics masks the full social impact 
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of in-migration. A truer approximation can be obtained if conditions in a 
typical in-migrant area are compared with a residential area. The housing 
areas, or wards, chosen are Albo:: ystown as the in-migrant area and 
Queenstown as the residential area. In the former the average household size 
exceeded six persons, while in the latter it was only between four and five 
persons. More important is that houses in Queenstown were larger and more 
spacious, which meant that there was little overcrowding. In Albouystown 
however, 80% of the households had on average two rooms or less. Thus, 
there was considerable overcrowding in Albouystown. The poor conditions 
were not only in housing. Overcrowding in Albouystown led to the general 
poverty of the environment. All of the available land was taken up in high 
density housing of which, in Guyana's case, only a small percentage was 
owner-occupied. Hence overcrowding, and unwillingness on the part of 
owners to effect repairs, resulted in the rapid ageing of the buildings with 
the effect that entire wards took on a slum appearance and were regarded as 
58 
such. 
This, however, did not lower the rate of in-migration to those areas. 
The fact that housing was cheap there resulted in a large number of arrivals. 
Between 1960 and 1970 indications are that the rate of increase in overcrowded 
areas such as Albo ystown was twice that of residential areas such as 
Queenstown. In-migration then contributed directly to overcrowding and 
slum creation, and hence the social conditions that are congenital and 
endemic to such areas can be attributed directly to it in such circumstances. 
In addition to creating external diseconomies mentioned earlier, rapid 
rural-urban migration as has occurred in Guyana also created a number of 
stresses on basic city services. The higher rate of city growth in terms of 
the capacity of services resulted in a continual deterioration of those services. 
To cater for unplanned growth placed severe financial burdens on the city 
councils. Changing city morphology brought about by land speculation, a 
by-product of uncontrolled migration, presented immense difficulties to city 
planning agencies and actively hampered urban development programmes. 
Although rapid rural-urban migration had a number of negative effects on 
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urban areas, it did confer some notable benefits. First and foremost, it 
increased the supply of skilled and unskilled labour to the urban labour 
market. This facilitated the increase in the growth of manufacturing and 
processing establishments that occurred in and around Georgetown during 
the latter half of the 1960-1970 decade. It assured an adequate supply of 
labour in all employment types - particularly in providing labour for the 
lower-paid lower-status jobs, i. e. municipal cleaning workers, domestics, 
casual labour, etc. In a sense, " the flow of skilled and educated persons to 
Georgetown, Linden and New Amsterdam contributed to the functioning of 
the Government civil and public services in those areas. 
Secondly, urban areas, in particular Georgetown, benefited substantially 
from capital flows from rural areas. This flow was usually cash flows 
brought to the capital by small entrepreneurs who were disenchanted with 
the business climate in rural areas, and were attracted by the size and 
59 Another important form of revenue from diversity of the Georgetown market. 
rural areas was in the form of investment in a 'town property'. Urban 
property values were increasing by a significant annual margin and, as such, 
the purchase of a town property was viewed as a sound investment. Although 
only a small percentage of migrants were able to acquire such properties, 
it nevertheless represented a substantial drain on rural resources. Cash 
flows also accompanied migrants. It was quite common for unemployed 
migrants or children at school in the city, where the best schools were, to 
receive financial support from the family at home. 
Thirdly, urban areas would have benefited from the general increase in 
employment creation brought about directly and indirectly by the inflow of 
migrant skills, capital and entrepreneurs60 Both the Manpower Survey in 
1965 and the Population Census in 1970 indicated that Georgetown had the 
lowest rate of unemployment in the country. Also, the above survey 
showed that during the 1965-69 four-year period, the number of establish- 
ments in Georgetown employing five or more persons had increased from 
495 to 72661 This was during the period when the rate of rural-urban 
migration was increasing, and thus it could be presumed that migrants had 
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some impact on mitigating high and rising unemployment. Also, increased 
income generated by an increase in the numbers employed was available for 
income-generation through its multiplier effects, to the benefit of the urban 
economy. 
Fourthly, the concentration of population that migration helped to bring 
about in urban areas allowed a returns-to-scale relationship between 
investment and the provision of certain social and public services, i. e. 
public water supply, electricity, sewage and waste disposal, policing, etc. 
By the above, and in a number of other specific ways too numerous to mention, 
urban migration has contributed to the gradual centralisation of resources 
to allow for greater economies of scale to operate in Georgetown, Linden 
and New Amsterdam. 
It was obvious that since most of the country's wealth was created in 
rural areas the loss of the wealth creation factor, i. e. labour, through 
migration would have several serious implications on the rural and national 
economy. In most circumstances out-migration was followed by a loss of 
production which deepened the general depression surrounding rural areas 
62 
Out-migration tended to induce further migration. The policy, scope and 
content of rural education contributed to high out-migration of school leavers 
63 
instead of retaining and re-training them to develop the rural economy. 
However, rural out-migration did not cause depopulation as it might have in 
a developed economy. The reason for this was that rural fertility was high; 
but, nevertheless, it entailed a loss of population, and particularly that 
portion which was most ambitious, articulate and energetic, and could have 
agitated by various means for improved rural conditions. Also, since 
migration was age-selective, it resulted in increasing the dependency ratio 
in rural areas while doing the opposite in urban. 
The most significant effect of rural-urban migration was its effect on 
rural agricultural production. This sector had always been the mainstay of 
the economy - providing food and accounting for about one fifth of the country's 
total gross domestic product. It was also the main export earner and the 
major source of employment for about a third of the entire country's work 
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force. The loss of rural labour, i. e. farmers and farm labourers, resulted 
in a slump in production relative to population increases. This occurred in 
two main ways. First, the out-migration of farmers and farm labourers 
contributed to the sluggish pace of agricultural production. During the 1960's 
production increased by approximately 1.5% per annum compared to 
population increases of 3% per annum. The failure of production to equal 
population increases was due, primarily, to the failure of sugar and rice to 
expand64 While sugar production was externally controlled, rice was not. 
Its cultivation was significantly increased during the 1960's, but productivity 
per acre declined drastically resulting in lower total production than formerly, 
when acreage cultivated was lower and productivity higher. (See Table 2.4 
in Appendix for the increase in rice cultivation and the decline in productivity 
per acre. ) 
Second, mechanisation and labour saving innovations became widespread 
and replaced labour intensive high-production methods for extensive 
cultivation at a lower unit productivity. In the process it made the smaller 
farmers much more underemployed and the pool of seasonal farm tabour 
redundant. Because farm incomes were generally low and inadequate and 
farmers - mainly small farmers - were freed from farmwork, many sought 
employment in wage occupations in urban areas or out of farming. Hence, 
they had divided loyalties, the result of which was that rice farming, which 
was more risky and yielded lower profits, was undertaken with less effort 
and lower husbandry. Thus production declined. Another factor responsible 
for declining production was that during the mid-sixties the new PNC-UF 
regime coming to office effected a number of changes that were seen to 
undermine the viability of rice farming 
S In reaction, many East Indian 
farmers (who were generally anti-government) withdrew their labour, i. e. 
give up their rice-farming activities entirely for wage tabour or continued 
in a low keyed fashion. Children from such households were discouraged 
from becoming farmers. Thus the farming population did not increase, and 
66 
neither did production 
Due to the withdrawal of a significant portion of farm labour, wages in the 
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industry increased steeply. 
7 
In many cases it was over and above the value of 
work done, making it uneconomical for small farmers to employ additional 
labour which was necessary due to the seasonality of rice or the seasonal 
demands of vegetable farming. As such, many farmers limited their cultiva- 
tion to acreage for which their household labour was adequate. Larger farmers 
on the other hand preferred not to enter into mixed farming but to substitute 
labour for machinery and cultivate crops that were not land-intensive. 
These developments had a number of repercussions to rural areas. 
First, the withdrawal of labour leading to the demand for higher wages meant 
that small scale farming became less viable. Secondly, the withdrawal of 
both labour and farmers meant that production could not increase in step with 
population increases. Thirdly, the substitution of labour for machinery led 
to an increase in the cultivation of labour un-intensive crops. This meant 
that land, in which the State had invested heavily in the form of drainage 
and irrigation, was not optimally utilised. And fourthly, since only the 
larger farmers were machine owners and peasant farming under mechanisa- 
tion (or with inputs of same) was not profitable, small farmers became 
progressively poorer and more dependent on their larger counterparts. Thus 
indirectly, out-migration which led, in part, to the creation of such 
conditions, helped to increase the income gap between poor and not-so-poor 
farmers. 
It would be untrue to say that rural-urban migration in Guyana was wholly 
disadvantageous to rural areas. In fact it did bestow some notable benefits, 
some of which are discussed here. First, education in rural areas was 
not oriented towards training individuals for agricultural occupations but 
for clerical and related which were not available. Thus rural-urban migra- 
tion acted as a safety valve, which allowed the outflow of population which 
rural areas did not have the capacity to absorb. Secondly, since most of 
the migrants were sponsored in their initial move, there was a remittance 
of cash to rural origin areas - which to some extent lessened the impact of 
the loss of rural cash to urban areas in the first instance. The few migrants 
who did return usually did so with a reasonable amount of cash to cause 
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some impact in their area of return. Also frequently East Indian migrants 
68 
would send cash to either improve family dwellings or to purchase land. 
The establishment of a member of the family, kin or close friend in any 
of the urban areas meant a significant amount of personal mobility between 
that area and its rural base. This facilitated the diffusion of relevant urban 
information to family at home, and to the community. Benefits to the 
community were obvious. More rural persons who were unemployed, or 
who could increase their incomes by migrating, were induced to and finally 
did so. The continual dissemination of information on urban life-styles, 
mannerisms, consumption etc. gradually drew the more or less self- 
sufficient communities into the 'urban monetary nexus'. Money became 
increasingly important and led to some transformation in agriculture. 
Market gardening became the important agricultural type in the peripheral 
areas of Georgetown. 
The degree of modernisation and liberalisation that is generally brought 
about by migration led to the discontinuation of a number of backward and 
antiquated rural practices and beliefs. East Indians were aroused from 
their nonchalant outlook on life. Many in this ethnic group realised that a 
livelihood could be obtained from a number of activities other than rice- 
farming, and so abandoned their farming activities for higher income 
occupations. Rural Africans too gradually expanded their horizons through 
migration: They became aware of the attractive employment and other 
opportunities existing in Linden and Georgetown and rapidly migrated to 
those areas. Gradually, migration effected a change of rural attitudes, life- 
styles and orientation in even the remotest of communities. Those areas 
that were closer to Georgetown and New Amsterdam began to imbibe a pro- 
urban outlook that was reflected in the similarity of their production and 
consumption to urban areas. Thus rural-urban migration, during the period 
of analysis, served to lower the rate of employment among certain sections 
of the rural population, and in so doing it allowed more rural persons to 
benefit from the higher urban incomes and the generally improved living 
conditions in urban areas. 
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From the individual migrant's point of view, migration from the 
relatively stagnated rural areas was a sound investment. Despite the high 
rate of urban unemployment and the long period of waiting in some cases, 
migrants on the whole seemed to have enjoyed greater economic success 
than their counterparts who stayed behind69In urban areas those migrants 
who found employment were able to benefit from the high urban wages 
available there, and from superior urban facilities such as housing, 
commercial, recreation and services, i. e. education, health, etc. Also, by 
migrating, migrants greatly improved their 'social standing' and that of 
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their family in the community at home. The alternatives to migration were 
bleak in particular, if the rural individual did not own an economic parcel 
of land or machinery, or was employed as a civil or public service employee 
of which there were few posts in rural areas. In the case of the small 
farmer who was not able or inclined to migrate, life became a ceaseless 
toil for poor returns. In the case of a landless labourer too poor to migrate 
it was even worse. Employment was irregular, wages low and conditions 
of employment, at best, were poor. 
In conclusion rural-urban migration in Guyana in the post-war period 
(up to 1970) had a number of disadvantages and, at the same time, benefits 
to the sending (rural), receiving (urban) and the national economy. From 
the sending areas it entailed a loss of the 'cream' of its population. In some 
areas this loss resulted in. rural areas becoming more depressed and 
stagnated. To the national economy the out-migration of practising and 
potential farmers and farm labour resulted in a loss of vital agricultural 
production and so food supplies and export earnings to the country. However, 
benefits to the nation as a whole were that more persons were earning the 
higher wages of urban areas and benefiting from the improved living 
conditions there. Advantages of rural-urban migration were that it acted as 
a safety valve in relieving high rural unemployment, remittances sent were 
a valuable source of rural cash, and increased mobility which resulted from 
migration caused a gradual assimilation of rural areas into the urban 
monetary economy. 
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8. Conclusions 
It is the observation here that rural-urban migration in Guyana 
is not a simple process. With the exception of the =expected incomes 
model of Todaro, most, of the models discussed earlier seem only to 
explain partially Guyanese migration, or are of little relevance. 
It should be noted that it was not possible to test the Todaro 
model in Guyana for lack of precise data on urban and rural wage 
levels or the level of employment in rural and urban areas. Neverthe- 
less, the model seems to have much more relevance to the observed 
pattern of Guyanese migration than the other models examined. Support 
for this view comes from the observation that the highest rates of 
rural-urban migration are from the poorest agricultural areas where 
urban-rural disparity is expected to be highest and so the difference 
in expected rural and urban incomes greatest (pp. 9I-97). 
If we treat each ethnic and educational group separately Todarots 
model appears to explain migrant decision-making and the patterns in 
which Guyanese migrate. Taking African migration, they have been 
shown to have a low level of land (and property) ownership in rural 
areas (pp. 97-98) and a lesser tradition of farming and so could be 
expected to have a relatively low net income stream in rural areas. 
But since this group had a higher level of education than others (p. 65) 
and a long tradition of urban migration (pp. 68,73) and the fact that 
a number of 2cul-tural factors' operate in their favour to give a 
relatively high probability of urban employment and hence, incomes, 
their rate of out-migration was higher than other groups (pp. 74; 
97-99). 
Similarly, East Indians, who were the major rural land-owners 
(p. 65), had a stronger rural economic base and little tradition of 
mobility. Because of this and because a number of 'cultural factors= 
operate to keep their employment probabilities and expected incomes 
low, this group had a low rate of urban migration. Hence the model 
would indicate that Africans are likely to have a relatively high 
rate of rural-urban migration while East Indians, a lower rate which 
. fact is corroborated by the 
data presented in sections three to six 
of this chapter. 
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In their applications of the model in Africa, Todaro and Godfrey 
used average rural and urban wage and employment rates, thereby 
implying a certain degree of homogeneity in the societies they were 
examining. Because of the sharp ethnic and cultural diversity pre- 
sent in Guyana (see Chapter II) and the fact that 'irregular factors' 
influence urban job recruitment (p. 101) the use of such simple wage 
and employment, assumptions seems to be a dangerous simplification. 
It would be wiser to apply the model hierarchically to each group 
even though, as shown above, it would appear to fit at the micro level. 
Secondly, the model does not seem to take into consideration the 
indirect benefits that accrue to the migrant by way of spouses= and 
childrents income which may very well influence the rural individualts 
decision to migrate (p. 21). Thirdly, it is the view here that the 
model could better fit the Guyanese situation if the basis of decision- 
making is changed from the individual to the family. This however 
does not alter the basic decision-making framework; it only implies 
that the family, in this case, behaves as the rational decision making 
unit. 
Despite the above shortcomings, the Todaro model seems the most 
useful of those discussed in the Guyanan context. First, the model 
shows that as long as wages in Georgetown, Linden and New Amsterdam 
are higher than rural wages, and opportunities to obtain that wage 
seem to exist, migration from rural areas is likely to continue. 
Secondly, in the poorest agricultural areas such as Essequibo Coast 
and West Berbice (see pp. 94-97) where the difference in expected 
rural and urban income streams is likely to be highest the rate of 
urban migration would also be highest, whereas in East Berbice and in 
the rurban areas of Demerara, where the difference is lower, the rate 
of urban migration is likely to be lower (see Tables 13 and 14 in text). 
Thirdly, since Georgetown is the main employment centre (pp. 89-90) 
it has the highest probable net returns which explains why it was the 
main destination of migrants (pp. 89-92). 
Fourthly, to a large extent the model explains the character or 
selectivity of migrants. They are mainly young individuals because 
the ability to earn and achieve high incomes seems to increase with 
time spent in the urban area. The educated seem to have a higher 
propensity to migrate since the difference between their rural and 
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urban net income streams appears to be greater than others at the 
place of origin. Female migration seems to be greater than male for 
the same reason. Also, this reason explains the differential ethnic- 
migration observed (see pp. 97-98). 
The Todaro model also seems to have relevance to policy making 
in Guyana which sets it apart from most migration models. We may 
regard the model as an index of local under-development. Applied at 
the micro-level by place and by race it can show which groups are 
migrating from where and the rate of migration. With relevant data 
the model might be useful in predicting the rate of rural-urban 
migration and so be a useful tool to planners and decision-makers in 
calculating levels of urban congestion, employment requirements, 
future housing and other welfare needs. However, since it is the 
opinion here that the rate and pattern of rural out-migration has a 
net negative effect on sending areas, and that agriculture forms the 
only feasible basis for prosperity in the future in Guyana, the 
following chapter sets out to examine more fully the causes of rural 
under-development and to suggest a set of policies designed to improve 
the rate of rural development and so to arrest rapid rural-urban 
migration and to minimise its negative effects. 
i 
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CHAPTER IV 
POLICIES TO ARREST RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION 
CHAPTER IV 
POLICIES TO ARREST RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION 
1. Introduction 
In view of the consequences of migration presented in the preceding 
chapter a radical development strategy with a heavy rural bias is urgently 
needed if the present down-turn in the economy is to be halted and momentum 
generated for continued economic growth and social development. This 
chapter sets out to present some of the more important policies of such a 
strategy and to emphasise their development implications to the economy. It 
begins by examining the present trend of decline in the major export sectors 
and to note its consequences in generating further decline. It then identifies 
the main reasons for the decline and, in some detail, discusses some of 
these with evidence from the two major rural activities - sugar and rice 
production. Finally, it presents a package of policies needed to bring about 
an appropriate rural-urban economic balance, which is a necessary 
precondition if the rate of rural out-migration is to be arrested and from 
which integrated rural and national development can be initiated. 
2, Recent Trends in the Economy 
From a development perspective the 1970-80 decade was one of growth 
and decline to the Guyanese economy. The decade began with the economy 
growing fairly steadily but after reaching a peak by the middle of the decade 
it declined sharply. As an indication of its performance, the average annual 
increase of the gross domestic product (GDP) at current factor prices 
during the decade was nearly 12%. However, nearly all of this growth 
occurred during the 1970-75 period, as the following table shows. From the 
beginning of the period of decline in 1976 the average rate of increase was 
only 2% compared to nearly 20770 in the 1970-75 period. 
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TABLE 16 Gross Domestic Product at current factor cost, 1970-1980 
(G $Mn. ) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
GDP 467 500 529 576 865 1093 1055 1006 1056 1170 
Percent 
769 50 26 -4 -5 5 11 Annual Increase 
Sources: 1. The Guyana Economy, General Facts and Development 
Prospects, Min. of Information, 1976, Georgetown 
2. Bank of Guyana Annual Reports, Georgetown 
3. Budget Speeches, 1977,1978,1979 Min. of Economic Dev. & 
Cooperatives, Georgetown. 
It should be noted that the seemingly high average rate of increase in the 
1 
GDP was not due to increases in the economic sector but to services . Since 
prices fluctuated greatly during the decade, the GDP at current factor cost is 
not a highly useful measure of real growth. At constant factor prices the 
increases were rather modest. At 1976 prices the average annual growth 
was only 2.7%o in the more prosperous first half of the decade. Since then the 
economy has stagnated showing very little or no growth and a period of an 
actual reversal of growth. 
The degree of openness of the Guyanese economy was unaltered during 
the decade. Many of the consumer and intermediate and all of its capital 
goods were imported. The extreme dependence on the exports of sugar, 
bauxite and rice also continued. Together these three products accounted 
for an average of over 90% of total exports by value. As a result of this, the 
failure or low production in these industries has had adverse effects on the 
entire economy. This was reflected in the second half of the decade when 
the production of the two main export commodities, sugar and bauxite, 
declined (see table below). 
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TABLE 17 Production of Sugar and Bauxite in the First and Second Half of 
the 1970-1980 Decade 
Industry Average Production (tons) % Increase °Decrease 
1970-1974 1975-1979 
Sugar 325 299 -8 
Bauxite 2812 1895 -33 
Sources: 1. Bank of Guyana Annual Reports 
2. Budget Speeches 1979,1980. 
Since the decline occurred at a time when imports were dearer its 
effects were extreme. The most serious outcome was that it led to a large 
balance of payments deficit, which endangered the country's international 
credit worthiness. In fact, by the end of 1976 declining production along with 
declining value of exports resulted in the foreign exchange situation becoming 
so critical that the country was forced to exist on a hand-to-mouth basis. Its 
survival was only maintained by running its international reserves and by 
substantial capital inflows by way of overseas loans. Even with this facility, 
at the end of 1979 the deficit on the current account was 184 million dollars 
or 157 of the country's Gross National Product. 
TABLE 18 Imports and Exports of Goods and Services and Balance of 
Payments 1970-1979 (G $Mn) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Imports -350 - -367 -457 -660 -936 -1080 -801 -700 -785 
Exports 305 344 333 650 908 745 661 745 737 
Deficit -45 -23 -124 -10 -28 -335 -140 +45 -48 
Sources: 1. The Guyana Economy, op cit 
2. Ministry of Economic Development, Georgetown 
3. Budget Speeches, 1979,1980. 
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The foreign exchange famine also seriously affected the country's 
external debt obligations, the servicing and capital payment of which has to 
be made in foreign currency. A conservative estimate puts the country's 
external debt in 1978 at 761 million dollars which is a 43% increase since 
the country began to experience trade deficits since 1976. 
In response to the foreign exchange predicament that seriously affected 
the welfare of all Guyanese, the Government, instead of devoting all its 
energies to stimulating and diversifying production, embarked on an 
austerity programme. (It should be noted that many of the non-essential 
consumer items were already controlled. ) A vigorous policy of import 
restraint was pursued as the view was held that this was the practical way of 
solving the foreign exchange crisis. The main instrument of this policy was 
the External Trade Bureau set up to monitor internal needs and to allow the 
importation of only those goods which were considered essential. In this way 
the Government had complete control over all imports and was able to effect 
further cutbacks on the level which was already very conservatively set. As 
a result import cutbacks of 26% and 12% were achieved in 1977 and 1978 
respectively. Although such cutbacks gave some respite by way of 
reducing the import bill, by being overzealous and insensitive to local needs 
they reduced the importation of goods that were essential to the well-being of 
the economy. This actually hindered attempts at revival and contributed in 
the following way.. to accelerating the decline. 
First, by severely restricting the importation of essential items of food 
and semi-durables, which either could not be produced locally in sufficient 
quantities to meet local demand or for which substitutes were unavailable, 
it created an acute shortage of food and items of everyday household use. 
This created a chaotic situation in the country. Queueing for selected 
consumer items, as is common in many Socialist economies, became wide- 
spread. The hoarding of foodstuffs and blackmarketing aggravated the 
shortage situation. Prices, as a result of these developments, doubled and 
quadrupled within a short period. Secondly, the reduction of intermediate 
goods, which included fuels and lubricants, spare parts and accessories etc, 
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that resulted from the Government's import policy created a severe bottleneck 
to agricultural and other production and to services. Thirdly, the reduction 
of capital goods such as construction and transport equipment, agricultural 
machinery, building materials etc brought much of the Government's 
Development Programme to a virtual halt. The shortage of agricultural 
machinery such as tractors, harvesters etc was disastrous to the food 
production drive. Except for a few-high priority Government projects the 
periodic shortages of essential building materials such as cement etc, 
drastically reduced public sector and private activities in the building and 
construction sector. 
The climate of shortages and allegations of widespread public sector 
corruption and mismanagement (that was seen to have created the shortages) 
generated a tremendous amount of unrest and Government opposition. One 
form in which this was expressed was in waves of industrial action that 
crippled production in key industries such as Sugar and Bauxite. An example 
of this is that in 1978 and 1979 the number of strikes and man days lost 
resulted in sugar production falling short of its expected target by 107 and 
17T respectively. In the case of bauxite it was even higher at 16% and 17% 
(see table below). 
TABLE 19 Number of Strikes, Man Days Lost and Production Shortfalls 
1978,1979 
Industry No. of Strikes Man Days Lost 
Production % 
Shortfall 
1978 1979 1978 1979 1978 1979 
Sugar 241 158 72875 139091 10 17 
Bauxite 14 15 - 173441 16 17 
Source: Budget Speech 1980, op cit 
The situation of shortages and unrest in the latter half of the decade was 
a major setback to production. Production of sugar and rice, the two major 
crops, fluctuated tremendously throughout the decade. On average, sugar 
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production throughout the 1970-80 decade was slightly above its 1970 produc- 
tion but significantly below Government production targets. Rice production 
fluctuated even more than sugar. Taking the production in 1970 as a constant 
the average production in the decade was below that of 1970 and this was in 
spite of the massive Government campaign to double production by the end of 
the 1970 decade. Production of other food crops increased appreciably but 
in many cases it was below target levels. There was a small increase in 
meat production due mainly to increases in poultry production. Egg produc- 
tion also increased but milk and dairy products declined drastically. 
Manufacture increased appreciably until 1974. Indications are that this level 
was maintained through the decade. Mining, however, mainly bauxite mining, 
declined significantly. The production of dried bauxite declined to below 40%o 
of its 1970 level. The higher priced calcined bauxite showed a slight 
increase. 






1965 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1979 
Sugar '000 tons 310 100 100 102 110 106 104 96 
Rice 142 116 100 66 101 77 127 100 
Coconuts Mn nuts 28.5 116 100 93 86 110 *82 - 
Ground 
Mn lbs 40.5 - 100 110 121 118 * 133 - Provisions 
Plantains & 
ff 33.6 - 100 96 92 102 *112 - Bananas 
Citrus 91 23.0 117 100 104 111 100 *117 - 
Meat (Beef) 8.8 98 100 109 94 100 - - 
Milk Mn gals 4.3 102 100 84 56 63 - - 
Eggs " eggs 24.2 74 100 110 141 174 - - 
Bauxite '000 tons 3293 - 100 80 74 52 *50 55 
Manufacture - 100 - 100 120 147 - - - 
* 1977 production 
(Table was compiled from various sources and own calculations) 
Sources: / 
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Sources: 1. Bank of Guyana Annual Reports 1976,1977 
2. IBRD - Current Economic Position and Prospects of Guyana, 
Vol II Agriculture, Central America and Caribbean Dept - 
Tables 1-6 appendix 
3. Ministry of Agriculture, RD & Planning Div, Georgetown 
4. Ministry of Economic Development, Annual Stat Abstract 1974, 
Tables 1-1 to 1-9. 
Since exports remained low the Government, which was the major 
employer, had to curb its annual intake and redeploy or make redundant all 
'posts' deemed 'non-essential'. This, along with contracting employment in 
the private sector, caused unemployment and underemployment to rise to 
unprecedented levels2. The Government also instituted a package of wage 
increases in which the basic wage increased by 100% since 1976. This gave a 
fillip to inflation and deepened the recession. Partly as a consequence of 
these factors, the rate of crime and lawlessness in the country soared 
dramatically. The apparent failure of the security forces to arrest this 
trend resulted in a perpetual state of uneasiness and insecurity in the country. 
Another disquieting trend was that the shortages and their resultant effects 
tended to polarise the two main groups, East Indians and Africans. 
The most significant development during the decade, in spite of 
Government attempts at laying the infrastructural foundations for national 
development, was the increasing urban-rural differentials in income and 
general conditions of life. Rural areas experienced the higher rates of 
population growth and suffered from steadily increasing underemployment and 
'open unemployment'. Shortages were more acute and prices higher. The 
effects of Government cutbacks in services and the recession of the Govern- 
ment development programme were more pronounced here than in urban 
areas. 
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3. Causes of Recent Decline 
Observing the Guyanese economy two trends are immediately identifiable. 
One is that production on the whole has been sluggish. In some cases, such 
as in sugar and bauxite, it has been declining with the result that the volume 
of exports has also been declining. The other is that attempts to diversify 
production and exports have not been very successful. The economy continues 
to depend heavily on the production and export of sugar, bauxite and rice. 
Since none of these are high-demand world commodities export prices have 
been fluctuating and, in real terms, have been declining while the prices of 
imports were rising. But while these may be more discernible factors the 
root cause of the stagnation and decline lies in the way the country's natural 
and human resources are utilised. The country is endowed with vast 
quantities of fertile land, with some useful minerals occurring within 
reasonable proximity to the coast and the labour supplies to exploit these 
resources, yet the conditions and quality of life of the majority of its people 
have not improved significantly during the last decade and a half. 
3 
Most ironical, the areas where these resources occur, i. e. rural areas, 
are the least developed. Where agricultural land is the resource crop 
production has remained low. Indirectly, this has contributed. to the lack of 
dynamism in the economy. This is because agriculture, which directly and 
indirectly employs one half of the country's workforce, is hindered by three 
major problems. The foremost of these is that colonialism created a 
marked dualism in agriculture where large efficient plantations (sugar) 
occupied the best lands and enjoyed concessions and privileges from the 
State. Peasant agriculture, on the other hand, took place on fragmented 
plots in more or less marginal lands and received very little help from the 
State. As a result, the latter was largely oriented towards food production 
except for rice, in which case large surpluses were available for export. 
Hence, the background to the present low level of agricultural development 
was that the peasant sector was harnessed to provide food for the cultivators 
4 
themselves and for the workers in the raw-material-export industries 
Secondly, there was little diversification in agriculture. Food production 
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was only in a few crops. Apart from sugar only rice emerged as a 
commercially viable crop and these two largely dominated agricultural pro- 
duction. Many of the items of food that could be produced locally were 
imported. Most important was that the imported items were heavily 
subsidised which undermined indigenous production. Thirdly, a multitude of 
problems have collectively stifled enthusiasm and prevented the necessary 
increases in productivity to strengthen the industry. Some of these problems 
include a shortage of land-- arising from its very unequal distribution and its 
resultant effects of fragmentation and landlordism, the absence of proper 
tenancy reforms, falling prices of agricultural products in relation to costs, 
institutional handicaps, a strong occupational stigma attached to farming, a 
low level of rural services, and a tendency for disenchanted farmers and 
farm labourers to migrate resulting in a small increase of new farmers and 
serious shortages of farm labour. 
The following are some of the more specific constraints to production in 
the individual industries. 
(i) The Sugar Industry 
The sugar industry is by far the largest in the country. For a number of 
years the economy of Guyana was regarded purely as a 'sugar economy'. At 
present the growth of sugar cane occupies about one-fifth of the total cultivated 
acreage and, with the manufacture of sugar, employs the largest proportion 
of the country's wage-labour force. In the national economy sugar production 
accounts for approximately 30% of the total gross domestic product. If the 
industries linked with sugar are included then it increases its share to 
between 40-47/0. The industry is also a major earner of net foreign capital. 
During the 1974-77 period sugar alone accounted for an average of nearly 457 
of the country's total domestic exports. The role of the industry in the 
Guyanese economy, succinctly put by a local researcher, is that "when pro- 
duction is high and the average export price is normal, the entire economy 
is buoyant, whereas in years of low production and reduced average prices 
5 
there is usually economic depression in the country" (Sukdeo, 1978 : 32). 
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While export prices depended on exogeneous factors beyond the influence 
of the industry, the production of sugar did not. It was here that a- number 
of factors operated to hinder the full benefits of the industry to the national 
economy. Because the industry, until its nationalisation in 1976, was 
externally owned and controlled, many of the noxious practices of absentee 
ownership were evident. Wages were always low and working conditions 
poor. Many of the biases and prejudices that were used to subjugate workers 
in the indentureship period persisted. The structure and practices of estate 
management did little to create a climate conducive to production. The 
'overseas' high level management remained as an elite group within the 
larger estate community. The local middle-management that it created were 
allowed a few privileges and proved to be hard task masters and guardians 
of the Estate's interests. As a result of this workers were estranged from 
management, which was a severe setback to good industrial relations and 
level of production. 
Also, because of foreign ownership and control the industry was organised 
on a purely profit-maximising motive. In addition, the emphasis seemed to 
be on short and medium term profits rather than on planning and orienting 
the industry to cater for the anticipated long term sugar demand. This was 
reflected by the following factors. A proportion of sugar producing lands 
was disposed of while new acreage brought under sugar cane cultivation was 
small. The productivity per acre, in terms of volume of canes produced 
and sugar content of canes, was allowed to decline in order to attain a higher 
cost-effectiveness in its operations. Double cropping, by bringing forward 
the reaping time of canes, was done to compensate for declining productivity 
and the small increases in new cultivation. (This is possible since the sugar- 
cane plant regenerates from ratoons. ) Also, little positive effort was made 
towards securing stable industrial relations. Workers frequently protested 
against low wages and other estate impositions by withdrawing their labour. 
This resulted in production fluctuating tremendously as can be seen in the 
following table. 
Over the 29 year (1950-1979) period the production of sugar did not increase 
significantly nor steadily as did the acreage of sugar-cane harvested. 
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Analysing sugar production in the five-year period the table below shows that 
it increased fairly rapidly from 1950 to the mid 1960's. Since then the 
increases were insignificant, relative to acreage reaped it declined. 
Productivity, in terms of tons of sugar produced per acre, also declined. 
However, not only did total sugar production and productivity per acre 
decline, but the industry had been mechanising and, as a result, had 
reduced its workforce by nearly 407o between 1950 and 19706. Sugar output 
was only maintained by increased worker productivity7. 
TABLE 21 Acreage Harvested and Sugar Produced 1950-1979 
Year Acreage Tons of Sugar Tons of Sugar % Increase +/- Decrease 
Harvested Produced Produced per 
*(Average) *(Average) Acre Acreage Sugar 
Harvested Produced 
1950-54 70,729 227,006 3.2 - 
1955-59 80,748 277,840 3.4 +14 + 22 
1960-64 99,694 312,145 3.1 +23 + 12 
1965-69 111,931 324,710 2.9 +12 +4 
1970-74 125,066 125,066 2.6 +12 +1 
1975-79 **(149,000) 299,000 2.1 +(12) -7 
Average of 5 year period 
** Estimated from Sources below 
Sources: 1. Min of Agriculture, R and Pl Div, op cit 
2. Min of Economic Development, Annual Statistical Abstract, 
1974, Table 1-5 
3. IBRD, op cit, Appendix Table 1. 
The poor performance of the industry as shown above was largely due 
to management and operations of the largest company, i. e. Bookers Brothers 
s 
Sugar Estates Ltd, which more or less controlled the entire industry. 
Because the Company was a subsidiary of a large multinational corporation 
external forces shaped the policies that determined the scale and nature of 
its operations9. One prominent such policy was that the industry expanded 
10 
rather slowly in spite of reasonable profits which were made. As shown 
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by two prominent local researchers, i. e. Thomas (1977)11 and Sukdeo (1973, 
1978)12, whatever expansion that occurred was due largely to depreciation 
allowances and very little to retained earnings except in years when profits 
were excessively high. Certainly no new capital was invested in the 
industry since the end of the 1950's. The slow rate of expansion was 
significant for two reasons. One was that since a great portion of the 
country's resources was tied up in this industry its slow expansion implied 
an under-utilization of those resources. The other was that since this 
industry was the major earner of revenue its slow expansion meant a loss of 
revenue. 
Another major policy of the Company was that, presumably in the 
interests of maintaining a high level of profitability, a situation of poor 
industrial relations which arose in the early 1950's was maintained. In each 
crop-grinding season a considerable number of work-stoppages (strikes) 
occurred. These were due almost entirely to inter-union rivalry in. certain 
sections of the industry and to wage grievances against the Company 
3. 
In 
the latter case the Company was shown to employ an accounting technique 
which reduced profits to a trickle, and on the basis of this negotiated for 
small wage increases. Because the Company usually bargained from a 
strong position (often with active State support) 
14 
the strikes were often 
protracted as workers would be equally adamant against the management's 
impositions. The result of these strikes was that production fluctuated in 
the manner depicted in Table 23. The wider implication of this was that, 
since much of the country's current and capital development expenditure 
depended on sugar exports, development was stow or was limited to spurts 
of activity instead of being continuous. 
A third major policy contributing to low production was that productivity 
per acre declined rapidly from the late 1950's, with little or no real attempt 
by the Company to arrest this trend. Declining productivity per acre was 
due to a combination of developments in the industry viz, a programme of 
mechanisation was pursued with great vigour and, as hand methods were 
being replaced, the level of husbandry declined. In the late 1950's the 
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estates discontinued the practice of long flood-fallowing. The inputs of 
fertilizer which were to be substituted for this practice were too small to be 
effective. To save on planting costs ratoons were extended (more crops 
were reaped from one 'planting'). Also, from the early 1960's there was a 
massive 'bringing-forward' of the reaping time of canes to make up for low 
yields and slowly expanding cultivation15. To one observer this practice 
was "tantamount to raiding the following year's production". 
As a consequence of the above policies the output of canes per acre and 
sugar produced declined substantially. Due to declining husbandry and the 
bringing forward of the reaping, the sucrose content of canes reaped declined 
with the effect that in the late 1970's the output of sugar per acre was nearly 
40jo below what it had been twenty years previously (see Table 21 column 4). 
If mechanisation had been used to complement labour instead of displacing 
it, and if some of the labour intensive methods such as weeding, mulching 
and long flood-fallowing etc had been continued, then production in the 1975- 
79 period would have doubled, assuming the 1955-59 level of production was 
maintained. As such practices were not continued the fall in output per acre 
had to be made up by reaping more canes (i. e. an increase in the acreage 
reaped). The reason for its production policy was clearly that the Company 
aimed at attaining a high cost-effectiveness in its operations. But by having 
such a policy the Company indirectly denied the full benefits of the sugar 
industry to the nation. If the Company had adopted a less mechanised 
production policy more of the rural labour force would have been employed 
and more sugar would have been produced by the labour intensive methods 
that this implies. 
(ii) The Bauxite Industry 
In terms of revenue to the nation this is the second largest industry. 
Its production performance, however, was poor. Except for calcined 
bauxite the output and exports have been declining since its nationalisation 
in 1971. The decline was due to a combination of marketing difficulties, 
adverse weather conditions and poor industrial relations. Even with the 
16 17 
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acceptance of the first two constraints, if good industrial relations had 
prevailed and the 1971 (year of nationalisation) level of production was 
maintained, then, by the end of 1976, the industry would have increased its 
gross revenue by nearly 20% or by $53.3mn. In absolute terms this sum 
represented 70% of the rice exports during that year. 
(iii) The Rice Industry 
The rice industry ranks as the third largest industry in the country. 
More than twice the acreage under sugar cane cultivation is under rice 
cultivation, and the industry supports more of the country's inhabitants than 
the sugar and bauxite industries combined. In the national economy rice is 
the staple food crop. It is also a major foreign exchange earner, increasing 
its share of gross domestic exports from 7% in 1970 to 1070 in 1977. 
Rice was first introduced from the United States of America to Guyana 
by the Dutch and the French during their respective occupations of the 
country during the 18th century. The early, sporadic, attempts to grow 
rice were by runaway negroes and ex-slaves. Later, at the end of the 
19th century, rice culture was made popular by the immigrant East Indian 
coolies18. Most of the vacant cultivable lands were put under rice cultiva- 
tion. By the mid 1940's an estimated 76,000 acres were under rice. Twenty 
years later (by the mid 1960's) the acreage had grown to approximately 
364,000. Since then it has declined somewhat, averaging about 300,000 
acres annually. 
The fivefold increase in rice acreage between the mid 1940's and mid 1960's 
was made possible by a massive investment programme oriented towards 
the production of rice (see Chapter 2, Section 6). The investment was 
primarily in drainage and irrigation projects, and land development and 
related schemes. The strategy was that by laying the necessary infra- 
structure the surplus rural labour would be harnessed to exploit the compa- 
rative advantage the coastlands have for the production of rice. It was 
realised that rural development was necessary if the nation was to attain a 
reasonably high rate of economic growth and social development. However, 
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these expectations did not materialise. The investments made to develop 
the rice industry had a longer than expected gestation period, due mainly to 
bad planning. Returns to the State were low because production rose 
sluggishly. Rural unemployment and underemployment remained high. 
Overall, the rate of rural development was not improved. The majority of 
the rice farming population remained in varying degrees of poverty and 
economic distress from which many sought to escape by migrating and, by 
so doing, reduced production on which the export economy so much depends. 
As to how this dismal state of affairs came about when the rice industry was 
regarded as a veritable panacea of rural and national development, the 
following analysis attempts to show. 
The first major problem in the industry is that for a number of years 
there has been a paradoxical situation of an acute shortage of land in a 
country where land is considered to be in surplus. This has come about for 
three reasons. The first was that the land policy present was not conducive 
to an easy distribution of reserve State lands for cultivation purposes. The 
State's land policy was designed with the implicit intention of Limiting the 
alienation of State lands and to encourage the intensive use of the lands 
already alienated. This policy was followed since 1931 and has changed 
19 
very little over the years. 
To a large extent the policy discriminated against peasant ownership. 
Land was only issued in large blocks, which meant that only large (existing) 
landowners and wealthy persons could acquire or found it easy to acquire the 
cheap State lands. The policy also gave existing landowners the automatic 
right of ownership of all new lands to be taken up adjacent to their plots20. 
By so doing it denied land to the growing number of landless persons and 
land hungry small farmers and created in the process a class of rapacious 
landlords who illegally, according to the terms of their leases, sublet, 
transfer, mortgage and fragment State lands. The policy also encouraged 
land hoarding, and in many cases land which had been drained and irrigated 
at considerable State expense was kept out of productive use or unbeneficially 
occupied. These developments greatly aggravated the shortage. Because 
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landlords wielded a considerable amount of political power they were able 
to stifle attempts made to redress this situation. Hence a situation of land 
scarcity remained, with fragmentation and other features inimical to the 
beneficial use of the country's land resources to its inhabitants increasing. 
The second major cause of the 'land scarcity' is that the conditions of 
land tenancy are very much undeveloped. In the case of State lands the 
conditions under which they were leased were too vague to enforce measures 
to prevent the various malpractices occurring in the use of land. To govern 
private landlord/tenant relationships an ordinance was enacted in 1956 which 
authorised the setting up of Committees with powers and functions to fix 
21 
rents and decide on the terms of usage of land . They were also to 
determine the conditions under which the tenant is dispossessed and land 
resumed by landlord and the amount of compensation to be paid by either 
party to the other as the case might be. But the functioning of these 
Committees was most unsatisfactory. Their powers were very vague, many 
of the key clauses of the Ordinance were ambiguous and legal back-up 
services were absent. Another reason was that the Committees consisted 
largely of Public Servants who had little knowledge or experience in agricul- 
ture. As a result of the absence of formal tenancy regulations tenants are 
at the mercy of landlords. Rent increases and tenant evictions are arbitrary 
landlords' decisions. This effectively prevents the development of land for 
agriculture and dampens farmers' enthusiasm for raising the level of 
productivity. 
The third major cause of land shortage is that the existing stock of land 
is extremely unevenly distributed. Out of nearly 40,000 holdings in which 
rice was cultivated in 1962,55% were uneconomic holdings below 5 acres 
and another 24% of the holdings were between 5-10 acres in size. Only 13% 
of the holdings were economically sized, at between 10-20 acres. A slight 
5% of the farms were medium sized, while 2.2% were large at more than 
50 acres. But these 2.2% of large farms occupied nearly 36% of the farmland 
while small farms, which were more than half of all farms, occupied only 
a little over 10% of agricultural land. Combined, the total number of holdings 
less than 10 acres, which comprised nearly 80% of all holdings, occupied 
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less land than the few large farms (see Table 22). 
The maldistribution of land was not righted, but rather increased in time. 
In 1977,15 years later, out of nearly 32,600 holdings under agricultural 
usage nearly 60% were small, being below 5 acres. The number of large 
farms over 50 acres increased, which meant that more of the total land 
available was in large holdings ( see Table 22, Column 3). Comparing the 
changes over the 15 year period, the acreage under rice had increased by 
approximately 20% between 1962-1977 but the number of holdings had 
declined significantly. Assuming that rice farms comprised 85% of total 
agricultural holdings in 1977, then the number of rice farms had declined by 
a third since 1962. This meant that there was a substantial amount of 
consolidation of the larger farm sizes on one end of the land distribution 
22 
spectrum while fragmentation increased at the other end 
TABLE 22 Land Distribution by Size of Rice Holdings in 1962 and 
All Agricultural Holdings 1977 
Size of Holding Percent Percent Cumulated Percent 
Rice Holdings Total Holdings of Holdings 
in Category (Rice Included) in Category 
1962* in Category 1962 
1977** 
0-5 55.3 58.3 100.0 
5-10 24.2 20.6 89.3 
10-20 13.0 14.5 66.5 
20-50 5.3 4.1 44.5 
50-100 .. 9 1.2 35.9 
100+ 1.3 1.3 28.3 
Total No. Holdings 39,763 32,588 (234,000 acres) 
Sources: Rice Producers Association, Georgetown 
Crop Reporters Special Tabulations, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Resource & Planning Div, Georgetown 
Note ** Rice farms are estimated to constitute 807/0 of the total number of 
farms. 
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Despite the existence of the gross inequality and maldistribution of land 
resources, Government efforts did little to alleviate the situation. In its 
attempts to increase the supply of land via land development schemes, 
drainage and irrigation, only small acreages were brought into cultivation. 
The reason for this was that expensive prestige projects were indulged in. 
A typical example of one such case was the Black Bush Land Settlement 
Scheme. The scheme, completed in 1962, settled 1,172 families at a total 
cost of 17,000 
23 
ý per family This was a phenomenal sum considering the 
financial resources available, the need for cheap land, and the alternative 
ways in which land could have been made available cheaply. Compared to 
the proposals of Berrill, who emphasised the need for agricultural 
expansion, the cost of providing land and settling one farmer in the Black 
Bush Scheme was seven times higher than what he initially considered to be 
high. Thus, if the finances available had been more prudently used as 
Berrill had advocated, the acreage of new lands brought into cultivation 
would have increased sevenfold. This would have nearly doubled the entire 
rice acreage of the early 1960's and would undoubtedly have reduced 
fragmentation and pressure on existing land. 
Apart from the scarcity of land and related factors, a major setback to 
the industry was that the production of rice increased only modestly. The 
acreage cultivated and proportion reaped, on the other hand, expanded 
rapidly. This was in spite of the introduction of labour saving technology, 
higher yielding varieties and more efficient crop production methods since 
the early 1960's. Analysing production trends over three decades, 
Table 23 shows that production increased gradually until the end of the 1960's. 
In the early 1970's it declined, but picked up moderately in the second half 
of the same decade. Acreage reaped (and cultivated) increased at a greater 
pace but in the same trend as the production of rice. Comparing the two, 
by 1969 the acreage reaped had increased by 2007/0 while the production of 
rice by only 125%. After the decline in the early 1970's, rice production 
showed a slight improvement over acreage reaped due to the adoption by 
farmers of higher yielding rice varieties. Nevertheless, by 1975-76 the 
acreage reaped exceeded that in 1946 by approximately 176,000 acres or by 
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177%, while production of rice increased by only 73,000 tons or by 118%. 
TABLE 23 Acreage Reaped and Production of Rice, 1946-1976 
(Average of Five Year Periods) 
Year Acreage Rice Paddy Yield Rice Yield 
Reaped Production Per Acre of Per Acre 
(Tons) Bags of (Tons) 
140 lbs 
1946-49 99,445 62,036 16.7 . 62 
1950-54 128,763 74,297 15.7 . 58 
1955-59 158,614 84,240 15.0 -53 
1960-64 245,512 128,118 13.8 . 52 
1965-69 298,312 139,754 11.7 . 47 
1970-74 242,910 119,357 12.1 . 49 
1975-76 *275,000 135,000 (13.0) (. 49) 
estimated 
Note: This table was compiled from own calculations from sources below. 
1. IBRD, op cit, Statistical Appendix, Table 3 
2. Min of Agri, Res & Pl Div, op cit, VI-9-VI-14 
3. Min of Economic Dev, Stat Bureau, op cit, Table 1-1. 
The reasons for the lagging production of rice lie in three inter-related 
factors, viz, the transformation of farm production methods from hand to 
mechanisation, variable weather conditions that affect mechanical efficiency, 
and a lack of adequate supportive services. Mechanisation, in the form of 
the agricultural tractor to prepare land for sowing and the combine 
harvester for reaping, was encouraged and quickly gained almost total 
appeal. The tractor replaced the oxen and made easy the arduous task of 
land preparation24. It made possible seed broadcasting which improved the 
farmer's seed sowing capacity many times over the traditional 'transplant' 
method25. The combine harvester had an even greater effect in increasing 
the farmer's efficiency. It encouraged large scale farming by obviating the 
constraint of an inelastic supply of labour at crucial sowing and reaping times. 
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However, the effects of mechanising were not all advantageous. First, 
as mentioned in Chapter 3 (Section 4), the efficiency of the machines over 
'hand methods' resulted in the displacement of the rural labour that depended 
on seasonal employment26. This, in turn, contributed to rural stagnation 
and poverty from which many sought to escape by out-migrating. The 
reduction of nearly a fifth of the total farm holdings between 1962 and 1977 
when there should have been an increase due to population increases, suggested 
that a considerable proportion of the out-migrants were farmers or members 
of farming households (see Table 23). Secondly, the tractor and the 
mechanical harvester made the bullock and other 'implements' of 'hand 
methods' of cultivation obsolete which, in turn, made farmers dependent on 
the machines27. Formerly, the PPP Government, dubbed by some as the 
'rice government', during its reign, provided substantial financial help to 
farmers by way of providing import and petrol subsidies etc for agricultural 
machinery. The succeeding regime, however, ended most of this preferen- 
tial bias, which caused the prices of agricultural machinery to soar in 
relation to the price of rice. The result of this was that the imports of 
agricultural machinery plummetted to the extent shown below. 
TABLE 24 Imports of Agricultural Machinery 1960-1974 
Year Total No. of Agricultural Total No. of Combine 
Tractors Imported Harvesters Imported 
1960-64 2743 271 
1965-69 1342 108 
1970-74 1281 55 
Sources: 1. IBRD, op cit, Table 27 
2. Min of Agric, Res and Pt Div, Table V4. 
The reduction in imports of the above machines created an immediate 
shortage, worsened by the expansion of rice acreage that was in progress, 
and the fact that the machines had a relatively short life. This was detrimen- 
tat to the entire industry. Because of the limited duration in which land 
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preparation, sowing, and harvesting must be done the shortage of tractors, 
harvesters and other mechanical equipment such as ploughs, water-pumps, 
spraying equipment etc results in a serious loss of production28. In a good 
year when 'dry-land' ploughing is possible and there is a rain-free period 
of at least six weeks at harvest time, between 80-95% of the available rice 
land is cultivated and reaped. But such 'good' years have been few. For 
example, in 1964, which was a relatively 'good' year, a total of 394,000 
acres were cultivated. From the following year and until 1976, because of 
early or heavy rains in the crucial planting season, only four times was 
80'70 of this acreage achieved. In two very wet years, i. e. in 1971 and 1972, 
tractors were restricted to half of their normal operating time, which 
resulted in the total acreage cultivated in those years being reduced to less 
29 
than 60% of the 1964 acreage. Harvesting operations were equally affected 
by bad weather. In 1973 'early rains' in the reaping season prevented as much 
as 36% of the crop from being harvested. Thus 'weather conditions' was a 
critical factor in rice cultivation. Since 1964 it has acerbated the shortage 
of machinery and caused a substantial portion of cultivable land to be 
abandoned annually. 
The third and most important factor is that mechanisation has been 
found to be directly related to the decline in productivity per acre in the 
industry. In the late 1940's and early 1950's when land preparation, sowing 
and reaping facilities were done 'by hand', the average yield of paddy was 
nearer 16 bags (of 140 lbs) per acre yielding nearly 0.6 tons of rice. With 
the introduction of mechanisation during the late 1950's and early 1960's, 
average yield per acre declined immediately and continued to do so until 
the end of the 1960's when the paddy yield was only 11.7 bags and rice only 
0.47 tons30 per acre (see Table 23, Columns 4 and 5). Since the early 
1970's the average yield per acre has increased slightly due to the adoption 
of new higher yielding varieties of seed-paddy by some of the more progres- 
sive farmers but, on the whole, it was still very low. As a result most 
farmers had a very low profit margin. In the case of the small farmer, if 
his labour costs were to be included in the costs of production, at 197531 
prices and at yields below 15 bags of paddy per acre, then his profit per acre 
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was zero. To the larger farmer low yields per acre meant a low rate of 
return to investment in machinery or land etc and, to the nation, declining 
productivity meant lower revenue from declining exports. If mechanisation 
had been used instead to complement the husbandry practices of the late 
1940's then yields per acre would have risen instead of declined. The 
yields of 16.7 during the late 1940's were still low by the standards of 
other rice producing countries such as Surinam, or the United States, 
Taiwan, Japan etc32. It is estimated that Guyanese rice farms have the 
capacity to increase yields up to an average of 30 bags per acre. If this 
figure had been achieved then the reaping of an average 275,000 acres in 
1976 would have increased the total yield by nearly two and a half times. 
The most debilitating of the handicaps the industry faced was that prices 
of paddy and rice paid to farmers during the last fifteen years have not kept 
pace with production costs . The Guyana Rice Marketing Corporation 
was appointed as the sole buying agent for farmers' rice and in this it 
exercised monopolist powers in the industry, acting as the sole arbiter in 
fixing rice and paddy prices. In 1953 the Corporation paid a fairly 
attractive $6.30 per (140 lbs) bag of paddy. Ten years later during the 
reign of the PPP Government the price per bag was increased by one dollar 
or by 16%. With a change of government and a change of development 
strategy in the mid-1960's, the price of rice declined initially but recovered 
and gradually increased to $15.50 per bag in 1975. The costs of production 
in the meantime had been rising rapidly and had outstripped increases in 
the price of paddy. In 1962 the average cost of producing one bag of paddy 
was $3.92 and by 1975 it had risen to $13.42. Comparing prices with 
costs over the 1962-75 period, prices rose by only 112% while costs rose 
by 242% or by more than twice the increase in price (see Table below). 
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TABLE 25 (A) Prices and Cost of Paddy Production 1953-1975 (G$) 














1953 $ 6.30 - - 
1962 7.30 3.92 +16 - 
1966 6.30 - -16 
1970 6.80 - +8 
1972 8.41 - +24 
1975 15.50 13.42 +84 242 
(B) Cost of Agricultural Machinery (G$) 
1962 1975 (1977) 
* Cost of Small Farm Tractor 3,800 14,000 (16,571) 
** Cost of Combine Harvester 27,000 74,000 (107,412) 
Plough 3-disc - 2,625 (2,852) 
* 35-45 hp Massey Fergusson Tractor 
Average 12 feet cutting 'header' 
Sources: A 1. IBRD, op cit, Table 17 
2. Min of Agriculture, R&P Div, op cit, p. VI-15 
3. Rice Producers Association (pamphlet) 
B 1. IBRD, op cit, Table 27 
2. Min of Agriculture, R&P Div, op cit, p. 111-5 
3. Ibid Quarterly Digest, Jan-Mar 1977, p. 29.. 
This vast increase in the costs of production was due mainly to the 
increased charges of mechanised operations, i. e. land preparation, reaping 
etc, and this in turn was due to the phenomenal increases in the cost of 
mechanical equipment and fuel costs. The effect of the high cost was that 
profits from rice farming activities declined precipitously. In 1962, a 
small farmer, not owning a tractor, had an average net profit of about $47 
per acre if he did not include his labour costs as part of the total costs. In 
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1975, due to increasing production costs and declining productivity, the 
same farmer was only able to achieve a profit of $27 per acre. Since he 
did not own a tractor, in years of adverse weather conditions a situation of 
small profits was easily converted into sizeable losses. 
But not all farmers made losses. Tractor owners, who usually owned 
or operated on medium-sized farms, made reasonable profits. By virtue of 
owning a tractor the farmer was able to reduce his mechanical costs by 
approximately 60%. More important, he was able to perform the essential 
operations better and in'season' and so obtain a yield that was, on average, 
between 30-07 higher than farmers who did not own a tractor. Adverse 
weather affected him least. He was able to reduce his capital overheads by 
double cropping and recoup his mechanical costs by hiring his equipment to 
other farmers. Not deducting for maintenance costs of machinery etc, the 
tractor-owner farmers made a gross profit of between $90-140 per acre, 
which was considerably higher than the small farmer, who at most made 
less than 50 dollars. The large farmers, i. e. those operating on more 
than 50 acres, also made reasonable profits, not through intensive cultiva- 
tion but rather through economies of scale. 
The profit level of the tractor owners and large farmers place them in a 
strong economic position in relation to small farmers. As costs tend to 
move away from prices the latter become increasingly marginalised. The 
chances of their owning farm machinery or increasing the size of their 
holdings are virtually non-existent since credit institutions tend to favour 
the larger and more efficient farmers. Hence, their dependence on larger 
farmers for machine hiring and on various money lenders to pay for such 
services, increases33. For many the vice of the money-lender, who is in 
many cases a tractor owner or landlord, tightens slowly putting the 
unfortunate farmer into a parlous situation where his land is, in time, 
usurped by the creditor and he is forced into a hand-to-mouth existence. 
Alternatively, he may become a share-cropper with a tractor-owner, or if 
sufficiently discouraged with farming he may sell his holding or give up his 
tenancy. If the former occurs then it is most likely that the large farmer or 
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medium-sized tractor-owner farmer acquires his plot. A continuation of 
this trend makes the medium-sized into large farmers who, since their 
need for land is now less acute, farm less intensively. It may also encourage 
large landowners to grow yet larger and become landlords. In each case 
land shifts from intensive to less intensive cultivation. 
But despite the fact that some farmers, i. e. tractor owners and large 
operators, had a reasonable profit level, their total farm earnings were 
wholly inadequate to meet living and other costs. Living costs tend to rise 
with public sector wages. At 1976 wages and prices, the basic or minimum 
(annual) earnings of a public sector worker were equivalent to the profits 
obtained from a parcel of between 35 and 50 acres in an average year of 
production. This meant that more than 75% of all farmers earned 
approximately the same or less than the lowest paid public sector worker. 
This situation, continued over a number of years, has resulted in a gradual 
depression in the industry. The present lack of real incentives to produce 
coupled with problems of inadequate drainage and irrigation, shortages of 
machines and vital supplies, high transport charges, and depressing rural 
conditions have significantly reduced the productive capacity of the industry 
Unless this situation is reversed the full employment and productive 
potential will not be achieved. Farmers will grow poorer and become less 
productive, lowering the supply of food and export revenue to the national 
coffers. 
(iv) Other Food Crop Production 
Although the production of a number of food crops has increased 
appreciably over recent years, exports of some traditional commodities 
such as plantains, cocoa and coffee beans etc have dwindled to insignificance. 
Not only were exports affected by the slow development of canning, packing 
and storage facilities, but the local market was characterised by a situation of 
gluts and shortages. Formerly, the shortages were made up by imports, 
but after the policy of import restriction was instituted the shortages were 
more common. Prices rose as a result but were not sufficiently high to 
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offset high costs and to overcome the constraints of fluctuating weather 
conditions and avaricious middle-men. Thus, a situation of chronic shorta- 
ges existed with fertile farmland remaining under-utilised or un-utilised 
and farmers languishing in idleness. 
(v) Livestock Production 
The actual production figures for livestock and products since 1965 make 
much of the widely publicised achievements of near self-sufficiency in food 
by the government a hollow vaunt. Between 1965 and 1975, while the 
population increased by approximately 23%, the production of beef actually 
declined by 17/10. Pork and poultry production however, showed a marked 
improvement, but the production of milk (fresh), which was always 
notoriously low, slumped further. (See table on Indices of Production. ) 
The result of low production was that the per capita consumption of fresh 
meat, eggs and milk was incredulously low taking into consideration that 
Guyana is primarily an agricultural country. In 1975 the consumption of 
fresh beef was a meagre 32 ounces per person per week. On average less 
than one egg and less than 2 pint of milk was consumed per week. 
TABLE 26 (A) Livestock Production 1965,1970,1975 
Product Unit 1965 1970 1975 
Beef (fresh) Mn lbs 10.2 8.8 8.5 
Pork 1.4 3.3 3.5 
Mutton & 
. 08 .1 .1 Goat if 
Poultry - 7.5 17.0 
Eggs No 17.9 24.2 33.9 
Milk ! fresh) Gals 4.2 4.3 x'2.5 
* 1974 production 
(s) / 
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TABLE 26 (cont) 
Per Capita Consumption of Meat, Milk and Eggs 1975 





Beef (fresh) 11.06 lbs . 22 lbs 
Pork 4.55 " . 09 
Mutton 
&Goat . 13 - 
Poultry 22.12 " . 43 
Total Meat 37.86 " . 72 
Milk (fresh) 3.25 gals . 06 (2 pint) 
Eggs (No. ) 44.00 .8 
Sources: (A) 1. Min of Agriculture, R&P Div, op cit 
2. World Bank Mission to Guyana, Jan 1977, Min of 
Economic Dev, Georgetown 
3. IBRD, op cit, Appendix, Tables 5 and 6 
(B) Per Capita consumption calculated from the above sources. 
Estimated Population 1975: 768,607 
The usual production picture presented above reflects clearly on the 
incidence and level of malnutrition in the country' Such a situation has 
come about due to the lack of foresight and adequate planning. Along the 
coast much of the land that was used as 'common' cattle pasture was 
absorbed into the rice expansion schemes with little provision made to develop 
alternative 'pastures'35. There was also a marked lack of sensitivity in 
restricting the importation of fresh and preserved meat. The abrupt 
restriction resulted in the running-down of the cattle herd as local supplies 
strived to meet demand. Incentives to increase production were inadequate 
for overcoming the constraints that ranchers, small owners and dairy 
farmers were faced with. One development that is worthy of mention was 
that, to complement the inadequacy and absence of 'pasture lands', the 
Government increased the fees for impounded strays by 900%. This had the 
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effect of bringing to an end small scale cattle-rearing, depriving many of a 
means of supplementing meagre farm incomes through the periodic sale of 
a bullock and creating an acute shortage, and a virtual absence, of fresh 
milk in many rural areas. 
Apart from specific handicaps, a number of general institutional and non- 
institutional factors have contributed to the decline of agricultural production. 
The foremost among these is inadequate marketing organisation. Many 
areas have no marketing facilities, which means that farmers are powerless 
to prevent their exploitation by middlemen. Where formal marketing 
arrangements are available, the buying price always lags woefully behind 
the costs36. Further, the Government has instituted retail price ceilings on 
some of farmers' produce, preventing farmers from relating costs to prices 
Insufficient and wrongly-oriented extension services are two other handicaps 
to production. The extension services on the whole tend to be isolated and 
operate in isolation from the farming community. In many cases their 
emphasis seems to be on promoting trifling aspects of crop science etc 
rather than on devoting their concentrated energies to bolstering failing 
production of the major commodities on which their and the nation's survival 
depend. 
Another factor is that there pervades a general air of stagnation and 
depression in the industry. Farmers feel very much maligned by the workings 
of the agricultural and national development policies that are seen to have 
perpetrated the above conditions in the first place, and to have continued to 
deepen it. 
The anti-government feelings and distrust that many farmers harbour 
proves to be a considerable obstacle towards an improvement in agricultural 
production. Government-set production targets are usually scoffed at by 
farmers instead of presenting a challenge to them whereas, if responded to, 
can only result in betterment for themselves and to the nation. Finally, the 
stagnation in agriculture invariably signifies stagnation in the rural 
environment as both tend to go hand-in-hand. The lack or inadequacy of 
basic amenities and services that are regarded as necessary for 'comfortable 
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rural life', even by Third World standards, serves as the final disincentive 
to farming and rural living. The out-migration that follows creates an 
impact whereby it accelerates the decline in agriculture and rural production. 
Hence, less food is produced, which intensifies the shortages, less is 
available for export, and so less is earned by the nation to buy its way out 
of shortages. 
In summary, the main causes of decline lie in the failure to optimise 
the use of the country's abundant rural resources. Except in the bauxite 
industry, the failure of the main export enterprises to achieve and maintain 
a high level of production was (and is) due to a number of problems that a 
committment to their rural and national development programmes by the 
Governments of the past two decades could have resolved. Since this was 
not so, agriculture and many rural areas have become very depressed with 
substantial out-migration occurring which, on one hand, increases urban 
problems of unemployment, congestion etc, and on the other, increases the 
depression. In a wider perspective the out-migration of rural individuals 
represents a loss of wealth-creating potential to the nation. 
4. The Need to Arrest Rural-Urban Migration 
In view of the ill effects of migration to rural and national development in 
Guyana it is imperative that immediate and drastic steps are taken to arrest 
its rate. The need for such action is becoming more acute as the Developed 
World on which Guyana depends for market and technology experiences . 
inflation and recession, the effects of which are passed on to her. Guyana 
is not alone in this situation. Most of the Developing Countries that experience 
a high rate of rural-urban migration are in a similar position. 
In these countries three main factors operate to keep the majority of their 
population in varying degrees of poverty and to fuel a continuing stream of 
rural-to-urban migration. The first of these is that these countries experience 
a rapid growth of their population. In many cases this growth exceeds the 
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pace of increase in food supplies. Aggravating the situation is that natural 
resources in these countries tend to be limited or relatively undeveloped. 
Old traditions that are usually a dominant feature of rural life tend to be a 
handicap to progress37. 
The second main factor is that in nearly all of the poor Developing 
Countries democracy or Socialism are hollow phrases38. In each a small 
minority (of elites) uses whatever means are necessary to retain political 
or economic power. The masses are manipulated and exploited to perpetuate 
the social and economic position of this group. The so-called more articulate 
middle classes are either powerless or seem to be content with a few 
privileges to maintain a system that exploits and subjugates the majority of 
the less able population. 
Thirdly, the content and direction of development planning that these 
countries have been pursuing seems to be not very relevant to their needs. 
As in the case of Africa, Guy Hunter (1973) shows that the entire philosophy 
of development was wrong. In the countries of Colonial experience the 
division of the society into a modern and traditional sector with the hope that 
the modern will draw surplus labour from the other was unfounded for two 
main reasons. One was that education which was to provide trained manpower 
for government and the modern sector oversupplied such personnel. The 
other was that the modern sector, which was to absorb this labour force, 
could not do so because it was based on high technology and had a small 
9 
market and so could not expand rapidly". 
Also, because of their pro-industrial approach to development, most of 
these countries failed to develop agriculture sufficiently 
40. 
According to 
Lipton (1977) the attitude to agriculture, which provided food, foreign 
exchange and was the main source of livelihood for the majority of the papu- 
lation, was one of "dormancy". In the simplest of terms this is a highly 
irrational strategy of development. What is even more tragic is that the 
limited resources that are usually available in these countries for the 
agricultural sector are inefficiently utilised. Because the 'Status-Quo' 
usually propose, control and administer agricultural spending, the direction 
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of the spending is usually in their self interest (Jacoby, 1971). In nearly 
all cases it is the larger farmers /landowners who are the main beneficiaries 
of agricultural development41. Except in the few Socialist countries, the 
various ill-planned, incomplete and hastily conducted land and tenancy 
reforms serve to consolidate their social and economic position rather than 
doing the opposite. (cf. Dorner, 1973; Jacoby, 1971; Griffin, 1974; 
Ladejinsky, 1977). For obvious reasons, large farmers have an easier 
access to credit and they tend to benefit most from scientific progress in 
agriculture42. A significant disadvantage of this is that the adoption of 
sensitive high-yielding seed varieties leads to increasing mechanisation 
which contributes to the increased poverty and displacement of the local 
labour force (Gotsch, 1971; Thiesenhusen, 1973; Myrdal, 1970). 
A final observation is that, as a result of continuing urban bias in employ- 
ment opportunities, education facilities and other basic social and welfare 
services, rural areas are becoming progressively underdeveloped. This 
trend is not new yet most governments seem oblivious to it or to its effects 
of increasing rural-urban migration, urban unemployment and stagnation. 
In cases where it has been recognised as a handicap to development there 
seems to be no clear thinking as to how to redress the situation. According 
to Griffin (1974) these "reformist" governments tend to "vacillate" in their 
choice of policies. 
5. Policies to Arrest Rural-Urban Migration in Guyana 
In view of the prevailing rural conditions, agrarian structure and the 
rate and consequences of migration in Guyana, it is suggested that a four- 
pronged approach be taken to remove the disparities existing between rural 
and urban areas and to modify other factors stimulating the high rural 
outflow. These four approaches are: 
A: The reorganisation of agriculture through a comprehensive land and 
tenancy reform supported by the necessary supplemental policies; 
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B: The provision of increased rural employment opportunities in the form 
of light industries and processing of agricultural products; 
C: An improvement in the level of rural services; 
D: General supportive policies including a clear education policy, i. e. 
adjusting the education curricula to suit local needs, a population and 
migration policy, urban wage and employment policies, etc. 
A: The Reorganisation of Agriculture 
By the reorganisation of agriculture is meant an integrated programme 
of measures designed to eliminate obstacles to economic and social develop- 
ment arising out of agriculture. Some of these measures are: the provision 
of opportunities for ownership, means of promoting the security and 
improving the conditions of tenure, the organisation of farms of economic 
size, land consolidation, the organisation of farm machinery services, 
measures to promote the equitable use of water supplies, extension of credit 
facilities and reduction of indebtedness, and a fiscal policy such as tax 
measures to promote more intensive land utilisation and land distribution. 
1. Planning and Scale of the Reform 
(i) Although there is a great urgency for a reorganisation in agriculture, 
careful planning should be undertaken before steps are taken to institute 
the reforms. It is essential that planning be a continuing activity with 
a constant feedback, and it must be dynamic with the ability to adjust 
to new information. 
(ii) A data base needs to be compiled. To ascertain an accurate situation 
of land and its utilisation in the country a detailed survey of land 
resources and agricultural practices is necessary. Information needs 
to be obtained on: the areal extent of land resources and its physical 
properties, ownership by nature of title, conditions of tenancy in cases 
where land is rented, utilisation of land, and fragmentation of it. Also 
farming profiles need to be built. Information is needed on the 
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characteristics of the practising farmer and his household, the level 
of farmers' education and experience, crop type, regimen of production, 
yields, livestock, farm implements, drainage and irrigation facilities, 
access to credit, income level and sources of income, constraints to 
production and propensity to innovate, etc. 
(iii) For the reform to be successful it should be comprehensive and should 
encompass the objectives set out in the definition given. It should, if 
possible, be conducted throughout the country simultaneously. However, 
in the case of limited technical manpower or financial resources, it 
may be phased with necessary measures taken to prevent malpractices 
or undue benefits because of this. 
2. The Reform 
The main components of the reform are: 
(i) Land expropriation, resumption and redistribution. 
All unutilised land held under freehold title should be expropriated for 
redistribution. Where such lands are State lands leased for cultivation 
or related they should be resumed by the State for redistribution to 
those (farmers) whose need for land is greater. In each case 
appropriate compensation should be made to the owner/leasee for the 
expropriation/resumption of their land. 
Large holdings that are under-utilised should also be expropriated for 
redistribution but allowing for the landowner/operator to retain an 
adequate acreage which he can farm more intensively. 
To prevent large landlords from employing 'underhand' methods to 
retain possession of their land a ceiling on land ownership is suggested. 
However there should be no rigid fixation of this ceiling. The efficient 
farmer should be allowed to expand his farming enterprises but where 
land is in short supply preference on the limited supplies should be 
given to needy small farmers. 
Also, adequate measures should be taken to prevent landlords from 
- 142 - 
evicting their tenants and becoming cultivators themselves in order 
to benefit from the improved agricultural conditions that the reform 
brings about - as occurred in many areas where reforms were 
improperly instituted. 
To complement these measures in providing 'land to the tiller' it is 
suggested that the extensive fertile coastal backlands should be brought 
into cultivation. There is an estimated 1.2 million acres or 1-1 times 
the entire cultivated acreage. With the provision of basic drainage 
and irrigation infrastructure much of this land can be brought into 
cultivation. If this is so then even deducting for the sugar estates 
lands there would be an acreage of over 50 acres for each of the 
country's 35,000 farmers. 
(ii) Compensation. 
Large landowners should be compensated on the basis of some formula 
which would recognise whatever contribution they have made towards 
the development of the land. 
(iii) Land Consolidation. 
There should be a policy of land consolidation of the small fragmented 
holdings presently under cultivation. Small farmers should be 
encouraged to take up economic-sized holdings made available through 
the division of large holdings and distribution of State lands. 
(iv) Land Sizes. 
It is not proposed to specify a minimum size of holdings. Rather they 
should be economic-sized. This depends on factors such as soil type, 
cultivation practices, access to markets, drainage and irrigation 
facilities, etc. 
(v) Selection of Farmers. 
Farmers should be selected with the utmost care so as to ensure that 
scarce land resources are available to those who are committed to 
use the land to their and the nation's benefit. Care in selecting 
farmers, however, should not result in the displacement of the popu- 
lation from rural areas. 
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(vi) Land Titles. 
It should be the policy that titles to land shall be made as quickly as 
possible to holders of land and that it should be recognised as a colla- 
teral in the raising of farm credit etc. 
(vii) Land Tax. 
It is suggested that a land tax be levied on all lands depending on the 
facilities provided and the potential of the land. This would serve to 
intensify the use of the resource. 
(viii) Tenancy Regulations. 
There should be a comprehensive tenancy reform with the aims of 
providing security of tenure to tenants and protecting landlords. These 
regulations should also prevent tenant exploitation and create conditions 
that eventually make them owners of the land they till. 
Under the reforms clear and unambiguous regulations governing the 
level of rents, responsibilities of tenants and landlords, the conditions 
under which the tenant can be evicted and land resumed, the level of 
and terms of compensation that is payable to either party for develop- 
ment to land and property. Generally the regulations aim at 
harmonisation of relations between landlords and tenants to their 
mutual benefit. 
3. Policies Supporting the Reform 
(i) Credit Facilities. 
It is recommended that adequate credit facilities are made available 
to farmers with the minimum of government and other procedural 
'red tape'. One possibility is that the Local Village Council be the 
disburser of farm credit. Land titles and crop in field should be 
regarded as acceptable collateral for such credit. This would prevent 
poor farmers from being exploited by rapacious local moneylenders etc. 
(ii) The Extension Service. 
A reform is only as good as its back-up services. It is recommended 
that there should be a change in the direction and orientation of extension 
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services. There should be less manpower and financial resources 
devoted to research and related activities which can be obtained 
cheaply from the more developed countries. The service should be less 
centralised. The strong urban orientation of most of its personnel 
should be discouraged. In general the service should shed its 'white 
collar' approach to agriculture and work closely with farmers. 
This institution should also be instrumental in educating farmers and 
creating conditions in which they are amenable to change in their self- 
interest. 
(iii) Agricultural Policy. 
There is a need for a clear and meaningful agricultural policy that is 
free from generalisations, aspirations or rhetoric. On this aspect of 
the reform the existing government policy of development through 
increases in productivity and total production does not necessarily 
mean that agriculture is being developed. The policy should extend to 
cater for an overall improvement in the livelihood of the farming and 
general rural population since agriculture is the main rural activity. 
The policy of agricultural diversification is laudable but there must be 
adequate incentives to stimulate such a movement. 
There should also be a clear-cut policy on the role of mechanisation in 
Guyanese agriculture. It is the conviction here that mechanisation in 
the form of tractors, harvesters and mechanised mills will be a 
permanent feature. However, if small and medium sized tractors are 
re-imported instead of large and expensive models that are presently 
imported, many medium sized farmers will be able to acquire their 
own machinery which will augur well for increased production and a 
tendency to innovate and diversify. 
To alleviate the present crop-time scarcity of agricultural machines 
it is recommended that machinery pools be organised by the Rice 
Producers, Agriculture Department or Local Village Councils and 
managed'with minim-im or, preferably, no State involvement. 
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(iv) Factor Price Equalisation. 
This is an important factor in ensuring that the majority of farmers, 
their dependents, farm-workers and others have a comparable and 
adequate income (compared with urban workers) from their farming 
and related activities. 
To ensure that this is so agricultural products should not suffer from 
unequal terms of trade in the economy. Prices of produce should be 
related to the costs of production and increases in living costs etc. 
It should not be the policy of government marketing agencies to strive 
to show a profit at the expense of the farmer by way of undervaluing 
his labour. Rather, the policy should be one of high prices which will 
serve to increase the productivity of land and labour and stimulate 
expansion, diversification and general development of agriculture. 
(v) Political Biases and Patronage. 
There should be an end to the system of patronage, racial and political 
biases in the industry. 
4. Administration of the Reform 
Administration is the crux of any land reform program. If a program is 
to be successful then it means that its administration has to exhibit several 
desirable characteristics. First, it must not be servile to bureaucracy and 
officialdom. It has: to be capable, well-informed and receptive to changes as 
advocated by its feedback mechanisms. Most of all, it must be impartial, 
uncorrupted, and show a genuine committment to the development of 
agriculture and to improving the livelihood of those involved in agriculture. 
In Guyana, it is suggested that the land and tenancy reforms should, at 
the national level, be conducted by a small semi-autonomous body operating 
with clear terms-of-reference and supported by the necessary legal and 
other instruments. 
This body should not be comprised of 'technocrats' who are likely to 
have urban backgrounds, middle-to-upper class values, and a limited 
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practical knowledge of farming and rural conditions, nor should it be 
comprised of academicians but of persons with experience and integrity who 
are not open to manipulation and corruption. 
At the local level it may be conducted by the Local Village Councils. 
Where this is unsuitable a democratically selected (local) group of farmers 
should be the agent of reform. It is essential at this level that an integration 
of the various services and resources occurs to accelerate the transforma- 
tion. For this reason the Local Village Councils seem to be the more 
appropriate choice of administration at the local level. 
5. Financing the Reform 
(i) Compensation for Land. 
Land reform can be a very expensive undertaking especially if large 
landowners are to be compensated for land that is expropriated for 
redistribution. Also, if new lands are to be redistributed then the 
initial costs of infrastructure are likely to be high. 
In Guyana's situation of scarce resources the policy should be that 
landlords are compensated by the issuing of Government Bonds due 
to mature within a 'few' years by which time the invigorated rural and 
national economy will easily be able to honour its financial committ- 
ments. In this way the reform can progress smoothly without adding 
to the financial crisis which the central government and the economy 
are currently experiencing. 
(ii) Financing the Complementary Programs. 
It is suggested that much of the finance for these programs (outlined 
previously) come from Central Government. This does not mean a 
vast increase in central government spending. It is envisaged that the 
elimination of many of the archaic and parasitic bureaucratic struc- 
tures in the institutions related to agricultural development will 
result in huge savings. The small, efficient and imaginative manage- 
ments created by the reform will optimise on present and whatever 
additional financial and manpower resources are available. 
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(iii) Repayment by Farmers. 
It is suggested that the costs of implementing reform and land 
redistribution should not be passed on directly to farmers benefitting 
from the reform. Rather, the State would benefit or recoup its 
expenditure from the general Land Tax and from taxes from the 
increased consumption of goods and services by the farming commu- 
nity. 
For individual liabilities such as individual loans, credits, etc terms 
of repayment should be lenient and be related to weather conditions, 
crop yields, profitability etc. 
B: Rural Employment Opportunities 
It is common logic that the surest way to lessen rapid rural-urban 
migration is to provide opportunities for employment at favourable wages 
in rural areas. 
1. Employment Creation 
(i) Increased rural employment can be provided by the setting up of light 
and 'screw-driver' industries in areas of high unemployment. 
(ii) The processing of agricultural products (in rural areas) should be 
developed to become a major industry and source of rural employment. 
(iii) A decentralisation of Government Departments related to agriculture 
and rural services should occur to increase manpower and financial 
efficiency and at the same time provide some employment. 
(iv) A system of industrial decentralisation should be actively pursued to 
favour rural population concentrations instead of Georgetown, where 
the level of employment is considerably lower than in rural areas. 
2. Wages Policy 
(i) There should be a movement towards the standardisation of agricul- 
tural wages to protect the farm worker from being exploited. 
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(ii) Wages on farms and in rural employment ventures should compare 
favourably with urban wages given workers' experience and skills. 
(High or reasonably high wages in agriculture should not result in 
unemployment among farm-workers, in increasing mechanisation or 
a fall in output due to less labour employed because the value of 
agricultural output would be increased to its true value. ) 
C: An Improvement in Rural Services 
The third policy of. the strategy to arrest rapid urban migration is the 
improvement in the level of rural services and basic utilities. 
It is urgently required to provide the basic utilities of electricity, pure 
water-supply and transportation to rural areas where it is absent or 
improvement in its supply where it is poor. 
The provision of social services such as housing, education and health 
facilities should also be improved. Unless this is so the disparity between 
urban and rural areas in living conditions will serve to stimulate out- 
migration from rural areas. 
D: Supplementary Policies to Arrest Migration 
1. The Need to Restructure the Education Curricula 
There is an urgent need to restructure the education curricula to suit 
local needs. The education reforms of the past two decades have not gone 
far enough to change attitudes and skills. To achieve this it is urgently 
recommended that the curricula be radically changed with a strong 
emphasis on science subjects and technical education instead of 'proliferating' 
the arts subjects and burdening the economy by preferential employment of 
unproductive parsonnel. 
Most important is that the 'bastions of Colonialism', i. e. aged 
administrators that influence policy making and staff all important levels in 
education (teaching) should be replaced by persons of a more progressive 
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outlook and who are more cognisant of the needs of the developing Guyanese 
Society. 
Unless this is speedily accomplished all the institutions of education in 
Guyana will continue to produce graduates destined for urban areas. 
2. The Need for a Popalation and Migration Policy 
A clear policy on population, in which fertility and migration (both 
internal and international) are considered, has not been enunciated for 
Guyana as yet. Because of population growth and other factors dealt with 
throughout this thesis, internal migration from rural to urban areas is 
rapid. International out-migration too has been rapid for nearly the same 
reasons as internal. It is estimated that a third of the country's natural 
increase is lost through international migration. What is significant 
about this is that a great portion of this outflow is comprised of the highly 
educated and skilled Guyanese, which represents more of a 'brain drain' 
than a 'safety valve'. 
In order to control the internal and this international outflow a 
population policy that includes family planning etc and a sharply delineated 
migration policy are needed. It is not advocated that there should be a 
restriction of free mobility but that it should be controlled to conserve 
resources for development. 
3. A Reduction of Urban-Rural Disparities 
It is strongly advocated that the urban bias in national development should 
be changed. Rural areas should not be disadvantaged. It is the opinion 
here that many of the urban wage increases are unwarranted and are usually 
made so as to conserve the status-quo of the urban employed. If such 
increases are necessary, policy makers i. e. politicians etc should ensure 
that raral areas and the agricultural labour force are similarly rewarded. 
If not then the expectation of high urban incomes will continually draw both 
the rural unemployed and the employed. 
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5. Conclusion 
Many distressing experiences in the Developing World have shown that 
land reform is by no means a panacea as it was thought to be. As mentioned, 
hastily planned and incomplete reforms have resulted in the rural poor 
becoming poorer and the disparities between urban and rural areas becoming 
wider. For a reform to be successful the essential back-up policies and 
services need to be implemented simultaneously with the redistribution of 
land and the regularising of tenancy arrangements. 
In the case of Guyana land redistribution should be seen as the 'pillar' 
around which integrated rural development should be approached. The present 
Government, in keeping with its Socialist Philosophy, has often enunciated a 
policy of "Land to the Tiller", but except for a few specific cases, the policy 
seems more of a statement of intent than action. In terms of development 
expenditure the urban bias, which was a feature of the country's Colonial 
past, is still strong and seems to be growing stronger while the rural 
resource centre is being emasculated. 
It is the firm conviction here that, unless there is a reversal of this 
trend and a genuine committment to rural development, through a compre- 
hensive land reform the present decline in the economy will continue. Rural 
areas will become more impoverished and will experience a greater migrant 
out-flow which will only aggravate the already high urban unemployment and 
tax the limited urban resources. On the other hand, if such a development 
is to take place, then agriculture will be developed and an invigorated rural 
sector will release and provide the resources for economic recovery and 
rapid growth and development. 
In these conditions narrowing urban-rural disparities will bring about a 
reduction in the rate of urban migration. It is even conceivable that 
migration will be more beneficial than harmful to both sending and 
receiving areas. 
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FOOTNOTES 
NOTES : Chapter One 
1 The term 'migration' is used to mean both rural-urban and inter-urban 
movements. 
2 There have been very few attempts towards a holistic approach to the 
study of migration. Analysts of migration tend to enter into indept 
investigations of complex issues using sophisticated tools without first 
having adequate references with the various disciplines that concern 
themselves with migration. 
3 In a world of harsh economic reality and 'unending' struggle for better- 
ment this approach seems to be the most appropriate in explaining 
migrant behaviour. 
4 This definition was obtained from the United Nations Yearbook of 
Population, 1970. 
5 Political factors, as motives for migration, are powerful but their 
momentum is usually quickly spent. Economic reasons, on the other 
hand, tend to cause a steady flow in a more or less fixed channel. 
6 For a detailed account of the major inter-continental flows see for 
instance Brindley Thomas, Migration and Economic Development, 
Cambridge Univ Press, 1954; G Beijer, "Modern Patterns of International 
Migratory Movements", in JA Jackson (ed), Migration, Cambridge Univ 
Press, 1969, pp 3-59; WD Borrie, The Growth and Control of World 
Population, London, Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1970, pp 85-127. 
7 For a full account of these flows and their magnitudes see Hugh Clont, 
"Rural Urban Migration in Western Europe", in J Salt and H Clont (eds), 
Migration in Post War Europe, Oxford Univ Press, 1976, pp 30-51. 
8 For a good account of inter-community (EEC) mobility see WR Bohning, 
The Migration of Workers in the United Kingdom and the European 
Community, Oxford Univ Press, 1972. 
9 For a concise account of Latin American emigration see WD Borrie, 
op cit, pp 179-197. 
10 A number of researchers have attested to this. See for example 
Alan Gilbert, Latin American Development, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 
1974; JE Perlman, The Myth of Marginality, Urban Poverty and Politics 
in Rio de Janeiro, Univ of California Press, 1976, pp 4-5; World Bank, 
Urbanisation Sector Working Paper, June 1972, Index I. 
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11 During the last twenty years the annual rate of total population growth 
was 2.97 while the urban rate of growth during the same period was 4.4%. 
World Bank, op cit, Annex I, Table 1. 
12 For instance urban areas. 
13 See C Geertz, Agricultural Involution - The Process of Ecological 
Change in Indonesia, Berkeley, 1963. It was found that the islanders 
in Java and Bali, two of the most densely populated places on earth, 
preferred to intensify production on their plots of land rather than to 
migrate to Jakarta. 
14 See McConnell et at, Migration From Rural Areas - The Evidence From 
Village Studies, Oxford Univ Press, 1976, pp 8-9. 
15 This is so because in the shift to cash cropping, usually the cultivated 
crop is not the staple food crop. Any extraneous condition that leads to 
crop failure means that the cash cropper has to migrate since it is not 
possible for him to revert to his former subsistence state, and because 
he has grown dependent on money for his wants. 
16 See for instance KC Abercrombie, "Agricultural Mechanisation and 
Employment in Latin America", in Mechanisation and Employment in 
Agriculture - Case Studies From Four Continents, ILO, Geneva, 1974; 
KN Raj, "Mechanisation of Agriculture in India and Sri Lanka", in 
Mechanisation and Employment in Agriculture, ILO, Geneva, 1973. 
See also CH Gotsch, "Tractor Mechanisation and Rural Development 
in Pakistan", op cit, 1973. 
17 McConnell et at shows that in a study in Mysore (India) TS Epstein 
found that the poorest caste did not seek work in towns, although they 
would have liked to, because they lacked links with prominent people in 
town and faced severe competition from higher caste men who were 
preferred. McConnell, 1976, op cit, p 20. Similarly, in Guyana and 
Surinam the poorest villagers have lower than average education and 
few urban contacts. Because these can hardly expect better than manual 
jobs there they tend to have low rates of out-migration. 
18 This feature seems to be very evident in Guyana. I suspect it might be 
the same in many other areas where society is less stratified and 
segregated (i. e. where caste etc. does not exist). 
19 Proximity in this sense is not taken to mean distance in terms of miles 
only. Where ribbon type settlement occurs small nodes at some 
distance may have a greater degree of development and more urban 
contact than areas that are closer, in terms of miles, to the urban 
centre. Beals, Levy and Moses have made the same observation. See 
RE Beals, MB Levy and LN Moses, "Rationality and Migration in 
Ghana", in The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol 49, No 1, 
Feb 1967, p 481. 
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20 According to EG Ravenstein the majority of migrants travel short 
distances. Ravenstein, "The Laws of Migration", in The journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society, London, June 1885, pp 167-227. 
21 It should be noted that when Ravenstein formulated his hypotheses the 
system of transport was far less developed than it is now. In the context 
of limited transport his distance hypothesis might hold reasonably well. 
22 This is because the migration decision was a family decision in the 
first place. 
23 In cases where chain-migration occurs a greater proportion of migrants 
move directly from their place of origin to an urban destination. Even 
in the absence of step-migration long distance, or direct rural-to-urban 
movement, may occur if there are only a few urban areas in a region or 
country. McConnell et al, 1976, op cit, notes a number of cases where 
this might happen, pp 82-82. For an exposition of intervening hypotheses 
as defined by Lee and Stouffer see ES Lee, "A Theory of Migration", in 
Demography, No 1, pp 47-57; SA Stouffer, "Intervening Opportunities: 
A Theory Relating Mobility and Distance", in American Sociological 
Review, Dec 1940,5 (6). 
24 The studies referred to are j Lopreato, "Peasants No More", Pub 
San Francisco, 1967, pp 216-217; RK Lewis, "Hadchite: A Study of 
Emigration in a Lebanese Village", Unpub thesis, Columbia Univ, 1967, 
p 240; and E Dussanze, "L'Emigration Sarakollaise du Guidimaka ver 
La France", in S Amin (ed), Modern Migration in Western Africa, 
Oxford Univ Press, 1974. Paul T Schultz also found that costs of move- 
ment in Columbia may dampen the rate of movement from rural to 
urban areas. See PT Schultz, "Rural Urban Migration in Columbia", 
in The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol 52, Feb 1971, No 1, 
p 161. 
25 Such 'attributes' are that education broadens the horizons of the 
individual. It gives a sense of superiority among some over those with 
lower levels of education; it often changes taste, stimulates new desires 
and accelerates acculturation and modernisation processes. 
26 See for instance RH Sabot, Economic Development and Urban Migration 
in Tanzania 1900-1971, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979, pp 105-127; 
McConnell et al, op cit, pp 61-63; MJ Greenwood, "The Determinants 
of Labour Migration in Egypt", in Journal of Regional Science, Vol 9, 
No 2,1969, pp 289-290; GS Sahota, "An Economic Analysis of Internal 
Migration in Brazil", in The Journal of Political Economy, Vol 76,1968, 
. 
pp 234-236; T Paul Schultz, op cit, pp 160-163. 
27 According to Bairoch, "The inadaptation of education, in both kind and 
degree to the real needs of the economy is an almost universal problem 
... " in the 
Developing Countries (Bairoch, 1973: 33). Helen Safa has 
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taken the same view. According to her, education in Third World 
countries is geared largely to preparing people for jobs in the relatively 
small modern sector of the economy. See HI Safa, in The Introduction, 
in Safa and Du Toit (eds), Migration and Development Implications for 
Ethnic Identity and Political Conflict, Moulton Publishers, The Hague, 
1975, p 7. See also Paul Bairoch, Urban Unemployment in Developing 
Countries, ILO, 1973. 
28 Potential migrants tend to have a reasonable knowledge of employment 
and other opportunities at their place of origin but their 'information 
field' in relation to the above declines with distance. 
29 To the young the faster tempo of life in urban areas and the variety and 
anonymity which it offers is an attractive feature, while to the more 
aged it is generally not. 
30 It is considered useful here to present a summary of the Migration 
Postulates (Laws) of Ravenstein (1885,1889). The Laws are presented 
as summarised by Everett Lee. (Single quotation marks denote 
Ravenstein's own words, see ES Lee, "A Theory of Migration", in 
JA Jackson (ed), Migration, op cit, pp 282-283. ) 
(1) Migration and distance: 
(a) 'The great body of our migrants only proceed a short distance' 
and 'migrants enumerated in a certain center of absorption 
will grow (less as distance from the center increases)' (1885, 
pp 198-199) 
(b) 'Migrants proceeding long distances generally go by preference 
to one of the great centres of commerce and industry' (1885, 
p 199) 
(2) Migration by stages: 
(a) 'There takes place (constantly) a universal shifting or displace- 
ment of population, which produces "currents of migration", 
setting in the direction of the great centres of commerce and 
industry which absorb migrants' (1885, p 178) 
(b) 'The inhabitants of the country immediately surrounding a town 
of rapid growth flock to it, the gaps thus left in the rural popula- 
tion are filled up by migrants from more remote districts, 
until the attractive force of one of our rapidly growing cities 
makes its influence felt, step by step, to the most remote corner 
of the kingdom' (1885, p 199) 
(c) 'The process of dispersion is inverse to that of absorption and 
exhibits similar features' (1885, p 199) 
(3) Stream and counterstream: 'Each main current of migration 
produces a counter current' (1885, p 199) 
(4) Urban and rural differences in the propensity to migrate: 'The 
natives of towns are less migratory than those from rural parts of 
the country' (1885, p 199) 
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(5) Predominance of females among short distance migrants: 'Females 
appear to predominate among short journey migrants' (1889, p 228) 
(6) Technology and migration: (Migrant streams have a propensity to 
increase in time due to technological developments) 
(7) Dominance of economic motives: 'Bad or oppressive laws, heavy 
taxation, an unattractive climate, uncongenial social surroundings, 
and even compulsion, have all produced and are still producing 
currents of migration, but none of these currents can compare 
with that which arises from the desire inherent in most men to 
. "better" themselves in material respects' (1889, p 286) 
The following are Everett Lee's hypotheses on the volume of migration, 
stream and counter stream and migrant characteristics: 
The Volume of Migration 
1. The volume of migration within a given territory varies with the 
degree of diversity of areas included in that territory. 
2. The volume of migration varies with the diversity of people. 
3. The volume of migration is related to the difficulty of surmounting 
the intervening obstacles. 
4. The volume of migration varies with fluctuations in the economy. 
5. Unless severe checks are imposed, both volume and the rate of 
migration tend to increase in time. 
6. The volume of migration varies with the state of progress in a 
country or area. 
Stream and Counter-Stream 
7. Migration tends to take place within well defined streams. 
8. For every major stream a counter stream develops. 
9. The efficiency of the stream is high if the major factors in the 
development of a migration stream were minus factors at origin. 
10. The efficiency of a stream and counter stream tends to be low if 
origin and destination are similar. 
11. The efficiency of migration streams will be high if the intervening 
obstacles are great. 
12. The efficiency of a migration stream varies with economic condi- 
tions, being high in prosperous times and low in times of depression. 
Characteristics of Migrants 
13. Migration is selective. 
14. Migrants responding primarily to plus factors at destination tend 
to be positively selected. 
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15. Migrants responding primarily to minus factors at origin tend to 
be negatively selected; or, where minus factors are overwhelming 
to entire population groups, they may not be selected at all. 
16. Taking all migrants together, selection tends to be bi-modal. 
17. The degree of positive selection increases with the difficulty of 
the intervening obstacles. 
18. The heightened propensity to migrate at certain stages of the life 
cycle is important in the selection of migrants. 
19. The characteristics of migrants tend to be intermediate between 
the characteristics of the population at origin and the population at 
the destination. 
The above hypotheses were taken from Lee, "A Theory of Migration", 
in JA Jackson (ed), Migration, op cit, pp 288-296. 
31. By this it is meant that labour moves to locations where its monetary 
and non-monetary returns are highest. 
32. Most of the writers along this line tend to present an incomplete and 
far too generalised analysis as to exactly how the transfer and 
utilisation of labour contributes to economic development. Kuznets, 
for example, stresses the critical role of population in development 
but does not fully take into account the behaviour of people particularly 
in a situation where natural resources are scarce. Some writers tend 
to model development after the North American experience which 
clearly is inappropriate elsewhere. See Simon Kuznets, The Economic 
Growth of Nations, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard Univ Press, 1971. 
33. The push and pull factors are usually ambiguous. The classic case of 
this is fewer negative and positive factors at origin and destination. 
Also, the relative intensity or strength of the factors are not given. 
This may be due to the fact that they are difficult to measure. 
34-. Urban areas in Developing Countries tend to have a weaker economic 
base than in the Developed Countries. Also, there'is greater regional 
(rural-urban) inequality - which results in a high income differential 
that seems to have a tendency to increase in time. 
35. Kammeyer and McClendon show that while Lee may have set out to 
show how the individual makes the decision of whether he should 
migrate or. not, his generalised hypotheses on streams and counter 
streams tend to lose the effect of individuality. See CW Kammeyer 
and McClendon, "Some Tests and Comments on Lee's Theory of 
Migration", in KCW Kammeyer (ed), Population Studies, Rand McNally 
College Pub Co, Chicago, 1975,2nd Edition. 
36. See Julius Margolis, "Internal Migration: Measurements and Models", 
in AA Brown and E Neuberger (eds), Internal Migration, A Comparative 
Perspective, Academic Press, London, 1977, pp 135-143. 
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37. See WA Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of 
Labour", in The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies, 
May 1954, pp 139-191 for a description of the original model, and 
MP Todaro's summary of the Lewis-Fei-Ranis model of development 
in MP Todaro, Internal Migration in Developing Countries, ILO, 
Geneva, 1976, pp 21-25. 
38. See Todaro, op cit, for some of the criticisms of this model. 
39. Most models do not consider benefits beyond those of the migrant's 
working life. 
40. It is the opinion here that household decision making is more appropriate 
in Developing Countries than the individual decision in migration decision 
making. The head of the household usually makes the decision, and thus 
individual rationality is inappropriate. 
41. Unfortunately Sjaastad does not say exactly how this could be done. 
See LA Sjaastad, "Costs and Returns of Human Migration", in 
The journal of Political Economy, Vol LXX, Part 2, Oct 1972, pp 80-93. 
42. Many modellers do not proceed beyond making the general statement 
that when employment is finally obtained at destination the high wages 
compensate for the disadvantages and costs of the initial period of 
waiting and job search. But costs during the period of job search, if 
the prospective migrant does not move straight into employment, may 
be a strong deterrent to migration since he would have to face these 
costs before he has an opportunity to take advantage of the anticipated 
higher earnings. According to Rothenberg his 'asset position' is 
likely to be unusually weak during the period of unemployment. See- 
J Rothenberg, "On the Micro Economics of Internal Migration", in 
Brown and Neuberger (eds), Internal Migration, op cit, especially 
pp 198-200. 
43. See Note 40. 
44. To an extent this nullifies the occurrence of pure rationality in the 
individual migration decision. 
45. Although Todaro catered for the upward shift in the migrants' income 
streams he did not extend his (the migrant) streams to include the 
probable income of spouses and children. In his study of migration and 
adaption in Mexico Kemper shows that the above considerations were 
part of expected benefits. See RV Kemper, Migration and Adaption, 
Sage Publications, London, 1977, p 159. For some criticisms on 
Todaro's model see the Book Review of Todaro's "Internal Migration in 
Developing Countries: A Review of Theory, Evidence, Methodology 
and Research Priorities", published by the ILO in 1976, by 
Henry Rempel in Journal of Economic Literature, Vol XVI, Sept 1978, 
- 158 - 
pp 1078-1079. For a test of Todaro's model and some criticisms see 
EM Godfrey, "Economic Variables and Rural-Urban Migration: Some 
Thoughts on Todaro's Hypothesis", in Journal of Development Studies, 
Vol 10, No 1,1973, pp 66-78. In his extensive survey of the recent 
migration literature Todaro cites Godfrey's study (and test) but does 
not discuss it. He mentions Barnum and Sabot's (1975) study, "Educa- 
tion, Employment Probabilities and Rural-Urban Migration in Tanzania", 
as the first really comprehensive and significant test of the Todaro 
hypothesis. See MP Todaro, op cit, 1976, p 69. 
46. Some authors, for example Raoul Prebisch, apply the same arguments 
which he used to show that international trade disadvantages under- 
developed countries to the internal terms of trade between agriculture 
and manufactured goods in a country. The same argument is in a 
number of his works. See for instance United Nations, Economic 
Commission for Latin America, New York, 1969. 
47. Most Governments institute some kind of minimum wage agreement 
with the intention of improving the livelihood of those who have the 
lowest incomes. However such agreements rarely go beyond urban 
areas or Government employment. Since wages of the semi-skilled and 
those with lower education rise significantly under minimum wage agree- 
ments it serves as a powerful incentive for rural persons with the same 
level of skill and education to migrate. This is quite rational on the 
part of the potential migrants. Vacancies for engineers at high wages 
in the city will not arouse the interest of the rural casual labourer, 
but high wages of Municipal manual workers will encourage him to 
migrate in the hope of Municipal employment. 
48. According to M Blaug, "... there is something about education that 
makes people unemployable: it raises their aspirations ... it gives 
them the wrong skills or the wrong attitudes. " See M Blaug, Education 
and . 
Employment, in IBRD Working Paper 160, World Bank, Feb 1975. 
49. Wen Lang Li has found that regional convergence occurred in Taiwan. 
Unfortunately his data is rather old (1895-1945) but nevertheless his 
findings were that the less developed regions (perfectures) experienced 
a relative population decline - migration transferred population from 
populated regions to those of lower density where the rate of industria- 
lisation was highest. See Li, "Internal Migration and Regional 
Development in Taiwan", in Richmond and Kubat (eds), Internal 
Migration: The New World and the Third World, Sage Publications, 
London, 1976. 
50. From the survey of Lansing and Morgan (1967) Morrisson records 
that: Relative to earnings at origin, people who have left rural areas 
for urban earn more, on the average, than those who remained ... and 
from the survey of Wertheimer (1970) that five years after moving the 
migrants have earnings equal to those of ... urban non movers of the 
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same education, age, race, and sex. See Morrisson, 1977, op cit, 
pp 66-68. 
51. Perlman (1976) emphasises that migrants are not marginalised in urban 
areas: instead they improve on their occupational levels upon migration. 
But while this may apply to the rural poor it does not apply to those who 
come with higher than average education and skills. Often these enter 
into comparatively lower-status occupations in urban areas. 
52. Although many observors emphasise the substandard conditions found 
in slums and shanti towns it must be remembered that whatever the 
conditions are there it is often better than where the occupiers have 
come from. 
53. Greenwood contends that wages must fall if there is an outflow of 
labour. This would be because it implies a redistribution of income. 
See Greenwood, 1975, op cit, p 416. 
54. A good example of this is the case of Guyana. Due to a fall in agricul- 
tural production caused, to a good extent, by the withdrawal from the 
land and a decline in productivity, the country has been having acute 
foreign exchange shortages which have acted as a bottleneck to develop- 
ment. 
55. See Wilbur Zelinski, who says that migration is an essential component 
of the modernisation process. See W Zelinski, "The Hypothesis of 
Mobility Transition", in The Geographical Review, No 61, pp 219-249. 
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NOTES : Chapter Two 
For the range and extent of mineral and non-mineral resources in 
Guyana see: United Nations Development Programme and Government 
of Guyana Urban and Regional Planning Project (URPP) Draft Report 1, C 
Minerals, Report 1. D Forest Resources, Guyana, 1976; UN/FAO 
Report on a Soil Survey Project - British Guiana, Soil Reconnaissance 
Survey Vol I-III, Rome, 1960. 
2. For the agricultural and other potentials of the soil resources see 
UN/FAO Report to the Government of Guyana on Soil Surveys, by soil 
specialist j Steele, Rome, 1966. 
3. See UNDP/Government of Guyana, URPP Report I. D, op cit. 
4. Because of the relative flatness of the coastlands canals are used as a 
cheap means of transporting sugar canes from fields to the factory. 
5. Mainly American competition. 
6. A similar strategy to secure labour supplies was used in South Africa. 
Peasants were covertly forced to become wage earners and once they were 
in the wage earning system they were imprisoned by it, which, according 
to Magubane, "perpetuated their exploitability". See Bernard Magubane, 
"Bantustans and Migrant Labour in the Political Economy of South Africa", 
in Safa and Du Toit (eds), Migration and Development, op cit (Notes, 
Ch I). 
7. According to Adamson, the growth of the indentured labour force resulted 
in a decline in wages of the resident populations. It also prevented 
any form of individual or collective bargaining. See Adamson, Sugar 
Without Slaves, The Political Economy of British Guiana, 1838-1904, 
Yule Univ Press, New Haven and London, 1972, pp 119-122. 
8. See also G Henry Dalton, History of British Guiana, 2 Vols, Georgetown, 
1855; Nath, Dwarka, A History of the Indians in British Guiana, 
Georgetown, 1950. 
9. This was because the sea coast was below the mean high tide and had 
to be protected by dykes or a 'sea-wall'. Often leaks would occur or 
parts of the wall was broken and the sea would innundate nearby 
villages. Flooding from rainfall was also common. 
10. This was the obvious reaction to unimproved conditions and the decades 
of exploitation and abuse that workers faced in the sugar industry. The 
poor returns from rice cultivation led to feelings of disassociation from 
the land. Also those who worked on the land were considered lowly or 
inferior to the office clerk. Because of this it was an inbuilt aspiration 
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to enter into jobs of an 'office' nature in preference to one of a 'field' 
nature. 
11. For many the schooling of children was given a high priority. Often 
education expenditure. eroded deeply into family income. 
12. The form and content of the Education System in Guyana was clearly 
not oriented towards the needs of the country. The curriculum-of 
primary and secondary schools was limited to the three 'Rs' and the 
'arts' and 'classics' in secondary schools. As such the education 
system was only geared to producing clerks and teachers, instead of 
educated farmers, skilled technicians etc. Education was thus instru- 
mental in causing out-migration by training individuals for employment 
which they could only get in urban areas. 
13. During the entire Colonialist period the Government did not make any 
real attempt to prevent sugar estates from exploiting workers. Wages 
were low even when profits were high. If wages during the 1953-60 
period in the sugar industry were to be examined it would be observed 
that the value of labour productivity had risen by 211%, money wage 
rates increased by only 57%, and real wage rates by only 13%. See 
Havelock Brewster, "The Pattern of Change in Wages, Prices and 
Productivity in British Guiana, 1948-1962", in Social and Economic 
Studies, Vol 18, No 2, June 1969, pp 107-136. 
14. See F Sukdeo, Malaria Eradication and Population Growth in Guyana, 
Univ of Guyana, mimeographed, March 1973, pp 7-14. 
15. Ibid, pp 15-16. 
16. An examination of Table 1, presented in the text, shows that numerically 
males exceeded females until 1931. (This was because immigration 
during the indentureship period 1838-1918 was male-selective. ) However 
real sex equalisation in terms of equal numbers above 15 years of age 
did not occur until the mid-1940's. 
17. In most Developing Countries, according to Schultz, children at a very 
early age become potentially capable of contributing towards family 
resources. However, if the means by which children contributed no 
longer exist, i. e. if mechanisation removes the need for children's 
labour contribution where they do make such a contribution, then they 
are redundant and constitute a near total burden to parents. In the 
case of Guyana mechanisation is substituted for labour, which tends to 
reduce the contribution children can make towards their upkeep. In 
addition, since most are not needed on the land, a higher investment 
in education is needed to prepare them for alternative employment. 
Thus a reasonably large number of children in a family means that a 
large portion of family expenditure would have to be diverted to educate 
and bring up children. See T Paul Schultz, "An Economic Perspective 
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on Population Growth", in The National Academy of Sciences, Rapid 
Population Growth, Consequences and Policy Implications, The 
John Hopkins Press, Baltimore and London, 1971, pp 149-159. 
18. Because of the high cost of child rearing, if a child is treated as a 
producer, Euke, according to Schultz, shows that he/she generally 
yields a low rate of return, for the childhood period of dependency 
absorbs sufficient resources to offset much of the child's future 
earnings as a mature worker. See Schultz, ibid, p 164. 
19. The approximate length of this main roadway is 270 miles. 
20. This represents a 22.7% reduction of the population engaged in agricul- 
ture between 1960 and 1970. 
21. It does not mean that only one person out of every eleven entering the 
labour force obtained employment. Because the birth rate during the 
period 1947-1970 was high and infant mortality reasonably low a high 
proportion of the population was always in the ages below 15 years. 
Thus the rate of unemployment was less alarming but still high. 
22. In 1965 the number unemployed rose from 13,800 in 1960 to 27,000 
while the tabour force increased from 175,000 to 193,000, which 
signifies a rate of 14% unemployment in 1965 compared to 7.9 in 1960. 
Thus unemployment increased by 43.5% during the five year period, 
and only by 1.2% in the 1965-70 period. 
23. The average number employed in the fields declined from 21,641 in 
1950 to 14,327 in 1972 (a decline of approximately 35%). During this 
period productivity per man increased from 6.86 tons per man to 
16.66 tons (an increase of 242.8%), and total output from 193,561 to 
283,401 (an increase of 89,840 tons by 31.7%). See F Sukdeo, The 
Sugar Industry and Economic. Transformation in Guyana, a Caribbean 
Public Enterprises Project Paper presented at the Barbados Workshop, 
Sept 1978, Univ of Guyana, Mimeo, 1978, p 56 and Table No 10. 
24. A further elaboration of this is presented in the section on causes of 
rural-urban migration in Chapter 3. 
25. Before 1946 there was more or less an absence of any notable form of 
political consciousness by the majority of brown and black populations 
and only a small minority of the middle class concerned themselves 
with the state of government and politics in the country. But around 
1946-1950 there was a rise of awareness by persons in all walks of 
life. Africans in Government civil and public service employment 
began to agitate for free trade unions. The hitherto sedate East Indians 
began to loosen the grip that the sugar companies had on them. 
Increasingly they began to strike for higher wages and improved 
conditions of work. For reasonable accounts of the rise of political 
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consciousness in Guyana during this period see Cheddie Jagan, The 
West on Trial, Michael Joseph, London, 1966, Chs 4,5 and 6; 
Peter Simms, Trouble in Guyana, George Allen and Unwin, London, 
1966, Chs 10,11 and 12; American University, Handbook on 
Guyana, Johnson Research Associates, 1969, Ch 14. 
26. Mainly long hours of arduous work for extremely low (pittance) wages 
and under deplorable conditions in the case of sugar workers, a 
'system of privilege' and 'segregation' in government employment and 
the general working of the economy to propagate exploitation of the 
people and the country. See The West on Trial, op cit, Ch 4. 
27. Jagan wanted the PPP-backed General Industrial Workers Union (GIWU) 
to replace the Sugar Producers-backed Man Power Citizens' Association 
(MPCA) as the union to represent workers in the sugar industry. 
28. The British were alarmed by public statements of leading members of 
the People's Progressive Party which was in power. The Party's 
leaders were in support of the 'Marxist' doctrine of development and 
by a controversial labour relations bill. These two developments 
infuriated the anti-Communist feelings in Britain, which was then under 
a Labour government. As a result the constitution of the colony was 
suspended on 8 October 1953. Most of the. leading members were jailed 
and an interim government under the Governor was appointed. 
29. Peoples National Congress. 
30. The supporters of Burnham were mainly from the African-dominated 
urban areas while Jagan's followers were mainly from rural constituencies 
where most of the East Indians live. 
31. See Cheddie Jagan, West on Trial, op cit, Ch 11. 
32. The country was divided into 35 electoral seats. In the previous elections 
there were 14. 
33. The main aim was to remove the MPCA. 
34. This was generally called the 80-day strike. 
35. For a good chronicle of events during this turbulent period see 
Peter Simms, Trouble in Guyana, op cit, Chs 19 and 20. 
36. UF - United Force led by Peter d'Aguiar, a Portuguese industrialist. 
37. The fear that was in many Indians of an'African Take-over', and a 
continuation of burning, looting and violence that the Indians attributed 
to the Africans. 
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38. The Mission noted that there was little coordination between government 
departments in the preparation and execution of plans. In the development 
programme itself, the Mission observed that there was a "comparative 
neglect" of vital sectors such as transport, communications and 
industry, and that there was a tendency to allocate "overgenerously" 
to the relatively less productive social welfare services. See IBRD, 
The Economic Development of British Guiana (Report of a Mission 
Organised by IBRD at the Request of the Government of Guyana), 
John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1953, p 17. 
39. During this period the large Black Bush land development scheme was 
completed. Most of the preliminary 'works' were completed on other 
schemes such as Cane Grove, and drainage and irrigation projects such 
as Boerasiri and Tapacuma. 
40. In the largest of these schemes, i. e. Black Bush Polder, on which 
G$ 12.6 million were spent - not counting civil engineering costs, only 
1,172 families were settled at a cost of $10,700 per family, which was 
a phenomenal sum by Guyanese standards. In view of such an expendi- 
ture to benefit only a few rice farmers the scheme was severely 
criticised. See Rene Dumont, Planning Agricultural Development, FAO 
Report to the Government of British Guiana, FAO, Rome, 1963, p 19. 
(Later the number of settlers increased to 1,440. ) 
41. See Chapter 3 on Causes of Rural-Urban Migration. 
42. The level of investment declined (see Table 2.3 in Appendix). Also, 
many of the subsidies to the Industry were terminated. 
43. The system of party politics and political patronage in Guyana, 
according to Premdas (1977: 79), is such that the Party in Government 
is expected to provide employment for its supporters. Hence, with 
the PNC in Government many Afro-Guyanese who comprise the 
majority of active party supporters are inclined to move to Georgetown 
in the hope of employment. See R Pre: mdas, 1977, "Guyana Communal 
Conflict. Socialism and Political Reconciliation", in Journal of Inter- 
American Affairs 30,1977, pp 63-83. (Ralph Pre'mdas was formerly 
a lecturer in Politics at the University of Guyana. ) 
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NOTES : Chapter Three 
1. See footnote 13, Chapter 2. The sugar industry was shown to be 
notorious for underpaying workers. Before and at the end of the last 
century wages were determined by the amount of labour the Sugar 
estates managed to secure from the outlying areas. In years when this 
outside labour was surplus resident sugar workers, as shown by 
Adamson (1972), had to work twice as hard and longer to secure the 
same wages as they would have received during 'normal' years. Later, 
Reubens and Reubens (1962) noted that wages were stagnant during the 
1930's and most of the 1940's. This was because the Estate 
'managements' continually sought to reduce costs by reducing wage 
rates or by increasing the number of tasks to be performed. 
Inevitably this led to strikes and to popular feeling among workers 
that they might as well "sit and starve rather than work and starve" 
(Jagan, 1966). See Alan Adamson, Sugar Without Slaves, op cit, p 137; 
EP and BG Reubens, Labour Displacement in a Labour Surplus 
Economy : The Sugar Industry of British Guiana, Institute of Social 
and Economic Research, UWI Jamaica, 1962, pp 39-41; CB Jagan, 
1966, West on Trial, op cit, p 109. 
2. Ex-slaves not subservient to their former masters were forced to 
leave the estate's premises. As slaves they received no wages and so 
could not purchase their dwellings or provision plots. Hence those 
who were not prepared to continue working (now for a wage) had to 
migrate. 
3. For an indication/account of the strength of ethnic ties of the two main 
groups (i. e. East Indians and Negroes) see RT Smith and 
C Jayawardena, "Marriage and Family amongst East Indians in 
British Guiana", Social and Economic Studies 59, pp 321-376, ISER 
Jamaica, 1959; RT Smith, 1956, The Negro Family in British Guiana, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
4. Prior to 1960 the Censuses were merely head counts (of people) at 
major areas of residence, usually the main urban concentrations, 
Sugar Estates and main villages. 
5. This was very surprising considering that prior to 1960 many of the 
employment establishments present at this time were absent or 
undeveloped. Most of the employment opportunities were in (or were 
supposed to be in) rural rice growing or sugar producing areas, hence 
those areas where the great majority of the labour force was expected 
to be (see Table 6 in Appendix, columns 6 and 7, which gives an 
indication of migrants in urban areas). 
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6. For census purposes the country was divided into 13 major districts 
(which were further sub-divided into 33 minor districts). Persons 
enumerated in a district in which they were not born were regarded 
as migrants. to that district. For the purposes of this study the 13 
major districts are reduced to 10, and the three interior districts, 
i. e. Northwest, Mazaruni/Potaro and Rupununi, are referred to as 
Interior District. 
7. There was a major hospital in each of the country's three counties 
but only one was in a major rural population district. The hospital 
serving the East of Berbice district was located in the adjacent urban 
area of New Amsterdam. Thus all babies from mothers originating 
from East of Berbice but born in the New Amsterdam hospital and 
found at the time of the Census in Berbice were regarded as migrants 
originating from New Amsterdam. Similarly, those persons born in 
the Georgetown hospitals were regarded as migrants to East Coast, 
East Bank and West Demerara. In view of this discrepancy the 
6 in 10 reverse flow from Georgetown to East Bank Demerara and the 
3 in 10 (persons) moving from Georgetown to East Coast Demerara 
and West Demerara should be regarded with some reservations. 
8. Georgetown is used to mean both the City of Georgetown and its 
suburbs. In the Census the Suburbs is a major area distinct from the 
City. 
9. See for instance Browning, 1970, op cit, pp 285-286; Elizaga, 1969 
332-336, "A Study on Immigrations to Greater Santiago (Chile)" in 
G Breese (ed), The City in Newly Developing Countries, Prentice Hall 
Inc, N Y, pp 332-359; Sabot, 1969, op cit, pp 81-89; McConnell et at, 
1976, op cit, pp 39-42; and others (most of the researchers who have 
conducted surveys in developing countries attest to this fact). 
10. See footnote 30, Chapter 1 for "Laws of Ravenstein". 
11. See RT Smith, 1956, op cit, on ethnic ties of Africans. 
12. This presumption can be regarded as more or less valid for three 
reasons. One is that few Africans were involved in agriculture as 
their main occupation, and the second is that this group tend by 
tradition to prefer wage employment in urban based activities such as 
Civil and Public Service jobs etc. (See also footnote 43, Chapter 1, 
which adds validity to this reason. ) The third reason is that since the 
racial clashes of the mid 1960's each group tends to prefer to relocate 
in areas where their group predominates. Hence, since the majority 
of Africans were in urban areas, those areas attracted a greater flow 
of Africans from areas where they were both in majority and in 
minority. East Indians were in the majority in rural areas, and 
hence they predominate in the rural-to-rural flows (see Tables 13-20). 
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13. But since there was a tradition of universal primary education, 
according to Standing and Sukdeo (1977 : 307) "many migrants have 
moved" precisely in order to get further education and training so that 
the differences between urban residents and migrants have been slight. 
See G Standing and F Sukdeo, "Labour Migration and Development in 
Guyana" in International Labour Review, Vol 116, No 3, Nov-Dec 1977, 
pp 303-313. 
14. Two studies indirectly substantiate the premise of migrants having 
a fair degree of occupation mobility. One is that of Ahmad Baksh (1974) 
"The Mobility of Degree Level Graduates of the University of Guyana". 
In this study Baksh (p 84) found that there was a trend by graduates to 
gravitate towards the city. Also, approximately 40% of the graduates 
interviewed had improved their qualifications and a further 35% were 
in the process of doing so at the time of the survey. In the case of 
Guyana improvement of one's qualifications meant job promotion 
along with increased remuneration in salary and other terms. See 
Ahmad Baksh, "The Mobility Level of Graduates of the University of 
Guyana" in Journal of Comparative Education, Vol 10, No 1, March 
1974. The other study is I Sukdeo's Occupational Mobility of 
Secondary School Teachers, University of Guyana (mimeo), 1977. 
15. Nearly all of the studies reviewed in this paper indicate that the 
earnings of migrants at place of destination are generally higher than 
previous earnings at place of origin, but few investigate migrants' 
earnings compared to those of the native urban population. Sabot 
found that only 8% of the migrants in Tanzania were in the upper income 
bracket. Donald Bogue, in the United States, found that 85T of 
migrants to Chicago were paid approximately $100 per week in their 
first job. This is presumably below average in terms of American 
wage levels. Compared to these two studies migrants in Guyana 
seem to have higher returns from their migration. See R Sabot, 
1979, op cit, p 196; Donald Bogue, -"A Migrant's Eye View" in 
Brown and Neuberger (eds), Internal Migration, 1977, op cit, p 175. 
16. Before proceeding to Table 13 in Appendix it is essential that an 
indication of distances in the country is obtained. Geographically, 
East Bank, East Coast and West Demerara extend from the suburbs 
of Georgetown for a distance of about 30 miles along the river bank 
in the case of East Bank Demerara, and 25 and 40 miles in the case 
of West Demerara and East Coast Demerara respectively (see Map 1 
in Appendix). Demographically, the bulk of the population in each 
area is within an area of 15 miles from Georgetown. West Berbice 
and Essequibo Coast and Islands are considered to be at a medium 
distance, i. e. between 40 and 70 miles, while East Berbice and 
Interior Districts are considered to be at a 'long'distance, i. e. over 
70 miles away from the city. 
17. In the 1960 and 1970 Censuses respondents were not asked the reasons 
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for their moving. Deducting from the tables generated it seems as if 
the migration questions were related to period of movement to present 
location. Information on sex, ethnicity, educational attainment, 
occupation, etc were generated from the general questionnaire. 
18. See schematic representation of migration decision in Appendix. 
19. For some of the glaring instances of State patronage of sugar see 
CB Jagan, 1966, op cit, Chapters V and VI. For a good picture of 
the degree of poverty and squalor in living conditions etc see 
Chapter IV. 
20. See Chapter Two of this paper. 
21. It is estimated that there are 13.8 million acres of arable land of 
which 2.2 million acres are in the coastal belt of the country. At the 
1960 population level the proportion of total arable land to people was 
nearly 25: 1, or on the coastlands it was nearly 4: 1. Labour was 
also in surplus. 
22. This survey was conducted by SS Naraine, then the Minister in Charge 
of Works and Hydraulics, Georgetown. 
23. According to Standing and Sukdeo, mechanisation in agriculture and 
the fragmentation of land ownership were two of the major reasons 
for rural out-migration. See Standing and Sukdeo, 1977, op cit, p 305. 
24. As will be shown later, small farmers who were in the majority 
obtained extremely small profits. In years of adverse weather 
conditions, by not owning tractors many were unable to perform 
essential operations in time, hence in such years small profits are 
easily turned into losses. 
25. Rene Dumont explicitly presents the case of Black Bush Polder where 
he found that mechanisation has reduced the number of man-days the 
farmer is required in his agricultural plot to about 38 days per year. 
R Dumont, Report to the Government of Guyana on Planning Agricul- 
tural Development, op cit, 1963, pp 18-20,88. 
26. For a very good account of how the 'quasi-feudal' relations of 
production in agriculture have bottled up rural labour see Peter Peek 
and Guy Standing, "Rural-Urban Migration and Government Policies 
in Low Income Countries", in International Labour Review, Vol 118, 
No 6, Nov-Dec 1979, pp 748-750. However, in Guyana since the late 
1950's the landlord's (or moneylender's) 'feudal' hold over his 
tenants has been weakening with the rapid spread of education and 
transport, with the result that the hitherto bottled up peasants have 
rapidly out-migrated from the stagnant rural sector. 
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27. This level of returns was the 'Ministerial expectations' in which the 
Black Bush Scheme was planned. On a 15 acre sized plot it was hoped 
that the first crop of 15 and the second of 72 acres of rice would yield 
405 bags (140 lbs) of paddy or a net return of $1,552. But productivity 
per acre was less than half of what was expected, hence the total 
return of $17 in the case of a typical farmer. See Wilfred David, 
Economic Development of British Guiana, 1963-1974, Clarendon Press 
London, 1969, pp 103-107. 
28. Another factor here was that insensitive relations and encumbering 
bureaucracy marred relations between Government and farmers. The 
failure of the tomato canning plant in Black Bush exemplifies such 
handicaps. In this case a tomato canning plant was established in the 
scheme, but the price offered to farmers was very much short of 
what would be needed to stimulate production of tomatoes. As a result 
the canning venture was abandoned, with farmers becoming more 
sceptical of Government attempts to 'better their lot'. 
29. According to F Sukdeo, the average number employed in the sugar 
estates declined from 28,235 in 1950 to 17,394 in 1972 -a decline of 
10,841 or 38%. See F Sukdeo, 1978, op cit, Table 10, p 59. 
30. The nature of highly mechanised open pit mining made it unlikely that 
bauxite mining would employ a large number of workers. Even the 
production of alumina, which is entirely a chemical process, has a 
low labour-capital ratio. In 1954 the industry employed 2,600, and by 
1971 it had risen to only 5,800. See W David, 1969, op cit, pp 187-189. 
31. For an inventory of services in rural areas see UNDP/Government of 
Guyana, op cit, Report 4- Settlement, Appendix A. 
32. See Chapter Two on population growth. 
33. In 1962 Mr LA Freeman of the Central Housing and Planning 
Authority estimated on the basis of population growth between 1946 
and 1960 that approximately 38,188 housing units were needed in rural 
areas alone. On average this needed a house building programme of 
2,222 houses per year, but the average number of houses being built 
annually was only about 1,300 (taking an average of rate of house- 
building between 1956 and 1962). Hence there was a progressive 
backlog of houses to be built, which implies the gradual increase in 
overcrowding etc. See LA Freeman's paper on Estimate of the Size 
of Housing Need in British Guiana, Ministry of Housing, 1962. 
34. This was because the rate of housebuilding even after 1960 was low. 
Between 1960 and 1967 the rate of building was a dismal 7.96 houses 
per thousand population. See UNDP/Government of Guyana, op cit, 
Report 5- Housing, p 6. As such, in 1970 46% of the total number of 
housing units in the country had only two rooms or less. The total 
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number of rooms in these units was 91,730 and the population to be 
housed was 248,232. Thus in these units there were 2.7 persons 
per room. 
35. According to the 1970 Census approximately 80% of houses were 
constructed out of wood, and one third of the total houses were 
constructed before 1950. Since the average life of a wooden house is 
about 20 years this proportion of houses could be considered old. See 
1970 Population Census of the Commonwealth Caribbean, Vol 9 on the 
housing conditions in Guyana. Census reports prepared by Census 
Research Programme, University of the West Indies, Jamaica. 
36. In rural (coastal) areas secondary schools, providing education up to 
the GCE '0' level, were available for only one out of thirteen children 
in primary schools in those areas. The comparative ratio for 
Georgetown was one place for every two children. These calculations 
were made from 1974/75 school enrollment. See Digest of 
Educational Statistics 1974/75, Planning Unit, Ministry of Education, 
Georgetown, Tables 9,26,28. (C H Enloe quotes only one in 17 pupils 
leaving primary school gets free secondary education to GCE level. ) 
See Cynthia H Enloe, Guyanese Political Response to Migration, paper 
presented for the Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological 
Association, Toronto, 1972 (mimeo), Clark University. To obtain 
secondary education was a prime motive for migration in Guyana. 
37. The 'bright lights hypothesis' is not a purely psychological phenomenon. 
Richard Curtain (1975), quoting on motives for migration from 
Conroy, says, "There is very little in the bright lights hypothesis 
that cannot be explained in terms of a wholly rational and understan- 
dable desire for a higher level of real income". See R Curtain, 
"Labour Migration in Papua, New Guinea", in Safa and Du Toit (eds), 
Migration and Development, op cit, p 281. 
38. Censuses in Guyana were decennial population counts. For example, 
in this century censuses were conducted in 1901,1911,1921,1931 and 
because of the Second World War no count was taken in 1941 but was 
taken in 1946. The next census was held in 1960 and then in 1970 and 
1980. 
39. In 1970 only 6.9% of the migrants moving to Georgetown made two or 
more moves before reaching the city. Thus the 732% increase in 
mobility is not inaccurate by much. 
40. It is the opinion that the rate of rural-to-urban migration had been 
increasing steadily throughout the 1960's but not at the rate depicted 
by the census of the last years of the 1960's. According to the 
census (see Table 8 in Appendix), during the last 15 months a third 
of the movement had occurred. This is clearly an error. 
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41. In 1970 the City of Georgetown (including its immediate suburbs) was 
approximately seven times more populous than the country's second 
largest city, Linden. In terms of population Georgetown contained 
74% of the country's urban population. 
42. This was because East Indian females, who were generally more 
prolific in terms of live born children per adult female, predominated 
among females of other ethnic groups in rural areas. See Chapter 2. 
43. See footnote 10, Chapter 2. Urban wages were considerably higher 
than rural. Of equal importance was that working conditions in urban 
areas were superior to those in rural areas. 
44. See Paul Bairoch (1973) and Safa (1975), both of whom say that 
education in developing countries is not oriented to local needs. 
Gunnar Myrdal, on this theme, says that students in developing 
countries "commonly expected and were expected to become 'deskmen' 
not soiling their hands". The educational system, according to him, 
was oriented towards the preparation of locals for public service 
employment, The observation of the above three authors seems to be 
especially valid in the case of Guyana. Holders of secondary and 
tertiary education tend to be prejudiced against any type of manual 
work. For Bairoch (1973) and Safa (1975) op cit, see footnote 27, 
Chapter 1. See G Myrdal, 1970, The Challenge of World Poverty 
A World Anti-Poverty Program in Outline, Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 
London, p 171. See also the outline of Chapter 6, in particular 
pp 170-182. 
45. Another reason why persons with some education in rural Guyana were 
loath to take up jobs in agriculture was that such jobs were 'dead-end 
jobs' and had no career prospects. Urban wages were considerably 
higher and there were ample opportunities for increasing one's human 
capital stock. As opposed to this, rural migrants who had some 
education and did not migrate or want to do so were, in the words of 
Ronald Dore, "left to rot in the overcrowded inanity of rural life". 
See Ronald Dore, "De School? Try Using Schools for Education First: 
The Educational Impasse in the Developing World", in IBRD Working 
Paper 160, World Bank, Feb 1975, p 57. 
46. Service jobs were limited to a few teaching posts and Local and 
Central Government officials who generally cover a geographically 
large area. Also various casual, jobs such as drainage and irrigation 
maintenance were available depending on specific local conditions. 
47. Recently this has become a major source of employment, drawing in 
the main employment seasons many of the unemployed of the Upper 
Corentyne District of East Berbice. 
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48. In 1970 the ratio of sugar estates to population in West Demerara was 
1: 20,000 but on the East Coast of Demerara it was 1: 50,000. Although 
the two sugar estates on the East Coast were larger, in terms of 
sugar produced (and hence numbers employed) they were not 
disproportionally larger than those in West Demerara. 
49. Access in this sense refers to that portion of the population along the 
coastal transport corridor, i. e. the Georgetown-Rosignol highway. 
Many more of the population on the East Coast resided in riverain 
areas, i. e. Mahaicony and Mahaica areas and at distances where it 
was uneconomical to commute, than in West Demerara. This was 
brought out by the passenger counts in 1970. 
50. Compared to the other two rurban areas, East Bank of Demerara in 
1970 had only 16% of the rurban population, yet (in 1973) it provided 
34% of the total number of persons commuting daily to Georgetown. 
See Transport Plan of Guyana, prepared by Central Transport Planning 
Unit and Israel Institute of Transportation Planning and Research, 1975, 
Georgetown, p. 44. 
51. This was more or less a deliberate policy to prevent the freed slaves 
from becoming peasant farmers, which would serve to increase the 
drift away from the sugar estates and so deprive the planters of their 
labour. For analyses of freed slaves' attempts to own land and become 
farmers see A Adamson, 1972, op cit, Chapter 3. See also 
Rawle Farley, "The Rise of Village Settlement", in Caribbean Quarterly, 
Vol 3, No 2,1953. The East Indians on the other hand were 
patronised by the Estates and by the Government in that they were 
allowed to rent small parcels of Estate land for rice growing, and 
finally attempts were made to settle them by providing free land. Thus 
East Indians, many of whom came from urban backgrounds, became 
agriculturalists while the Africans had no such inclination. 
52. The analogy of Todaro that if 100 new jobs are created in urban areas 
it might draw 300 migrants seems to be especially true in the case of 
Guyana See MP Todaro, Economics for a Developing World, 
Longman, London, 1977, p 222. 
53. Due to there being one definition for the labour force and a different 
one for employment the findings of unemployment surveys are 
debateable. In 1956 the ILO Report on unemployment and under- 
employment reports 30% unemployment. The 1960 Census shows a 
lower rate. The Man-power surveys of 0TC Francis (Min of Labour) 
in 1965 indicate a lower and declining rate of unemployment. However, 
it is estimated here that if a survey is conducted that is designed to 
unmask all of the unemployed, a proportion of between 30-40% of the 
labour force would be found in this category. Juvenile unemployment 
was always high. According to CH Enloe the Government admitted 
that 75% of the total unemployed were between the ages of 14 and 24. 
See/ 
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See (i) ILO/Dept of Labour Unemployment Survey, Min of Labour, 
Georgetown; 
(ii) 0JC Francis, Report on a Survey of Manpower Requirements 
and Labour Force, Min of Labour, Georgetown; 
(iii) 1960 Population Census Report on Labour Force; 
(iv) CH Enloe, 1972, op cit, p 13. 
54. To give an indication of this the figures for the 1970-79 period are 
here used. Between 1970 and 1979 the number of schools providing 
secondary education rose from 38 to 85 (an increase of 124%). The 
number of students increased from 23,000 to 52,618 (an increase of 129%). 
The total expenditure on education rose from $m 22.8 to $m 118. This 
huge increase in spending to give many more secondary education may 
not be entirely advantageous. In a situation where employment 
opportunities for the educated are limited this will, according to 
Todaro, only lead to more unemployment and greater demand for 
increased education to compete for the few jobs. Inevitably this will 
lead to a greater demand for public spending on expanding education 
linearly (i. e. from secondary schools to universities to specialised 
postgraduate training etc for jobs that were filled previously by persons 
of much lower education). See MP Todaro, "Education, Migration and 
Fertility", in IBRD Paper, op cit, p 26. Education statistics were 
obtained from Government of Guyana Publication 10 Years of Achievement 
1.970-1980; Ministry of Information, Georgetown, pp 7-8. 
55. Where the Government is the employer such practices no doubt cause 
a considerable amount of antagonism and malingering within depart- 
ments. Hence it affects the overall efficiency of 'Government'. This 
practice also contributes to the ethnic polarisation in occupation. 
Africans tend to go to public and civil service jobs and Indians to the 
sugar estates. 
56. In 1945 a survey of. housing in Georgetown showed the need for 6,930 
units. By 1960 13,060 were needed as well as repairs to existing 
stock. See LA Freeman's paper, 1962, op cit. 
57. These statistics were obtained from Vol 9 of the 1970 Population Census 
Reports and from F Sukdeo, Constraints of Urban Planning in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean Countries, University of Guyana (mimeo), 
Nov 1973. 
58. Statistics for the comparison between Albonystown and Queenstown 
wards of Georgetown were obtained from jJ Heins, "Spatial 
Inequality in Guyana. A Case Study of Georgetown", in Tijdschrift 
voor Econ en Soc Geografie 69, Nr 2 1978, pp 39-40. 
59. The argument of NV Sovani (1972 : 329) seems applicable here. As 
Sovani argues, this movement of capital to Georgetown where it is 
likely to have higher returns will increase the pace of economic 
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development. This may be true, but if there is unequal redistribution 
of income favouring the urban areas, as is the case in most of the poor 
developing countries, then the channelling away of rural funds will 
accelerate inequality and disadvantage rural areas. This seems to be 
the case in Guyana. See NV Sovani, "The Analysis of Over-urbanisation" 
in Gerald Breece (ed), The City in Newly Developing Countries, op cit, 
pp 322-330. 
60. In the City and Suburbs of Georgetown a number of large employment 
establishments are owned and operated by migrants to the city. 
61. This statistic on employment creation was obtained from the Report on 
Establishments Enquiry, Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 
Georgetown, 1969. 
62. This fact is dealt with later in Chapter Four, Sections 1 and 2. 
63. The education curriculum in primary schools is basically dedicated to 
the three 'Rs' (writing, reading and arithmetic). At the secondary 
level arts subjects predominate, and the same can be said of the 
University of Guyana. The following statistics are intended to lend 
credence to the above. In 1975, out of the total number of students 
who sat and gained passes at the London GCE examination 65.5% gained 
passes in arts subjects, and 11.4% and 22.5% in social and natural 
sciences respectively. In the local University between the academic 
years 1966/67 and 1974/75, out of 797 persons graduating in Degree 
programs, 53.9% were in arts subjects, and 27.4% and 18.7% in 
social and natural sciences respectively. At the Diploma level where 
practical subjects are taught only 32.7% were in engineering and 
related technical subjects. See Educational Digest, op cit. 
64. Costs of imports were higher and the main exports to pay for such 
commodities, i. e. rice and sugar, were not sufficiently increased to 
cater for the increase in costs of imports. , 
65. With the coming to office in 1964 of the new regime the emphasis on 
rural agriculture changed to infrastructural provision and industrial 
development. As a result the duty-free importation of agricultural 
machinery, petrol used by such machinery, and soft loans to purchase 
same was removed. The price of rice declined somewhat, and as a 
consequence profits also declined. 
66. According to Prewudas the East Indian population, which includes the 
majority of farmers, did not 'identify' with the policies of the 
Government in its drive. to increase production etc. Hence production 
slackened. See R Pre. m: das, 1977, Guyana Communal Conflict, op cit, 
p 78. 
67. Between 1960 and 1970 the (unregulated) agricultural wage increased 
by about 1 50 to 200°70. 
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68. Thus the benefits of migration to the origin community in Guyana are 
not different from those in most Latin American, African or Asian 
areas where rural-urban migration takes place. 
69. The extent of this can only be determined empirically. 
70. This is considered to be important considering the degree of 
communalness in Guyanese social relations. 
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NOTES : Chapter Four 
1. Between 1970 and 1976 at constant factor cost economic services 
including agriculture, mining and quarrying, manufacturing and 
processing grew by an annual average of 0.5% while services grew by 
5%. Most notably Government grew by 97o during the period. 
2. See footnote 53, Chapter 3. See also Chapter 2, Section 4 (iii)(C) on 
employment and unemployment of the Guyanese labour force. 
3. It cannot be said that the Guyanese have made optimum use of the 
resources at their disposal. Taking land as a resource it is reasonably 
plentiful but very unevenly distributed. It is used at low productivity 
per acre to produce low value crops mainly for export. Diversification 
has not occurred. Development in agriculture comes in the form of 
improved seed varieties that necessitate mechanisation and costly 
inputs of fertiliser. It also encourages large scale farming which means 
that many small farmers have been forced out of their traditional means 
of subsistence. These now migrate to more promising areas, i. e. to 
urban areas if they can, or eke a living from what Standing calls 
"occupational multiplicity". For a graphic account or reasons why 
countries such as Guyana have not been able to improve the livelihood 
of their inhabitants see Barbara Ward, Progress for a Small Planet, 
Penguin, 1979, Chapter 17. See also Guy Standing, "Labour Force 
Participation in Historical Perspective: Proletarianisation in Jamaica", 
A World Employment Programme, Working Paper No 50, ILO Geneva, 
March 1977, p 6. 
4. Mainly sugar and (later) bauxite. 
5. At the time when this paper was written Fred Sukdeo was a director of 
the nationalised Sugar Industry in Guyana. 
6. See footnote 29, Chapter 3. 
7. Between 1950 and 1970 the amount of sugar produced per worker during 
a year increased from 6.86 tons to 16.66 tons, an increase of 143%. 
See F Sukdeo, 1978, op cit, Table 10. 
8. At the time of Nationalisation Bookers Brothers Ltd owned and were 
operating nine of the country's 13 sugar estates, producing 80 to 85% 
of the total amount of sugar produced in the country. 
9. The Company was a subsidiary of Booker McConnell Ltd -a multi- 
national Company, with its head office in London. In Guyana the 
Company had interests in sugar production, commerce, manufacturing, 
publishing and printing, distribution, real estate, insurance, shipping 
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and others. For a list of the enterprises and the extent of its network 
see jJF Heins, 1978, op cit, p 37. The Company also operated in a 
number of countries in the Caribbean, in Canada, in Zambia, and in 
Britain. In all these operations it used its size and multinational 
influence to its advantage. For a brief account of the operations of 
this Company see G Beckford, Persistent Poverty : Underdevelopment 
in Plantation Economies of the Third World, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1972. See in particular Chapter 5. 
10. According to Sukdeo (1973: 130) the Company made substantial 
profits but through "deceptive accountancy manipulation" it showed a 
low profit level. This was possible because the Company was not 
incorporated locally and operated under an outdated Company Law 
System. From the production costs presented by Sukdeo, the average 
cost of producing one ton of sugar between 1967 and 1971 was $217.47. 
The IBRD Mission (1970) estimated that sugar could be produced at a 
cost of about $180 per ton. This is 20% lower than the production 
costs shown by Bookers when in fact, because of the vertical nature 
of the Company, it should be very much lower. See F Sukdeo, 
"Profitability of the Sugar Industry in Guyana", in Proceedings of the 
Eighth West Indies Agricultural Economics Conference, St Augustin, 
Trinidad, 1973, pp 123-130. See also "Current Economic Position and 
Prospects of Guyana", IBRD/LDA Central American Dept, Vol 2, 
Agriculture, Oct 1970. 
11. Prof CY Thomas, in a series of articles in the Guyana Chronicle, 1976, 
(newspaper) showed how Guyana was exploited by Bookers McConnell Ltd. 
12. F Sukdeo in 1973, op cit, and 1978, op cit, showed the same. 
13. After 1953 the PPP backed GIWU (Guyana Industrial Workers Union, 
later GAWU - Guyana Agricultural Workers Union) tried to gain 
recognition as the workers' bargaining agent in the Sugar Industry. 
The efforts of the PPP failed and for 24 years the Sugar Producers 
(Bookers) and the union were locked in combat, and during that time 
the industry was plagued by work stoppages in support of the union. 
The main reason for the lack of recognition was that the union was 
agitating for high wage increases. In some cases it was canvassing 
for a 3007/0 wage increase for workers to achieve a comparable wage 
status to those in Trinidad. 
14. The Industry generally enjoyed Government support and State Security 
forces were often used to suppress workers in their struggle for 
increased wages and better conditions of work. 
15. The practice of bringing forward of the premature reaping of canes 
became a common practice since the early 1960's as the industry 
strived to meet its quota from a slowly expanding acreage and 
declining productivity of canes per acre. It should be noted that the 
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sucrose content of the stalks is sufficiently high to produce sugar from 
canes 6-8 months old but its sugar yield is highest when the canes are 
about 12 to 15 months old. 
16. Bauxite ore in Guyana is obtained from open pit mining. 
17. Although the wage level is the highest in this industry it is prone to 
"wildcat strikes". 
18. For an account of the early growth of the rice industry see jR Mandle, 
"Population and Economic Change : The Emergence of the Rice 
Industry in Guyana 1895-1915", in journal of Economic History, 30, 
1970, - pp 785-801. See also jLR Singh, The Coastal Lowland of 
Guyana :A Study in Agricultural Geography, unpublished thesis, 
London University, 1970. 
19. According to WB Mitchell and others, the land policy was changed by 
the 1956 ordinance. But this was purely a tenureship ordinance aimed 
at protecting rice farmers and as such it did nothing to change the 
existing land policy. According to Gyanchand, the policy has been 
unchanged since 1931. CK Meek (1949) shows that the last 
legislation to be enacted concerning land policies in the Colonies was 
in 1938. Thus effectively the land policy in Guyana has not changed 
since 1938. See WB Mitchell and others in American University 
Handbook on Guyana (1969), op cit, p 240; Gyanchand, Estimates on a 
Three Year Plan for Guyana, Government Printery, Georgetown, 1963, 
p 36; CK Meek, Land, Law and Custom in the Colonies, London, 
1949. 
20. See CA Cole, Memorandum on Titles to Crown Lands with an 
Historical Background and Recommendations for Control. Measures 
for Maximum Utilisation of Land, Ministry of Lands, Georgetown, n. d. 
21. See Rice Farmers (Security of Tenure) Ordinance 194; 1 Ministry of 
Agriculture, Georgetown. 
22. The information on land holdings (land distribution) is very unclear. 
23. See Rene Dumont, 1963, op cit, p 17. 
24. It is estimated that, under normal conditions, a 45 hp tractor would 
do the work, with relative ease, of 12-15 men each with a pair of 
bullock, in one day (this is in the case of land preparation or even any 
other work related to rice farming). 
25. The traditional method of transplanting seedlings from seed bed 
(nursery) by hand. 
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26. This fact has been brought out by a number of empirical studies. See 
for instance articles by MK Raj and CH Gotsch, in Mechanisation and 
Employment in Agriculture, ILO Geneva, 1973. See also 
KC Abercrombie, "Agricultural Mechanisation and Employment in 
Latin America", in Mechanisation and Employment in Agriculture : 
Case Studies in Four Continents, ILO Geneva, 1974. For a general 
work covering a number of countries see ILO General Study, Why 
Labour Leaves the Land, A Comparative Study of the Movement of 
Labour out of Agriculture, Studies and Reports No 59, ILO Geneva, 1960. 
27. The tractor made the 'bullock' virtually 'extinct'. The result is that 
in years when excessive rainfall reduces the efficiency of tractors very 
little hiring is done. There are no bullocks to which farmers who do 
not own tractors could turn, and hence hundreds of acres are left 
uncropped, or unreaped, in the case where the appearance of combine 
harvestors had made most of rural farm labour redundant. 
28. Rice cultivation in Guyana depends to a great extent on the rainy 
season for sowing and the dry season for reaping. 
29. Because of the heavy clayey soils the operating efficiency of the 
machines is also reduced. Breakages are frequent. Most models of 
tractors are old and outdated, and as such replacement parts are 
difficult to obtain. Many farmers also lack technical 'know how' 
concerning their machines. See F Sukdeo, "Utilisation of Tractors 
in the Rice Industry in Guyana", in Proceedings of the Tenth West 
Indies Agricultural Economics -Conference, Vol II Working Papers, 
St Augustin, Trinidad, 1975, pp 55-59. 
(In a survey of tractor utilisation in Black Bush Polder Sukdeo found 
that the majority of the tractors were old (78% were over nine years 
old) and in poor working condition. Costs of repairs, labour and 
parts were high. In 1974 more than three quarters of the tractors 
in working order (78%) prepared less than 40 acres each for the 
autumn rice crop. ) 
30. This does not mean that all farmers had low yields. Good or 
efficient farmers achieve reasonable yields, but low yields by the 
larger and some small farmers depress total yields in the national 
averages. See IBRD Report 1970, op cit, p 13. 
31. It is estimated that a farmer on a ten acre plot needs to spend an 
average of 30-50 days. But this may depend on whether the farmer 
owns a tractor or not. If he does not then he may spend several days 
trying to secure the hire of a tractor to do the various tasks 'in time'. 
Also he may spend considerable time in trying to obtain supplies, i. e. 
seed paddy, fertilizer, drugs,. spraying equipment, empty bags etc 
from the Rice Corporation's offices. 
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32. The UN/FAO year books on agricultural production show rice yields 
in Guyana to be among the lowest in the world. 
33. It is not unusual for farmers to pay between 30-40% on loans from the 
local money-lender. 
34. Food is generally more available in-Guyana than in many poor 
countries, but as far as nutrition is concerned the evidence, 
according to Guy Standing, "points to a widespread incidence of 
malnutrition". A nutrition survey in 1971 showed that about half of 
the population were consuming less than 80% of the recommended 
daily intake of energy. For an in depth study of malnutrition in 
Guyana see G Standing and R Szal, Poverty and Basic Needs : Evidence 
from Guyana and the Philippines, ILO Geneva, 1979, see pp 41-52. 
35. In one case the alternative pasture offered (i. e. at Moblissa for 
dairy farmers in the Suburbs of Georgetown) was distantly located 
and the pasture itself was undeveloped at the time when dairy farmers 
were urged to take their cattle there. 
36. In many cases the retail price for crops in the municipal markets was 
twice what the main government buying agency (Guyana Marketing 
Corporation) paid farmers in rural areas. In the case of plantains 
in 1970 GMC paid farmers an average of 5.4 ¢ per lb while the 
retail price was nearly 11 ¢. In 1977 the pricing policy of the agency 
was the same. Farmers were paid 18 ¢ per lb while the average 
retail price was between 45-50 ¢ per lb. With many other types of 
produce a similar pricing gap was present. See Municipal Market 
S tatistics, Ministry of Agriculture Resource and Planning Division, 
Georgetown. 
37. See for instance Myrdal (1968,1970) for numerous references to the 
negative effects of 'undying' tradition to agricultural development. 
See also the monumental work of Ladejinsky (1977) on Land and 
Tenancy Reforms in India. See Myrdal (1968), "Asian Drama", 
op cit, 1970; "The Challenge of World Poverty, op cit; 
LJ Walinsky (ed), The Selected Papers of Wolf Ladejinsky, Agrarian 
Reform as Unfinished Business, Oxford University Press. 
38. See Myrdal, 1970, "The Challenge of World Poverty; ' op cit, Ch 7. 
This factor is not new and has become more rampant in recent years. 
39. The capital intensive industries in these countries could not comp-ate 
with their European counterparts which benefitted from certain 
comparative advantages, internal and external. economies of scale, 
etc. 
40. See for instance Erich H Jacoby, Man and Land: The Fundamental 
Issue in Development, London, Andre Deutsch, 1971; K Griffin, 
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The Political Economy of Agrarian Change: An Essay on the Green 
Revolution, London, Macmillan, 1974; M Lipton, Why Poor People 
Stay Poor, London, Temple Smith, 1977. 
41. Most of the observers of land and agrarian reform in Developing 
Countries attest to this fact. See for instance Jacoby, 1971, op cit; 
Griffin, 1974, op cit; Ladejinsky, 1977, op cit; WC Thiesenhusen, 
"Green Revolution in Latin America: Income Effects, Policy Decisions", 
Land Tenure Centre Research Paper No 83, University of Wisconsin- 
Madison, 1973. 
42. See D Kanel, "Creating Opportunities for Small Farmers: The Role 
of Land Tenure and Service Institutions", Land Tenure Centre 
Research Paper No 92, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1973. 
Kanel shows that in some Latin American countries small farmers 
receive only between 2 to 30'70 of farm credit to the agricultural 
sector. See also Peter Dorner, "Problems and Prospects of Multi- 
and Bi-Lateral Assistance for Agricultural Development", Land Tenure 
Research Paper No 81, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1973. 
43. For some of these effects see WC Thiesenhusen, 1973, Land Tenure 
Research Paper No 83, op cit; also 1973, "Suggested Policy for 
Industrial Invigoration in Latin America", Land Tenure Research 
Paper No 80, University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX I 
1. Brief Description of Major Population Areas (Districts) 
For census purposes Guyana has been divided into thirteen major 
population districts but for the purposes of this thesis the three interior regions 
North-West, Mazaruni-Potaro and the Rupun. uni districts have been regarded 
as Interior Districts. Also the city proper and its suburbs have been 
regarded as Greater Georgetown and have been referred to simply as 
Georgetown. As such, the country is considered as having ten population 
districts. The following is a brief description of each of these districts. For 
a location of these districts see Map iv in Appendix. 
Area 1. City of Georgetown This is the chief city and port that has, over 
the years, grown to assume primate characteristics over other urban areas 
in the country. The main factors causing this development were that the 
city was (and is) the political, administrative capital of the country and its 
main centre of industry and commerce. From it radiate the main transport 
and communication links with the country, making it the hub of economic and 
social life in the country. The original population of plantation owners and 
petty bourgeoise became minority groups with the influx of freed slaves who 
migrated to the city in search of employment. Since the early fifties 
East Indians have shown a preference-for urban living and have been slowly 
gravitating to it from their rural habitations. As a result negroes have 
become by far the most populous group, with East Indians ranking as the 
second most important group. The attraction of the city to these two main 
groups (negroes and East Indians) has resulted in serious overcrowding in 
city centre areas, and since the late 1950's the overspill began to locate in 
vacant lands adjacent to the city. Also, because of inner city overcrowding 
there was a substantial amount of relocation by upper and middle classes to 
low density suburban areas. Overcrowded areas in the city quickly took on 
slum characteristics and continued to deteriorate. Migrants who were 
unable to find cheap housing in the city moved to the adjacent rurban areas. 
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Because most of the country's industrial and manufacturing (apart from sugar, 
bauxite and rice) commerce and administrative activities were located in 
Georgetown there was considerable commuting to the city. 
Area 2. East Bank of Demerara As Map iv in Appendix shows, settlement 
in this area is of the ribbon type and extends from the suburbs of Georgetown 
to Timehri. The population is mixed, with East Indians being the most 
populous group (63% in 1970). The major economic activity is wage 
employment in processing and manufacturing industries in the area and 
small scale agriculture. There is also considerable commuting to the city 
for reasons of employment and commerce. In relation to other rurban and 
rural areas this area has the greatest employment opportunities. 
Area 3. East Coast Demerara Settlement in a ribbon fashion stretches 
for some 40 miles along the Atlantic sea coast. The areas immediate to 
Georgetown can be described as rurban while those furthest away are rural, 
with agriculture (mixed farming) as the principal economic activity. This 
area is also an old plantation zone. Much of the population in the central 
area is employed in the two large sugar estates located there. As in 
East Bank, there is also a considerable amount of daily commuting to 
Georgetown for employment etc. In 1970 East Indians comprised 62% of the 
population, while Africans were less than a-third. 
Area 4. West Demerara This area includes both the West Bank and 
Coast of Demerara. The pattern of settlement is the same as in East Coast 
or East Bank of Demerara. 70% of the population in 1970 were East Indians 
who were principally rice and vegetable farmers or sugar estate workers. 
There is also a substantial amount of daily commuting to Georgetown. 
Area 5. Upper Demerara River This is the riverain interior region of 
Demerara. Approximately 83% of its population in 1970 was concentrated 
in the mining township of Linden. The remainder of the population is 
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scattered in riverain settlements or located along the main Georgetown/Linden 
Highway. Nearly 90% of the population are Africans or of mixed stock. Like 
Georgetown, Linden town, which tends to be used interchangeably with 
Upper Demerara River since it contains the vast majority of the population, 
suffers from overcrowding which has resulted in unplanned 'sprawls' and 
slums. 
Area 6. West Berbice Settlement here is of the same ribbon type. 
East Indians account for a little over 60% of the population, while Africans 
were just about one third in 1970. Because of its location between 40 and 65 
miles from Georgetown, there is little daily commuting to Georgetown. 
Rice farming and estate employment are the main economic activities. 
Area 7. New Amsterdam This is an old urban settlement that has, more 
or less, been dormant over recent years. Compared with the suburbs of 
Georgetown with 33% growth or Linden with a 53% increase in the 1960-70 
decade, New Amsterdam increased by only 26.5% over the period. It is 
generally known as the administrative centre of the county of Berbice - and 
as such 'office' employment features heavily along with some commerce. 
Africans and persons of mixed descent account for 65% of the total population. 
Area 8. Rest of Berbice Except for Georgetown this is, demographically, 
the largest area in the country. It contains one fifth of the entire country's 
population and more than one quarter of all rural persons. Settlement is 
limited to a narrow strip along the main roadway and isolated villages in the 
Berbice Canje and Corentyne riverain areas. By far the majority of the 
population are East Indians (86% in 1970). The major employment activities 
in this area are rice farming and sugar estate employment. In relation to 
other agricultural areas, i. e. West Berbice and Essequibo, this region has 
tended to be more developed with better employment and related opportunities. 
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Area 9. Essequibo Coast Although only between 40-70 miles from 
Georgetown, this is the most isolated of the coastal regions because of the 
two river systems, the Demerara and Essequibo, which separate it from 
Georgetown. It is generally regarded as having the lowest rate of develop- 
ment and services. In 1970 East Indians comprised approximately 65% of the 
population. Major economic activities along this coast are primarily in rice 
and vegetable farming. Since the end of the 1960's there has been a small 
amount of seasonal commuting to West Demerara for employment on sugar 
estates. 
Area 10. Interior Districts Three areas comprise this district: the 
North-West Region, Mazaruni-Potaro and Rupun_uni. Amerindians comprised 
over 6070 of the total population in 1970. The other main group, Africans 
and Mixed, were approximately one third of the population. This is the 
furthest region from Georgetown and is accessible only by river, as in the 
case of the North West Region, and mainly by air for Rupumuni. The 
Mazarumi-Potaro region can be reached by interior roads and trails. The 
principal activities are subsistence farming and some cash cropping in the 
North West; mining in the Mazaruni-Potaro; and cattle ranching and subsis- 
tence agriculture in the Rupununi. 
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APPENDIX II MAPS I-IV 
MAP I GUYANA 
GENERAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY -j 
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TABLE 1 East Indian Infant Mortality Rate 1939-1960 
Year Infant Mortality 






Source: F. Sukdeo, 1973, Malaria Eradication and 
Population Growth, op cit, Table 6, p 21. 
TABLE 2 Proportion of Women of all Conjugal Conditions who 
Reached Motherhood by Age and Ethnic Group 19b6 




All Other Groups 
Below All 
19 19-23 23+ Ages 
20.1 29.8 30.4 80.3 
43.7 28.8 16.7 89.2 




Source: ibid, Table 11, p 31. 
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TABLE 3 Population of Guyana by Age Group 1946,1960,1970 
Percentage of Population 1 Age Group Population in Age Group 
1946 1960 1970 1946 1960 1970 
All ages 369,678 560,330 699,848 100 100 100 
0-4 51,982 98,177 110,640 
5-9 46,634 90,948 118,512 
10-14 40,798 70,103 100,593 37.7 46.2 47.1 
15-19 36,387 51,884 79,383 
20-24 32,247 42,157 56,635 
25-29 26,504 35,959 39,759 
30--34 26,354 32,458 33,467 
35-39 22,435 29,003 31,764 
40-44 21,040 23,767 28,262 (44,6) (38.4) (38.4) 
45-49 17,835 22,774 24,611 
50-54 12,733 18,015 20,037 
55-59 11,138 15,098 18,271 
60-64 8,841 11,177 12,809 58.3 50.4 49.3 
65-i- 14,751 18,810 25,104 4.0 3.4 3.6 
1Population 
at Census date, usually in April of the Census year. 
Source: Population Census 1970, Summary Tables, Statistical Bureau, 
Ministry of Econ Dev, Georgetown. 
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TABLE 4 Net Population Increase and Migration1 
Year Mid-Year Natural Net Net Migration 
Population Increase Increase Change 
1960 563,785 
1961 584,514 19,533 20,729 + 1,196 
1962 600,393 19,921 15,879 - 4,042 
1963 616,680 19,446 16,287 - 3,159 
1964 629,892 19,268 13,212 - 6, o56 
1965 643,041 19,140 13,149 - 5,991 
1966 658,589 18,237 15,548 - 2,689 
1967 674,196 18,256 15,607 - 2,649 
1968 686,158 18,111 11,962 - 6,149 
1969 694,305 16,982 8,147 - 8,835 
1970 701,940 18,895 7,635 -11,260 
1971 711,498 19,708 12,342 - 7,366 
1972 724,058 20,056 12,560 - 7,496 
1973 736,840 20,410 12,782 - 7,628 
1974 753,787 20,770 16,947 - 3,823 
1975 766,187 17,753 12,400 - 5,353 
TOTAL - 286,486 205,186 81,300 
Annual 




Sources: 1.1960-1970: IINDP/Govt of Guyana, Urban and Regional 
Planning Project, National Physical Dev Strategy. 
1977, Background Study - 2. Population, Table 20, p 32. 
2. Own calculation from Population Statistics 
(unpublished) of the Statistical Bureau, Ministry of 
Econ Dev. 
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TABLE 5 SHOWING LOCATION OF THE TWO MAIN ETHNIC GROUPS BY 
MAJOR URBAN AND RURAL RHEAS 1970 
Proportion of Ethnic Major Area Total Composition of Population 
EAST 
Urban AFRICANS INDIANS OTHER 
Georgetown 100 50 25 
New Amsterdam 100 52 23 25 
Linden (U. D. R. ) 100 71 7 22 
Average Urban 58 18 24 
Rural 
East Bank Dem. 100 28 63 9 
East Coast Dem. 100 30 63 7 
West Damerara 100 22 73 5 
West Berbice 100 32 63 5 
Rest Berbice 100 13 86 1 
Essequibo Coast 100 18 65 17 
Interior Districts 100 15 5 80 
Avera Rural 23 60 17 
Source: Population Census Reports 1970. 
The population of Linden Town is more than 80'o of the 
population of U. D. R. - Upper Demerara River. Since it is 
not possible to obtain exact percentages (figares) for 
Linden, that of U. D. R. is a useful approximation. 
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TABLE 6 INTERNAL MIGRANTS TO PLACE OF RESIDENCE BY EDUCATIONAL 

























100 66.5 23.1 1.4 3.2 5.8 
Suburbs of 100 68.4 20.1 1.1 4.0 6.4 Georgetown 
East Bank Dem 100 73.1 9.5 "3 3.2 13.9 
East Coast 
Dem. 100 72.6 10.7 .6 2.7 13.4 
West Demerara 100 71.8 8.3 .2 2.7 17.0 
Upper Dem. 
River 100 77.9 11.7 "4 4.4 5.6 
West Berbice 100 75.1 7.3 .3 3.0 14.3 
New Amsterdam 100 69.9 17.4 .8 3.0 8.9 
Rest of 100 75.0 8.3 .1 1.7 14.9 Berbice 
Essequibo 100 77.8 4.8 .1 1.7 15.6 Coast & Is. 
Interior 100 74.6 11.7 .4 2.6 10.7 Districts 
Average % 72.9 12.1 0.5 2.9 11.5 
Source: 1970 Population Census Report, Vol. 5. 
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TABLE 7 INTERNAL EIGRANTS BY NUMBER OF MOVES TO PLACE OF 
RESIDENCE BY MAJOR AREAS 1970 
Place of Residence Number of Moves % 
Total One Two Three Four Five 
or 
More 
City of Georgetown 100 80.2 17.5 1.5 .5 "3 
Suburbs of Georgetown 100 76.2 19.2 3.2 .9 .5 
East Bank Demerara 100 78.0 19.6 1.9 "4 .1 
East Coast Demerara 100 82.2 15.0 1.8 .6 .4 
West Demerara 100 81.5 15.8 1.8 .L .5 
Upper Demerara River 100 74.3 22.3 2.4 .6 .4 
West Berbice 100 88.2 10.6 .8 .L 0 
New Amsterdam 100 80.7 17.2 1.8 .2 .1 
Rest of Berbice 100 86.5 11.9 1.0 "3 "3 
Essequibo Coast & Is. 100 84.2 13.5 1.5 .3 .5 
Interior Districts 100 65.6 25.8 5.1 1.3 3.2 
Source: 1970 Population Census Report, Vol. 5. 
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TABLE 8 SHOWING TOTAL MIGRANTS BY PERIOD OF ENTRY 
BY MAJOR AREAS 1970 
Both Sexes 
Major Areas Period of Entry 
(By Residence) Pre: 1939- Intercensal Proportion 
1970 Period Arriving 
1961-1970 1961-1970 
City of Georgetown 22,855 13,580 59.4 
Suburbs of Georgetown 53,789 35,058 65.2 
East Bank Demerara 13,385 8,683 64.8 
East Coast Demerara 22,594 14,494 64.2 
West Demerara 19,996 10,290 51.4 
Upper Demerara River 13,485 8,546 63.3 
West Berbice 4,287 2,377 55.5 
New Amsterdam 7,192 3,946 54.9 
Rest of Berbice 27,355 16,989 62.1 
Essequibo Coast & Is. 10,973 6,139 56.0 
Interior Districts 7, J47 5,050 67.8 
TOTAL 203,358 125,152 61.5 
Source: Population Census 1970, Vol 5. 
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TABLE 9 SBDWING MIGRANTS TN TEE POPULATION 1960, AND 1970 BY 
MAJOR AREA OF USUAL RESIDENCE 
Total Proportion % +/- 
Total 1 Migrants in Migrants in in Po alation Population Population 1970 
Major Regions 1960 1970 1960 1970 1960 1970 
City of Georgetown 69571 63184 20240 22855 29.12 36.2 7.1 
Suburbs of 73181 100855 21607 53789 29.5 53.3 23.8 Georgetown 
East Bank Damerara 22771 36600 8743 13385 38.4 36.4 - 1.8 
East Coast of 84798 108403 15954 22594 18.8 20.8 2.0 Demerara 
West Demerara 61089 78309 16205 19996 26.5 25.5 - 1. 
Upper Dem. River 17549 28949 9887 13485 56.3 46.6 - 9.7 
West Berbice 26276 32975 4489 4287 17.1 13.0 - 4.1 
New Amsterdam 13359 17782 6691 7192 50.1 40.5 - 9.6 
Res of Berbice 99768 132468 20543 27355 20.6 20.7 .1 
Essequibo Coast 
& Is. 
44689 57180 9640 10973 21.6 19.2 - 2.4 
Interior Districts 31894 43143 7081 7447 22.2 17.3 - 4.9 
Not Stated 3 - 
TOTAL 544948 699848 
1 
14180 203358 25.9 29.1 3.2 
1. Non Institutional 
2. To nearest decimal place 
Sources 1.1960 Population Census Report, Vol. II, Part A; III, 
Parts A and G. 
2.1970 Population Census Report, Vols. 2 and 5. 
3. Annual Statistical Abstract 1974, Stat. Bureau, Min, of 
Eco. Dev. 1974. 
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TABLE 10 SHOWING TOTAL MIGRANTS ENTERING DURING 1960-1970 
INTERCENSAL PERIOD BY MAJOR REGIONS 
Both Sexes 








City of Georgetown 13,580 8,688 4,892 36.0 
Suburbs of Georgetown 35,058 21,848 13,210 37.7 
East Bank Demerara 8,683 5,260 3,423 39.4 
East Coast Demerara 14,494 9,851 4,643 32.0 
West Demerara 10,290 6,557 3,733 36.3 
Upper Demerara River 8,546 6,023 2,523 29.5 
West Berbice 2,377 1,620 757 31.9 
New Amsterdam 3,946 2,560 1,386 35.1 
Rest of Berbice 16,989 12,890 4,099 24.1 
Essequibo Coast & Is. 6,139 3,480 2,659 43.3 
Interior Districts 5,050 2,440 2,610 51.7 
TOTAL 125,152 81,217 43,935 35.1 
Source: Population Census 1970, Vol. 5. 
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L- 
TABLE 11 COMPARING MIGRAITTS WITH RESIDENT POPULATION BY 
LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED, 1970 
Primary Secondary University Total 
Georgetown 
Resident Population 65.0 32.7 2: 3 100 
Migrants 73.1 25.4 1.5 100 
Suburbs of Georgetown 
Resident Population 72.9 25.2 1.9 100 
Migrants 76.3 22.4 1.3 100 
Source: 1970 Population Census, Vol. 5. 












W 91 9 "I I'll U] Q 
C C h 
. C D C 
Ö" 


















CD P O 
O C W D 0 













































O O O O O O- O O O O O P 
la" 
1 1 1 N N -1 -1 s s 1 
-t -; -l Vl N W N . '. 
D Vt 







s s _l H (D Vl N W 0 W \, O -. 3 co co ON \1O P Ro H 
" o " " o " " " c " " C+ F-" 
co ýl U. ) co W W -. 1 CO W -11 CD 0 
0 
pý -. a co 
s 
s 




0 OD ýO .1 N 
Q7 
HH 
" " " " " " " " " o " (p 
s W Co W -a O\ 4 Vl \0 \Tl W (D in 
F3 Zý al 
N CD 



















VI Un N" 0 
6 6 O 
5" 
















O VL .s cc) s .ý s \O N CD 
to S° 
gb 
8 F' W s s s s W s s N) N) -i R+ r 
Vi. 0 N) -1 0 N) .ý ýD N N co c+ . 
+ 
" " " " " " " " o " " (D O 
OO W W 6 6 14 'f W s O O' R+ ý 
0 
s CO W 7 N Oý 7 \O Vt .ý 
:0 
" " " " " " . . " " O 





y s -1 0 
" 
N) N) \TL W 0 CD 
O 
s 














- 201 - 
TABLE 13 IN-MIGRANTS TO GEORGETOWN BY PLACE OF BIRTH, OUT-MIGRATION 
TO PLACE OF RESIDENCE AND NET E IGRATION, 1970 
Place of Birth 
Place of Residence Migration 
In Out Net +- 
East Bank Demerara 2,527 4,025 - 1,498 
East Coast Demerara 11,845 5,510 6,335 
West Demerara 7,658 2,698 4,960 
Upper Demerara River 2,389 3,422 - 1,033 
West Berbice 2,767 469 2,298 
New Amsterdam 3,533 1,056 2,477 
Rest of Berbice 5,883 1,359 4,524 
Essequibo Coast & Is. 7,561 963 6,598 
Interior Districts 2,797 1,629 1,168 
TOTAL 46,960 21,131 25,829 
Source: Population Census 1970, Vol. 5. 
TABLE 1L IN-MIGRANTS TO EAST BANK DEMERARA BY PLACE OF BIRTH, 
OUT-T4IGRATION TO PLACE OF RESIDENCE AND NET NIGRATIONi__1 0 
Place of Birth 
Place of Residence Migration 
In Out Net +- 
Georgetown 4,025 2,527 1,498 
East Coast Demerara 2,656 984 1,672 
West Demerara 2,843 1,250 1,593 
Upper Demerara River 902 480 422 
West Berbice 354 112 242 
New Amsterdam 218 78 140 
Rest of Berbice 705 374 331 
Essequibo Coast & Is. 1,395 310 1,875 
Interior Districts 287 185 102 
TOTAL 13,385 6,300 7,085 
Source: op cit 
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TABLE 15 IN-MIGRANT'S TO EAST COAST DEMERARA BY PLACE OF BIRTH, 
OUT-MIGRATION TO PLACE OF RESIDENCE AND NET MIGRATION, 1970 
Place of Birth 
Place of Residence Migration 
In Out Net +- 
Georgetown 5,510 11,835 - 6,325 
East Bank Demerara . 984 2,656 - 1,672 
West Demerara 1,936 2,814. - 908 
Upper Demerara River 627 2, L50 - 1,823 
West Berbice 1,537 1,377 160 
New Amsterdam 421 580 - 159 
Rest of Berbice 1,750 2,674 - 924 
Essequibo Coast & Is. 1,042 640 402 
Interior Districts 314. 1,057 - 713 
TOTAL 14,151 26,123 -11,972 
Source: op cit 
TABLE 16 IN-MIGRANTS TO WEST DFV'MRARA BY PLACE OF BIRTH, 
OUT -MIGRATION TO PLACE OF RESIDENCE AND NET MIGRATION, 1970 
Place of Birth 
Place of Residence Migration 
In Out Net +- 
Georgetown 2,698 7,658 - 4,960 
East Bank Demerara 1,250 2,843 - 1,593 
East Coast Demerara 2,844 1,936 908 
Upper Demerara River 422 1,382 - 960 
West Berbice 363 181 182 
New Amsterdam 230 260 - 30 
Rest of Berbice 914 813 101 
Essequibo Coast & Is. 3,200 2,094 1,106 
Interior Districts 387 717 - 330 
TOTAL 12,308 17,884 - 51576 
Source: op cit 
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TABLE 17 IN-MIGRANTS TO UPPER DENERARA RIVER BY PLACE OF BIRTH, 
OUT-MIGRATION TO PLACE OF RESIDENCE AND NET MIGRATION, 1970 
Place of Birth 
Place of Residence Migration 
In Out Net -t- - 
Georgetown 3,422 2,389 1,033 
East Bank Demerara 480 902 - 422 
East Coast Demerara 2,450 627 1,823 
West Demerara 1,382 422 960 
West Berbice 1,892 158 1,734 
New Amsterdam 706 91 615 
Rest of Berbice 1,473 221 1,252 
Essequibo Coast & Is. 1,243 155 1,088 
Interior Districts 437 320 117 
TOTAL 13,485 5,285 8,200 
Source: op cit 
TABLE 18 IN-MIGRANTS TO WEST BERBICE BY PLACE OF BIRTH, 
OUT-MIGRATION TO PLACE OF RESIDENCE AND NET MIGRATION, 1970 
Place of Birth 
Place of Residence Migration 
In Out Net +- 
Georgetown 469 2,767 - 2,298 
East Bank Demerara 112 354 - 242 
East Coast Demerara 1,377 1,537 - 160 
West Demerara 181 363 - 182 
Upper Demerara River 158 1,892 - 1,734 
New Amsterdam 289 1,110 - 821 
Rest of Berbice 1,533 2,385 - 852 
Essequibo Coast & Is. 120 111 9 
Interior Districts 48 305 - 257 
TOTAL L., 287 10,824 - 6,537 
Source: op cit 
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TA13LE 19 IN-MIGRANTS TO NEW AMSTERDAM BY PLACE OF BIRTH. 
OUT-MIGRATION TO PLACE OP RESIDENCE AND NET MIGRATION, 1970 
Place of Birth 
Place of Residence Ni tion 
In Out Net +- 
Georgetowm 1,056 3,533 - 2,477 
East Bank Demerara 78 218 - 140 
East Coast Demerara 588 421 159 
West Demerara 260 230 30 
Upper Demerara River 91 706 - 615 
West Berbice 1,110 289 821 
Rest of Berbice 3,734 1,649 2,085 
Essequibo Coast & Is. 202 88 114 
Interior Districts 81 202 - 121 
TOTAL 7,192 7,333 - 141 
Source: op cit 
TABLE 20 IN-MIGRANTS TO REST OF BERBICE BY PLACE OF BIRTH, 
OUT-MIGRATION TO PLACE OF RESIDENCE AND NET MIGRATION, 1970 
Place of Birth 
Place of Residence Ni ation 
In out Net +- 
Georgetown 1,354 5,883 - 14,529 
East Bank Demerara 374 705 - 331 
East Coast Demerara 2,674 1,750 924 
West Demerara 813 914 - 101 
Upper Demerara River 221 1,473 - 1,252 
West Berbice 2,385 1,533 852 
New Amsterdam 1,646 3,734 - 2,088 
Essequibo Coast & Is. 519 330 219 
Interior Districts 190 435 - 245 
TOTAL, 10,206 16,761 - 6,555 
Source: op cit 
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TABLE 21 IN-NLIGRATION TO ESSEQUIBO COAST AND ISLANDS BY PLACE OF BIRTH, 
OUT-MIGRATION TO PLACE OF RESIDENCE AND NET MIGRATION, 1970 
Place of Birth 
Place of Residence Migration 
In Out Net +- 
Georgetown 963 7,561 - 6,598 
East Bank Demerara 310 1,395 - 1,085 
East Coast Demerara 640 1,0)2 - 402 
West Demerara 2,094 3,200 - 1,106 
Upper Demerara River 155 1,243 - 1,088 
West Berbice 111 120 9 
New Amsterdam 88 202 - 114 
Rest of Berbice 330 549 - 219 
Interior Districts 782 1,887 - 1,105 
TOTAL 5,473 17,199 -11,726 
Source: op cit 
TABLE 22 IN-MIGRATION TO INTERIOR DISTRICTS BY PLACE OF BIRTH, 
OUT-MIGRATION TO PLAGTE OF RESIDENCE AND NET MIGRATION, 1970 
Place of Birth 
Place of Residence Migration 
In Out Net +- 
Georgetown 1,629 
. 
2,797 - 1,168 
East Bank Demerara 185 287 - 102 
East Coast Demerara 1,057 314 713 
West Demerara 717 387 330 
Upper Demerara River 320 437 - 117 
West Berbice 305 48 257 
New Amsterdam 202 81 121 
Rest of Berbice 439 190 249 
Essequibo Coast & Is. 1,887 782 1,105 
TOTAL 6,741 5,353 1,388 
Source: op cit 
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TABLE 23 Guyana - Govemment Investment in Agriculture 1954-1976 
Year Level of Investment (G Sj 
Total 3 Agriculture Agriculture as Public Sector Sector a Percentage 
of Total 
1954-59 108.3 33.0 31 
1960-64 82.3 29.5 36 
1965 16.4 3.5 15 
1966 26.3 6.5 24 
1967 27.2 6.4 24 
1968 32.0 5.5 17 
1969 - - - 
*19702 52.1 7.6 15 
1971 55.8 15.2 27 
1972 60.6 17.8 29 
1973 85.0 17.7 21 
1974 103.9 12.8 12 
1975 258.3 35.1 14 
1976 312.4 24.2 8 
Sources: 1.1954-1968 IBRD/IDA Current Economic Position and 
Prospects of Guyana, Vol II Agriculture, Appendix, 
Table 24 
2.1970-1976 Ministry of Finance 
3. Excludes compensation for Nationalisation, 107.6 million 
dollars to DEM A in 1971,22.3 million to Reynolds in 
1975, and 10.3 million to Bookers Ltd in 1976. 
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per Acre of 
140 Bags 
(1911) (38,000) - - 
1946 100,763 64,472 17.1 
1948 93,189 59,780 17.1 
1950 103,016 61,743 16.0 
1952 `127,500 74,120 *15.5 
1954 x143,000 88,562 x16.0 
1956 136,000 78,500 15.4 
1958 183,326 100,519 14.6 
1960 220,207 126,153 15.3 
1962 245,973 129,924 14.1 
1964 311,417 155,926 13.4 
1966 308,395 159,408 1207 
1968 313,135 136,690 10.7 
1970 294,280 142,285 11.9 
1972 196,270 94,107 11.8 
1974 261,180 163,000 14.8 
1976 - 109,000 - 
1978 - 180,000 - 
1979 - 142,000 - 
*estimated 
Sources: 1. IBRD/ADA (Central America and Caribbean Dept), 
Current Economic Position and Prospects of Guyana, 
Vol II Agriculture, Appendix Table 3 
2. Ministry of Agriculture, Resource Development and 
Planning, Georgetoi. rn. 
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